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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists in two chapters. In the first chapter I collected and digitized
historical tax records from the Spanish colonial regime in Ecuador to estimate the
long-run effects of a forced labor institution called concertaje on today’s economic
performance. This institution allowed landlords to retain indigenous workers due
to unpaid debts, and forced them to work as peasants in rural estates known as
haciendas. In order to identify the causal effects of concertaje, I exploit variation
in its intensity caused by differences in labor requirements from the crops a region
could grow. I first report that an increase in 10 percentage points in concertaje rates
is associated with a 6 percentage points increase in contemporary poverty. I then
explore several channels of persistence. Districts with higher concertaje rates have
been historically associated with higher illiteracy rates, lower school enrollment, and
populations with fewer years of education. I also report that concertaje is associated
with a higher fraction of people working nowadays in the agricultural sector.
In the second chapter I use administrative data on the ownership, management,
and taxes for the universe of all firms in Ecuador to study the role of family manage-
ment in firm dynamics and its implications for aggregate productivity. A novel finding
I document is that family-managed firms grow half as quickly as externally-managed
firms. This growth differential implies that family-managed firms account for half
of employment, despite comprising 80% of firms. I construct a general equilibrium
model of firm dynamics that is consistent with these facts. Entrepreneurs choose
whether to utilize family members as managers or hire external managers. External
managers allow firms to scale up production, but their efficiency is a affected due to
contractual frictions. Changes in the contractual environment that lead to a drop in
the presence of family-managed firms by half could increase output on the order of
6%, as firms that abandon family management enjoy rapid growth.
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Chapter 1
ATTACHED ONCE, ATTACHED FOREVER: THE PERSISTENT EFFECTS OF
CONCERTAJE IN ECUADOR
1.1 Introduction
A major, yet open question in economics is why some regions are poorer than others.
Although no consensus has emerged, a recent literature has focused on economic in-
stitutions as a key element in explaining contemporary development (Acemoglu et al.
(2005)). Notably, this research agenda has placed special attention to the role of his-
torical institutions in shaping modern ones and consequently, economic development.
Explaining development through the lens of this theory demands to answer why some
regions developed different institutions than others, but more important, to unfold
the mechanisms by which they shaped long-run economic growth.
However, considering that the set of institutions that promote growth is poten-
tially ample, it is difficult to point out directly what are the most immediate mecha-
nisms that explain its long-run and persistent effects. Moreover, the identification of
those mechanisms is challenging in a cross-country setting due to presence of several
confounding factors. Nevertheless, the variation of historical institutions within a
country could potentially address this difficulty by creating a more comparable setup
to identify both its effects on contemporaneous development as well as its persistence
channels.
Along these lines, this paper focuses on a specific forced labor institution created
by the Spanish in the Ecuadorian highlands named concertaje. This institution forced
indigenous workers to provide labor to landlords to pay off past debts. Because
1
indebted workers were usually unable to pay their obligations, this situation implied
a lifetime of service to the rural estates (haciendas) where they worked. Additionally,
this condition was transmitted over generations via inherited debt. These mechanisms
allow the institution to persist for a long period of time. Concertaje was legally
abolished in 1918, but survived through other forms of forced-labor relations until
1964.
Although I focus on the Ecuadorian case, concertaje is not very different from
other types of forced labor relations in Latin American countries1. Furthermore,
forced labor has been one of the most common labor relations through history (Ace-
moglu and Wolitzky (2011)). However, empirical evidence about the effects of forced
labor systems is scarce due to data limitations. I circumvent this challenge by col-
lecting and digitizing more than 2000 pages of historical tax records from the Spanish
colonial regime around 1800 to construct a unique dataset of free and hacienda work-
ers, covering nearly all the colonial districts in the Ecuadorian highlands where the
institution existed.
In order to assess the effects of concertaje on contemporary development, I exploit
the fact that its intensity, measured by the rate of indigenous labor permanently
attached to haciendas, varied across colonial districts. I identify a causal relation
guided by the Ecuadorian historiography and the well known hypothesis that natural
endowments influenced the formation of forced labor institutions (Engerman and
Sokoloff (1997)). Due to the peculiar characteristics of the Ecuadorian highlands,
there are non-negligible variations both in crop suitability and productivity even
1The conciertos of Ecuador are comparable to terrazgueros in Colombia, inquilinos in Chile,
yanacunas in Peru or colonos in Bolivia (Oberem (1978)). The system of getting indebt workers
during agricultural activities was also common in Mexico and known as “tienda de raya” (Villegas
(2008)).
2
within short distances. These variations in turn produced different incentives in
landlords to coerce labor.
Data available from the GAEZ-FAO project allow me to compute for each district
the relative productivity of crops with different labor requirements and use it as an
exogenous variation of concertaje. Crucially, crop productivity is computed from esti-
mates of potential yields based on agro-climatic, instead of agro-ecological conditions.
Those agro-climatic conditions are orthogonal to human intervention. Specifically, I
use the relative productivity of maize, a labor-intensive crop characteristic of the
Ecuadorean highlands, to potatoes, as an instrument of the intensity of concertaje.
Both are among the most common crops of the region. I document that on average,
regions where potatoes were relatively more productive to grow than maize coerced
less indigenous labor. Further details of the instrument are discussed below2.
Using contemporary census data, under the instrumental variable framework I find
that an increase in one standard deviation of concertaje around 1800 increased 1990’s
extreme poverty rate of a locality in 15%. These results are conditional on controlling
for geographical variations, and robust to the inclusion of colonial province fixed
effects, distance to capital, or the exclusion of certain regions and colonial province
capitals. Moreover, I also find a negative effect of the institution on satellite night
light intensity, a proxy for economic development (Henderson et al. (2012)). However,
I also report that the effects of concertaje have reduced over time if we use extreme
poverty rates as a measure of economic performance, but remain almost the same
if we consider its impact on average night light intensity. Overall these results are
2Easterly (2007) also employs data from the GAEZ-FAO project to test the causality between
inequality and economic development by using the log of suitability of land for wheat versus sug-
arcane as an instrument of inequality, without studying its direct effect on the formation of forced-
labor institutions. Lagerlo¨f (2005) instead tests the effect of geographic characteristics as a deter-
minant of slave use in the United States.
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consistent with the work of Acemoglu et al. (2012) and Dell (2010) who document
the negative long-run effects of other forced labor institutions in Latin America such
as slavery in Colombia and Peru’s mining mita, respectively, and with the work of
Banerjee and Iyer (2005), who report a negative association between landlord system
and development in India.
I then disentangle the mechanisms behind the detrimental effects of concertaje by
first understanding why the institution itself persisted for so long, even after coloniza-
tion ended. This exercise sheds light on how the intensity of the institution shaped
economic incentives across districts. I document that around 1800 concertaje was
strongly associated with average size of haciendas (measured by employment). That
is, places where concertaje was higher also exhibited, in average, larger haciendas,
implying agriculture was a profitable activity. Furthermore, a hundred of years later,
the total value of land in places where concertaje prevailed was also higher, reflecting
how the value of land was shaped by the number of attached workers. These two
facts suggest that landlords retained workers as a business strategy to both profit
and to maintain the value of their land. However, later in 1960 concertaje started
to be associated with higher illiteracy rates and longer distance from farms to main
roads. Finally, districts with higher rates of concertaje also report nowadays a large
fraction of their workers in the agricultural sector and lower density of road networks.
This sort of reversal of fortune suggests that during the transition from an agrar-
ian economy, concertaje became a major obstacle to development because it created
significant barriers to human capital accumulation and labor mobility. First, the in-
tergenerational transmission of debts gave landlords a tool to retain the offsprings
of conciertos in order to keep a stable labor force. This forced children of hacienda
workers to substitute schooling for early work, which is reflected in the high rates of
illiteracy that predominate in districts where hacienda had a major presence.
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Lastly, due to landlords’ effort to retain workers, concertaje become also a barrier
to labor mobility, specially from agriculture to other economic activities, generating a
possible misallocation of labor. Regions with higher rates of concertaje induced gen-
erations of workers to specialize in agriculture and probably slowed down the process
of structural transformation. This situation could have generated very persistent dis-
tortions in the labor market that in turn could have harmed economic development.
I show a strong relationship between the rates of concertaje around 1800 and the
fraction of individuals working in agriculture nowadays. This suggests that one of the
most important persistence mechanisms of concertaje was the creation of barriers in
the allocation of labor.
Studies that have investigated the historical origins of underdevelopment in the
Americas have stressed the negative association between labor coercion and eco-
nomic development, although through different channels. Notoriously, Engerman
and Sokoloff (1997) hypothesis sees land inequality as the first-order consequence of
labor coercion and the crucial channel that determined long-run economic growth.
Specially because forced labor relations were seemingly more common in large plan-
tations, or haciendas. The authors suggest that higher rates of inequality induced
by forced labor systems hampered the formation of wider, deep markets, so they
failed to create the right incentives to invest in public goods. Instead, Dell (2010)
evidences a negative long-run effect of coercion from the mining mita, but finds a
positive association between haciendas and development for the case of Peru, arguing
that regions which did not contribute labor to the mining mita allowed the expansion
of large landowners, which in turn had secure property rights, and so were more likely
to invest and lobby for public goods.
The negative effects of coercion from haciendas reported in this paper states
doubts about a generalization of Dell’s hypothesis related to the distinct effects of
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coercion coming from mita and haciendas, and rather emphasizes the general negative
effects of all forms of forced labor. Moreover, the empirical results of this paper
provide support to the idea that historical labor coercion, instead of land inequality by
itself, is a key element in explaining contemporary development. Principally because
labor coercion does not have to be necessarily accompanied with land inequality. In
lieu, labor coercion was typically accompanied with education restraints that lowered
the levels of human capital, and subsequent restrictions of labor mobility, which
altogether provide a better explanation of its detrimental effect in the long-run.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section offers a historical background
of haciendas and concertaje. Section 1.3 describes the identification strategy and the
data used. Section 1.4 presents the results for the long-run impact of concertaje on
contemporary poverty. Section 1.5 studies the mechanisms of persistence. Finally,
Section 1.6 concludes.
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1.2 Historical Background
1.2.1 Concertaje
The distribution of indigenous labor in the Ecuadorian highlands during colonial
times was mainly organized via a pre-hispanic system known as mita. The mita was
a system of forced but paid labor which assigned one-fifth of the male population
between the ages of 18 and 55 to work on a specific task for a certain period of time
(Cushner, 1982, p. 119). Its enforcement was mainly in charge of the local chiefs,
who could lose their power or be forced to pay with their own wealth in case the
solicited workers were not supplied (Cushner, 1982, p. 121). Given the absence of
gold and silver mines in the Ecuadorean highlands, the mita was mainly distributed
to landlords for agricultural and textile activities3.
Concerns about their ability to secure a stable labor force led landlords to develop
mechanisms to retain workers (Cushner, 1982, p. 128). The most important one was to
force indigenous workers to get indebted with the hacienda during their mita period.
Once workers were employed by the hacienda, landlords deducted from their wages a
combination of benefits that included a small plot of land to cultivate, the guarantee
to pay their tribute, and advanced provisions of food and clothes. For instance, the
average wage for a worker ranged between 18-25 pesos, but tribute payments averaged
5-6 pesos and the cost of food and clothes charged by the hacienda an additional 5-10
pesos (Andrien, 1995, p. 122). Under this cost structure, it was not very difficult to
make a worker finish the mita period indebted. In fact, it was more an exception,
rather than a rule, that mita workers did not end up indebted at the end of their
3Deposits of precious metals were rapidly depleted during the first colonial years (Andrien,
1995, p. 18). Since many landlords combined in their haciendas both activities (Oberem, 1981,
p. 347), in practice its distinction is not clear.
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turn (Oberem, 1978, p. 314).
Except for the tribute cost, landlords had the power to adjust the extent of the
benefits of their workers in order to retain them. This could be done either by
increasing the provision of food and clothes or by charging higher prices for them.
For instance, the parcel of land provided was small enough so its benefits could not
meet any subsistence requirements, and the prices of food and clothes charged to
workers exceeded those of the market (Oberem, 1978, p. 314-315; Cushner, 1982,
p. 134), while the loss of livestock during shepherding was added directly to their
debt with the hacienda (Andrien, 1995, p. 123). All of the previous strategies point
out mita workers could be easily converted into indebted workers if the landlord
decided to. Indeed, under the typical wage, workers were usually forced to extend
their original contracting period with the hacienda mainly because they could not
afford to pay their debts. An example of this is provided by Cushner (1982, p. 123-
128), who documented the story of an indigenous worker in a jesuit hacienda who
started with a debt of 27 pesos in 1701, and continued to work there for 15 more
years just to end up accumulating a debt of 48 pesos by 1716.
Precisely, the process of attaching a worker to an hacienda created the institution
named concertaje, a system of debt peonage that forced indigenous workers to be
employed for extended periods of time. These hacienda workers, known as conciertos,
were not considered slaves because landlords did not formally own them. However,
the existence of debtor’s prison guaranteed landlords a legal mechanism to retain
them in their haciendas. And because conciertos ’ debt was considered an asset of
the property, it allowed landlords to buy and sell them with the hacienda (Oberem,
1978, p. 310; Baud, 2007, p. 76). Therefore, by holding workers in their properties
landlords not only gained a stable labor force, but also increased the value of their
land.
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1.2.2 Persistence
One of the main features of concertaje was its persistence. Once a worker was
attached to an hacienda, the possibilities to escape were low. Those workers who
tried to abandon the property were chased, and only in a few cases they were not
recaptured. Furthermore, the intent to escape implied not only a harsh punishment,
but also an increase in the amount indebted, since all the costs of prosecution were
charged to the worker (Oberem, 1978, p. 316). In addition, their descendants ended
up sharing the same fate since the debts of the parents were inherited by their children.
Accordingly, many haciendas reported two or three generations of one family living
and working together on the same estate (Alchon, 1991, p. 85). The difficulty to
escape and the intergenerational transmission of debts attached entire generations of
families to haciendas4.
Persistence of the institution during colonial times can be noticed in Table 1.1,
which shows the differences between attached-to-hacienda and free indigenous workers
for two regions, Cayambe and Otavalo, in a similar exercise as Valarezo (2002). It is
clear, as Valarezo notices, that even two centuries later, the percentages of indigenous
workers attached to haciendas had barely changed in each zone: while Otavalo only
had one third of its workers as conciertos, Cayambe had almost 80 percent of them
under that condition.
The same pattern is corroborated using the data I collected. For the colonial
administrations of Ibarra and Otavalo, which have data for the longest span of time,
Figure 1.1 shows the evolution of concertaje from 1785 to 1830. Except for a few
4In 1833 the intergenerational transmission of debt was prohibited, however, it did not elim-
inate the intergenerational transmission of the concierto status, as in many cases children were
forced to obtain a debt when young in order to guarantee their labor supply by the time they be-
came adults (Oberem, 1978, p. 315).
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Table 1.1: Free and Attached Indigenous Workers for Two Regions
Cayambe Otavalo
Year Free Attached to hacienda Free Attached to haciendas
1830 22.4% 77.6% 69.1% 30.9%
1820 25.2% 74.8% 66.5% 33.5%
1805 21.6% 78.4% 62.6% 37.4%
1785 NA NA 56.1% 43.9%
1645/1685 20.7% 79.3% 66.3% 33.7%
Notes: Otavalo includes the colonial districts of San Pablo, Atuntaqui, Cotacachi
and Otavalo, while Cayambe includes the colonial districts of Tabacundo, Tocachi,
Cayambe and Cangagua. Attached to haciendas is the percentage of workers living
in haciendas. Data for 1645/1685 is from Valarezo (2002). See Appendix A for a
detailed explanation of the source of the rest of the data.
districts, the fraction of workers attached to haciendas is relatively stable5. Also,
for those towns where we can observe its concertaje rates for at least two periods,
Figure 1.2 shows the correlation between concertaje in period t with its immediate
predecessor, in t − 1. With the exception of a few outliers, the correlation is very
strong, altogether suggesting that the institution was very persistent.
Data limitations do not allow us to observe the evolution of concertaje after
Ecuador’s independence, but the system persisted until the twentieth century despite
its several reforms. For instance, in 1918 concertaje was legally abolished via the
5Mira, Pimampiro and Salinas reported to have a significant amount of slaves in the census of
1782, which might explain its substitution with concertaje (Salmoral (1994)).
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Figure 1.1: Concertaje Rates for Different Years
Notes: See Appendix A for a detailed explanation of the source of the concertaje data. The town
of Puntal after 1784 includes the information of the towns Puntal and El Angel.
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Figure 1.2: Correlation Between Concertaje in t and Concertaje in t+ 1
Notes: Sample includes only those towns where Is possible to observe concertaje rates for at least
two periods. See Appendix A for a detailed explanation of the source of the concertaje data.
prohibition of prisons’ debt and the impediment of inheritance of a parent’s debts.
However, once that de jure mechanism to retain indigenous workers disappeared,
landlords continued to coerce them de facto by giving them the right to farm a small
plot of land in an hacienda in return of labor obligations, a variation of concertaje
known as huasipungo (Oberem, 1978, p. 321-322).
Precisely, one way to see the persistence of concertaje is by comparing its pres-
ence during colonial times with information about the huasipungo system 160 years
later. Figure 1.3 shows the correlation between the distribution of concierto and
huasipungo workers across several provinces. As can be seen, the provinces that had
the greater concentration of conciertos circa 1805 continue to show the larger presence
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of huasipungo workers in 1959. Ecuador’s rural workers just witnessed the disappear-
ance of any residuals of concertaje in 1964, when the agrarian reform abolished all
forms of labor coercion. Saying that, it is possible to conclude that concertaje was
one of the most persistent economic institutions in the Ecuadorian highlands.
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Figure 1.3: Relation Between Concertaje and Huasipungo System
Notes: Data about conciertos circa 1805 is from Oberem (1981), except for the provinces of Azuay
and Canar, that comes from the historical tax records of the colonial province of Cuenca, described
in Appendix A. Data about huasupingueros in 1959 comes from Barsky (1984) (p.73). The match be-
tween historical and modern provinces has been done following the criteria explained in Appendix A.
1.3 Labor Requirements and Coercion
In order to study the effect of concertaje on long-run economic development, I use
as an instrument for concertaje the relative productivity of crops that differ on its
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labor intensity. Historical analysis suggest that business considerations determined
the decision of landlords to coerce labor, since debt peonage was also costly (Andrien,
1995, p. 124). However this hypothesis has not been formally tested. In the absence
of profitable activities other than agriculture, the demand for labor was likely to be
directed by the types of crops a region could grow. Anecdotical evidence suggests
that was the case. For instance, the book records of a Jesuit hacienda located in the
town of San Antonio report a high number of indebted workers, as well as a large
production of maize, a labor intensive crop. Conversely, a Jesuit hacienda in the
town of Santa Rosa failed to retain indebted workers, where instead no production of
maize is mentioned (Andrien, 1995, p. 124). This is indicative of the economic motives
behind labor coercion, as the same owners show a different behavior depending on
the natural endowment of the region.
The previous historical observations are also consistent with Engerman and Sokoloff
(1997) hypothesis that initial factor endowments determined the development path
of a region, although their theory pays special attention to large scale plantations as
sugarcane. However, the evidence discussed above suggests that not only did large
scale plantations induced the formation of forced labor institutions, but in general,
plantations with high labor requirements contributed to its existence, a point also
made by Earle (1992).
Therefore, it is expected that haciendas located in regions with natural endow-
ments for crops that require relatively fewer days of attention or are less labor-intense,
such as potatoes or wheat, might not have attached many indigenous workers. On the
other side, regions suitable for crops with high labor requirements such as sugarcane
or maize might have experienced higher rates of concertaje6. In the next section I
6Sugarcane is widely known for being a labor-intensive crop, as it was typical of slave planta-
tions, while maize requires extensive labor demand, specially during the three to four months of
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discuss how I test this hypothesis by estimating the relationship between the relative
potential yield of crops with different labor requirements and concertaje.
1.3.1 Identification Strategy
As suggested before, local endowments seems to have influenced the decision of
landlords to attach labor to their properties by forcing indigenous workers to go into
debt. I test this relationship by running the following regression,
concertajed = γ0 + γ1ratio+ θXd + νd (1.1)
where concertajed is defined as the fraction of workers in colonial town d living in
haciendas relative to the total working population in the district circa 1800. The
variable ratio is the ratio between potential yield of highland maize relative to poten-
tial yield of potatoes, which captures the relative productivity of one crop versus the
other. Then X includes several exogenous characteristics, in particular geographical
ones like elevation, longitude and latitude.
Finally, I use ratio as an instrument for concertaje to quantify its effects on
contemporaneous economic outcomes by running the following regression,
yd = α0 + α1concertajed + βXd + d (1.2)
where, yd is the outcome of interest in district d. All variables are discussed in detail
below.
The instrumental variable framework requires that first, the ratio is correlated
with concertaje, and second, that the ratio must be uncorrelated with other variables
affecting our outcome of interest. While the first assumption is testable via the F
the plowing and tillage period (Andrien, 1995, p. 124), and had an extended crop cycle that lasted
about ten months (Cushner, 1982, p. 73).
15
statistic in the first stage, the second is not. For instance, geographic factors that
influence the suitability of certain crops, like elevation, might also have a direct effect
on economic development. Therefore, the assumption for this case requires that, con-
ditional on other exogenous factors, the suitability of two crops is uncorrelated with
variables affecting the studied outcome. Consequently, I include as many geographi-
cal exogenous controls as possible to separate for any confounding effect of geography
different from the ratio of potential yields. The section below discusses thoroughly
the exogeneity of the proposed instrument.
1.3.2 Data
Crops
Due to the presence of the Andes Mountains and the location of the region near
the Equator, the Ecuadorian highlands have non-negligible climate variations within
short distances (Basile, 1974, p. 19). Those variations are translated into important
differences of potential crops yields. I exploit those variations to predict the distinct
agricultural labor requirements of a district by using spatial data reported by the
GAEZ-FAO project. The GAEZ project provides estimates of potential crop yield
(ton per hectare) at a grid resolution of 5′ × 5′ (approximately 100 km2). Yields of
each crop could be computed for low, medium and high inputs. Moreover, one can
select the source of water supply between rain-fed and irrigation. In the interest of
replicating historical conditions, I selected a combination of low inputs and rain-fed
water supply7.
One important feature of the GAEZ project is that it reports potential (rather
than actual) yields based on agro-climatic conditions, which, as discussed by Galor
and Ozak (2016), are arguably exogenous to human intervention. None of the es-
7Results are robust to the selection of intermediate input and irrigation.
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timates of potential yield reported by the GAEZ project use information on actual
or historical production, but instead, they are based on very detailed models that
incorporate agro-climatic conditions to predict the potential yield of a crop. Climate
characteristics taken into account include, among others, temperature, radiation and
moisture regimes. Further explanation of these data can be found in Nunn and Qian
(2011) and Costinot and Donaldson (2016).
While using the GAEZ data to replicate historical conditions, an implicit assump-
tion is that those conditions have not changed significantly in the last 300 years. The
use of agro-climatic conditions instead of agro-ecological ones mitigates this concern
as it is plausible to argue that the first have not changed drastically in the last cen-
turies. Even if those conditions have somehow been modified, as long as they have
affected more or less equally all crops, those concerns should be minor as I focus on
the relative productivity of crops, instead of the absolute one. Therefore I assume
that any effect of climate change has not been big enough to reverse the comparative
advantage of one crop to another.
The crops I focus in this paper, and reported in the GAEZ project, are maize
and potatoes8, which represented some of the most important crops of the region
(Cushner, 1982, p. 72). In order to compute the relative productivity of two crops
in a district, I first compute the average potential yield of each crop using geospatial
software. Formally, the relative productivity of two crops in a region d is,
zd =
y¯id
y¯jd
, i 6= j, i ∈ {maize}, j ∈ {potato} (1.3)
where, y¯id is the average potential yield of crop i in region d
9. For the results pre-
8In particular, I use highland maize and the corresponding variation of maize that grows in
the region.
9To avoid problems relative to places where a crop is not suitable at all, I follow a strategy
similar to Easterly (2007) and add a constant (1) to the average potential yields and finally divide
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sented below, I focus on the ratio of maize relative to potatoes, although results are
similar if I use wheat instead of potatoes. Additional technical details are discussed
in Appendix A.
Relative agro-climatic productivity is plausibly exogenous, however, one concern
of using this instrument is that it might be capturing other effect instead of the
institution itself. For instance, differences in crop suitability might reflect instead
differences in caloric diet, which might have a direct effect on workers’ productivity.
While possible, this statement requires that one crop substantially outperforms the
other in caloric terms. But maize and potato are both high-calorie food sources
(US Department of Agriculture (2016)10). Moreover, the ubiquity of both crops in
the Ecuadorian highlands allowed most regions to produce both crops, although in
some places it was more suitable to produce one of them.
Differences in crop productivity may also have created differences in population,
which could have lead to differences in economic organization. Figure 1.4 shows the
relationship between tributary population around 1600 and the proposed instrument,
namely, Maize to Potato productivity. As one can notice, there is no clear relation
between the relative productivity of both crops and the size of tributary population
at the beginning of colonial times. Although this result should be taken with caution,
since early data for population is of low quality (Tabla Ducasse (1980)), it nonetheless
is indicative of the initial conditions of the region.
A final concern is that differences in relative productivity between crops may be
capturing differences in other geographic features that might have a direct impact on
economic development. Hence, in order to distinguish for any other confounding fac-
one by the other to obtain a ratio.
10Using wheat instead potatoes, which has almost the same amount of calories than maize,
produce very similar results.
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Figure 1.4: Population (1600) vs Maize to Potato Productivity.
Notes: See Appendix A for a detailed explanation of the source of the population data. Maize to
Potato is computed as explained in Equation 1.3.
tor, I control for a comprehensive set of exogenous variables, which include elevation,
latitude and longitude. All geographic variables are discussed below.
Concertaje
The data of concertaje come mainly from colonial tax records. Spanish authorities
typically collected taxes by visiting each town twice a year and reported the individual
taxes paid by every indigenous worker from 18 to 55 years old11 (Villegas (2008)).
Each of these records were filed in separate books organized by tax administrations or
11Taxes were paid in “San Juan” (June) and “Navidad” (December). Women, people with dis-
abilities and the elderly were exempted of tribute.
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colonial provinces. Some of those books are lost, but others are located in the National
Archive of History in Ecuador. I collected at least one tax record from 9 of the 10 tax
administrations that comprised the Ecuadorian Highlands. These records correspond
to the years 1780-1830, the last period of the colonial administration and the first
years after independence, when concertaje was already a consolidated system12.
Every book clearly distinguishes between free workers and those living in hacien-
das, and they were usually organized as follows. First, authorities reported a list of
the names of free workers and then, described the workforce of each hacienda. Hence,
records show for each hacienda in the town the name of the owner, the names of the
indigenous workers living there and the tax paid. The tax paid did not differ between
free and hacienda workers. I digitize those records and compute at a town level how
many free and attached workers lived at the time, as well as the number of haciendas.
Figures 1.5, 1.6 and 1.7 are examples of how the tax books look like.
Historians as Tyrer (1988) have used some of these records to report aggregate
rates of concertaje, but never reported a full list of the rates at the town level. A
notable exception is Oberem (1981), who reported a partial list of the concertaje rates
of 1805 at a town level, but only for those with the three highest and lowest rates at
each tax administration, and using a different source that seems to be lost. I included
that information in my dataset to complement it and have a comprehensive database
for almost all the colonial districts of the time. Poloni (2006) also reported a list of
the concertaje rates for the tax administration of Cuenca, although he used the same
source as I do.
Tyrer (1988) mentions that the quality of the data is better for earlier years, since
there were stronger incentives to know the real number of workers, as well as their
12The region gained its independence in 1822 and became part of The Gran Colombia until
1830 when it separated and named Ecuador.
20
exact location. The availability of books for some years allowed me to observe if
there were dramatic differences in the number of workers and rates from year to year.
Overall, as discussed in Section 1.2, the concertaje rates are similar over time, but
seem to be higher for earlier years. Some of the differences in the concertaje rates
seems to reflect the fact that officers collected taxes seasonally, and sometimes deferred
its collection for the next visit13. In those cases where I observe the town for several
years, I select the earliest source of data, following the observation of Tyrer (1988),
but results are generally robust to this selection. This is also important because some
of the books overlap with the independence wars, which might have affected the tax
reports. Nevertheless, in some specifications I also include as a regressor the decade
from which concertaje information was taken, to control for any time discrepancies
in the quality of data or trends. Details about the source of every book and data
selection can be found in Appendix A.
Since colonial data is organized at a town level and modern outcomes are ag-
gregated at a district (parish) level, I matched concertaje data with contemporary
outcomes mainly by comparing the names of modern districts with those reported in
the tax books. Except for very few of them, almost all modern districts retain their
colonial town name. This matching process leaves a sample of 127 modern districts.
Further details about the matching are discussed in Appendix A. As mentioned in the
introduction, almost all the districts studied in this paper belong to the Ecuadorian
highlands, since the phenomena of concertaje was almost exclusive to this region14.
Figure 1.8 shows a map of the studied region, the location of each tax administration,
and displays the intensity of concertaje in each district.
13Tax records show plenty of cases where an indigenous worker pays the tribute for an old pe-
riod.
14Data from population census reported by Salmoral (1994) at the end of the colony shows that
population was heavily concentrated in the highlands.
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Figure 1.5: Example of the Cover of a Book of Tax Records
Notes: Contribution of the indigenous workers from the province of Riobamba, year 1812. See
Appendix A for a detailed explanation of the source of this book.
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Figure 1.6: Example of the Description of the Tax Records
Notes: ... Town: Payments by indigenous workers ... free and in Haciendas. From the book of
Ibarra, year 1784.See Appendix A for a detailed explanation of the source of of this book.
Figure 1.7: Example of the Tax Payments
Notes:Hacienda 20 ...: owned by ... with the following workers ... tax payment. From the book of
Riobamba, year 1812. See Appendix A for a detailed explanation of the source of of this book.
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Figure 1.8: Map of the Studied Region with Its Colonial Tax Administrations
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Geographic variables
Data of geographic controls are obtained by using geospatial software and GIS files
reported by the Geographical Military Institute of Ecuador. For instance, the coordi-
nates of towns (latitude and longitude) are recovered from a GIS file that contains the
point-location of all modern districts in Ecuador. To compute elevation and slope,
I overlay a map of Ecuador’s parishes on 30 arc second (1 km) resolution elevation
data produced by NASA’s Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (National Aeronautics
and Space Administration and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (2010)).
Further details about geographical variables are provided in Appendix A.
Contemporary outcomes
Data for contemporaneous economic outcomes is obtained through the national Ecuado-
rian census, which is conducted every 10 years and includes information disaggregated
at the district level. The principal variable I use to measure today’s economic devel-
opment at the district level is a poverty index called Unsatisfied Basic Needs (Necesi-
dades Basicas Insatisfechas in Spanish) which is commonly reported in the census
and used in several Latin American countries. In order to be considered as poor
under that definition, a household should satisfy one of the following criteria.
1. Dirt floor or the house is made of precarious building materials
2. Lack of running water, sewers or toilets
3. Number of people per bedroom is greater than 3
4. Children between 7 and 11 years old do not attend school
5. Head of the household has less than fourth grade education and has more than
three dependents
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If a household satisfies two or more of the conditions above it is considered as ex-
tremely poor. The variable used is then the fraction of households in a district
considered extremely poor. Other variables obtained from the census and used later
to explore the channels of persistence include illiteracy, average years of school, sec-
ondary enrollment and sectoral composition. Summary statistics for all the variables
discussed above are presented in Table 1.2.
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics
Mean S.D p10 p90
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Concertaje 43.41 23.86 13.38 76.92
Maize/Potato 0.40 0.19 0.21 0.69
Altitude 25.73 4.67 19.06 30.84
Extreme Poverty (1990) 60.32 18.58 33.30 85.90
Night Light Intensity (1992) 4.91 7.36 0.00 14.02
Illiteracy (1960) 42.36 16.90 24.10 68.59
Functional Illiteracy (1990) 36.85 15.42 17.50 60.60
Years of School (1990) 5.48 1.95 3.00 8.30
Secondary School Enrollment (1990) 57.58 14.03 39.10 75.60
Notes: Concertaje is the percentage of workers living in haciendas circa 1800. Maize/Potato is the relative pro-
ductivity of maize respect to potatoes as described in Equation (1.3). Altitude (hundreds) is the elevation in m2 of
the district’s capital. Extreme Poverty (1990) is the percentage of population living in Extreme Poverty as defined
in Section 1.3.2. Illiteracy (1990) is the percentage of population above 15 years who can’t write or read. Func-
tional Illiteracy (1990) is the percentage of population above 15 years with 3 or less years of education. Years of
School (1990) is the average years of education of the population above 24 years. Secondary School Enrollment
(1990) is the population between 12 and 17 years assisting to secondary school. Night Light Intensity (1992) is the
average night light intensity of a district. Sources for all variables are described in the text.
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1.4 Results
Table 1.3 shows both the OLS and IV estimates of equation (1.2) using as a
dependent variable extreme poverty rates in 1990. First, one can notice that the F
statistic reported in Panel B ranges between 11-20, depending on the specification.
These results suggest a solid first stage, reducing concerns about a weak instrument15.
Table 1.3: IV Results: Extreme Poverty (1990)
Model
Base
fixed effect
Time
Districts
Southern
Without
fixed effect
Province
to Capital
Distance
Capitals
No
(1800)
Indigenous
Fraction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: 2SLS
Concertaje .63*** .74*** .52*** .54** .41** .56*** .66***
(.22) (.25) (.18) (.28) (.18) (.21) (.24)
Panel B: First Stage
Maize/Potato 48.55*** 47.07*** 58.86*** 36.11*** 48.68*** 47.57*** 46.86***
(11.74) (12.16) (12.96) (10.8) (12.59) (12.05) (12.29)
F 17.12 14.98 20.62 11.18 14.95 15.57 14.55
Panel C: OLS
Concertaje .09 .12 .1 .23*** .07 .05 .09
(.08) (.07) (.08) (.08) (.07) (.07) (.09)
Geo. Controls Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Time Controls No Yes No No No No No
Province fixed effect No No No Yes No No No
Observations 126 126 110 126 126 119 112
Mean Dep. Var. 60.32 60.32 59.7 60.32 60.32 62.05 58.92
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Geographic controls include elevation, latitude and longitude.
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
15I report the F statistic from the Montiel Olea and Pflueger (2013) test, which is robust to the
presence of heteroskedasticity (Pflueger and Wang (2014)).
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The IV coefficient reported in the first column of Panel A suggest that the long-
run effect of concertaje on extreme poverty is around 0.6. The result is statistically
significant, while economically, it suggests that in average, an increase in 25 per-
centage points in the rate of concertaje circa 1800 (almost one standard deviation),
increased extreme poverty in 1990 by 15 percentage points. To put it another way,
this result implies that on average, a district that had all of its workers attached to
haciendas around 1800 nowadays has an extreme poverty rate that is 60 percentage
points higher than a district where concertaje was fully absent.
Column (2) includes as a control a time fixed effect for the decade data was
taken (1780-1830) in order to control for discrepancies in the quality of the data
due to potential changes in the collection of taxes at the end of the colonial period
related with the independence struggle or simply trend effects. As can be seen, the
magnitude of the effect of concertaje increases, although the F statistics is smaller
in part because the time dummies reduce the variation of crops within provinces.
Column (3) excludes the southernmost administration of Loja, which, because of its
remoteness from Quito, was rarely inspected, and taxes were often ten to twenty years
out of date (Newson, 1995, p. 243). Additionally, the region is the only one among the
studied which reported important mining activities (Newson, 1995, p. 237). However,
its exclusion does not change the results fundamentally, although improves the first
stage.
Columns (4)-(7) of Panel A report the estimates when other controls are added.
Overall, the point estimates for the IV coefficients remain close to the base model.
Column (4) includes a colonial province fixed effect in order to capture other time-
invariant unobservables such as historical regional differences, like being located in the
same province as the nation’s capital, or being in a bordering province, but excludes
geographical controls to avoid overfitting the model. More important, since tax books
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were organized by colonial province, adding a fixed effect will help to control for any
systematic misreport in the level of concertaje at a province level. However, the
inclusion of a fixed effect reduces the strength of the first stage relationship, as crop
variation within some provinces is smaller.
Furthermore columns (5)-(6) report the results when I test whether being close to
the capital of the province or excluding the colonial capital districts affect the results.
Although the estimates are smaller, they are still statistically significant. This also
suggests that the estimates are not driven by the inclusion of historically important
administrative centers. Finally, column (7) controls for the fraction of indigenous
population circa 1780 in order to observe if concertaje is actually capturing the effect
of the institution instead of differences in the colonial distribution of indigenous pop-
ulation. The estimates reported are bigger from the previous ones, perhaps reflecting
a direct effect of ethnic distribution, although note that this regression includes less
observations because population data is missing for some districts.
Table 1.4 mimics the estimates presented in Table 1.3, but instead use average
night light intensity of a district as a dependent variable, which has been shown as a
good proxy for income. Hence, it is used as a robustness check for the long-run effects
of concertaje. Night light intensity is obtained from US Air Force weather satellites,
and is available in the National Centers for Environmental Information (National
Geophysical Data Center (2010)). The data is reported as a six-bit digital number
(DN) between 0 (no light) and 63, for every 30 arc-second output pixel. More details
about this data and its relation with income is provided in Henderson et al. (2012).
I use the satellite light data from 1992 (the earliest available), in order to make the
results comparable to those presented in Table 1.3. The estimates suggest that an
increase in 10 percentage points of concertaje in 1990 reduces average night light
intensity in 2 digital numbers (DN). Interpretation of the magnitude of the effects
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has to be taken with certain caution, due to the mapping between light intensity and
income. However, all the IV estimates of Table 1.4 report the expected sign and are
statistically significant.
Table 1.4: IV Results: Night Light Intensity (1992)
Model
Base
fixed effect
Time
Districts
Southern
Without
fixed effect
Province
to Capital
Distance
Capitals
No
(1800)
Indigenous
Fraction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: 2SLS
Concertaje -.2** -.23** -.17** -.21** -.13* -.15* -.25**
(.09) (.11) (.09) (.09) (.08) (.08) (.11)
Panel B: First Stage
Maize/Potato 48.55*** 47.07*** 58.86*** 36.11*** 48.68*** 47.57*** 46.86***
(11.74) (12.16) (12.96) (10.8) (12.59) (12.05) (12.29)
F 17.12 14.98 20.62 11.18 14.95 15.57 14.55
Panel C: OLS
Concertaje -.02 -.02 -.02 -.1*** -.01 0 -.03
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Geo. Controls Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Time Controls No Yes No No No No No
Province fixed effect No No No Yes No No No
Observations 126 126 110 126 126 119 112
Mean Dep. Var. 4.91 4.91 5.46 4.91 4.91 4.43 5.34
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Geographic controls include elevation, latitude and longitude.
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
In all columns from Table 1.3 and 1.4, the IV estimates are larger than the OLS
ones reported in Panel C. One reason why this can occur is measurement error at dif-
ferent levels. First, keep in mind that concertaje data come mainly from tax records
organized at a province or tax administration level from more than 200 hundred years
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ago. Quality of the data might have differed by province, or worse, by town. Even
though the Spanish had an organized system to collect taxes, nothing exempts the
process from include accidental or deliberate misreports since each province had its
own tax collector. One can suspect this is the case given that the OLS estimates
that include province fixed effects are the largest (and statistically significant). More
plausibly, by mixing data different sources, and different years, I could be introducing
measurement error. It could also be the case that there are omitted variables that
explain the process of concertaje. Although historical analysis suggests economic mo-
tives due to differences in types of crops, no ultimate explanation has been accepted.
As a robustness check, I also estimate the effects of the institution on extreme
poverty and average night light intensity for different years in order to understand
if the effect of concertaje has vanished over time. Figures 1.9 and 1.10 show the
estimates of the base model for extreme poverty and average night light intensity
respectively. While the effect of concertaje on extreme poverty appears to be reduced
over time, the effect of concertaje on night light intensity remained almost the same.
Considering the government’s policies to reduce poverty in the last decades, one can
expect that their efforts were more concentrated in those places with higher rates,
some of them historically affected by concertaje. On the other side, the effect on
night light intensity, as a proxy for income, shows a stable pattern, less affected by
the efforts on poverty reduction.
In summary, the estimates reported in this section reveal a long-run and quantita-
tively important effect of concertaje on today’s economic prosperity. These results are
also consistent with the historical narrative of several scholars that have discussed the
pervasive effects of haciendas in the rural workers of Ecuador. For instance, Oberem
(1978) reports that the annual wage of a free agricultural worker, compared to that
of huasipunguero (including the non-pecuniary benefits) was around 80% higher. To
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some extent, these results may not very surprising as coercing labor through forced
debt or granting land usage was a common practice in the region until the agrarian
reform. However, they confirm that the persistence of the institution generated ef-
fects that are reflected in the well being of today’s population. In the next section I
discuss the mechanisms by which concertaje generated its long-run effects.
1.5 Mechanisms
As discussed in Section 1.2.2, concertaje, and its subsequent variations, persisted
for almost two hundred years greatly in part because it gave landlords the means
to retain cheap labor, and to include workers as part of a valuable asset in their
properties. However, given that the incentives to indebt workers were closely linked
to the suitability of certain crops, not all regions developed under the shadows of this
institution. In this section I study the mechanisms that explain how variations in the
incidences of concertaje lead to a divergence in the development paths across regions.
The main argument is that the long-run economic effects of labor coercion are
better understood if they are seen as a barrier to both accumulate human capital and
reallocate labor from agriculture. In that sense, the negative effects of concertaje are
explained because it was profitable for landlords to maintain the system while agricul-
ture was the main economic activity, although by doing so they blocked and neglected
the required investments (like the provision of public school) to develop other eco-
nomic activities and limited workers’ mobility. Precisely because the reallocation of
workers would have supposed a reduction in their economic power.
For instance, Figure 1.11 documents that around 1800 concertaje was strongly
associated with average size of hacienda (measured by employment). That is, places
were concertaje was higher also exhibited, in average, larger haciendas, who usually
are more productive (Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014)). Furthermore, Figure 1.12
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Figure 1.11: Log-hacienda Size (circa 1800) and Concertaje
Notes: See Appendix A for a detailed explanation of the source of the data.
shows that the total value of land in 1900 in those places with higher rates of concertaje
was also higher. These two facts suggests not only that concertaje was a profitable
activity for landlords, but also that regions with a high prevalence of it were likely
to be more productive (as they were larger), and perhaps even richer in terms of
land value. However, later in 1960 concertaje started to be associated with higher
illiteracy rates and lower levels of educations that persist until today.
This sort of reversal of fortune suggests that during the transition from an agrarian
economy, concertaje may have played a major distortion in the labor market, reducing
the incentives to provide school and affecting labor reallocation. As landlords retained
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workers in their haciendas, they created a barrier to accumulate human capital and
reduced the incentives to provide public goods. Second, I also document that because
of the barrier to mobility, most workers in regions with high prevalence of concertaje
remain in the agricultural sector.
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Figure 1.12: Log-value of Land (1909) and Concertaje
Notes: See Appendix A and A for a detailed explanation of the source of the data.
I also test other mechanisms discussed by the literature like inequality and public
good provision, presenting mixed results. Although land inequality is strongly linked
to concertaje, inequality by itself is not associated with lower levels of contemporary
economic development. Hence, I interpret the results as a generalization of the overall
negative effects of coercion, instead of its operation through inequality. Moreover, I
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also show that public good provision, in terms of roads, seems to be negatively related
to concertaje.
1.5.1 Human Capital Accumulation
In addition to the attached workers, their wives and sons were also part of the
labor force of the haciendas (Oberem, 1981, p. 352). Women were usually employed
as housekeepers for landlords, while sons were sent at a very early age to work. This
early disposition of children to work limited their education, if any was available in the
district. Accordingly, in 1934, 80% of indigenous workers attached to haciendas were
illiterate, as opposed to the 40% of the rest of rural workers (Oberem, 1978, p. 323).
In that spirit, I test as one of the potential channels of persistence of concertaje its
effects on human capital by using the illiteracy rates, functional illiteracy rates and
the average years of school of a district. Illiteracy rates come from the 1960 census,
the first year for which this information available. The rest of the data come from the
1990 census. I omit the results of the first stage since they are similar or the same as
those reported in Table 1.3.
The results for illiteracy are reported in Table 1.5. All of the estimates are statis-
tically significant except when controlling for province fixed effects, and vary little for
the different specifications. Economically, they suggest that in average, an increase
of 10 percentage points in concertaje increased the illiteracy rate of a district by al-
most 4 percentage points in 1960. These results are considerable since they suggest
that in average, a district with all of its workers attached to haciendas has illiteracy
rates that are 40 percentage points higher than districts with no attached workers. I
also estimate the effects of concertaje on a robust measure of illiteracy, namely, func-
tional illiteracy, defined as the fraction of population 15 years and above with less
than 3 years of primary education for the year 1990. Table 1.6 shows the results for
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Table 1.5: IV Results: Illiteracy (1960)
Model
Base
fixed effect
Time
Districts
Southern
Without
fixed effect
Province
to Capital
Distance
Capitals
No
(1800)
Indigenous
Fraction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: 2SLS
Concertaje .39** .48** .44*** .26 .34* .39** .34*
(.18) (.19) (.16) (.18) (.17) (.18) (.2)
Panel C: OLS
Concertaje .15** .19** .17** .18** .14* .14* .12
(.07) (.08) (.08) (.07) (.07) (.08) (.08)
Geo. Controls Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Time Controls No Yes No No No No No
Province fixed effect No No No Yes No No No
Observations 122 122 109 122 122 115 108
Mean Dep. Var. 42.36 42.36 43.77 42.36 42.36 43.11 41.57
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Geographic controls include elevation, latitude and longitude.
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
functional illiteracy, evidencing a similar effect than the one for illiteracy, confirming
the conclusion about the negative relation of concertaje on education, except when
dropping the capitals and accounting for being close to one.
Given that illiteracy means zero human capital accumulation via formal education,
these results imply a strong relationship between institutions and human capital
accumulation. The elevated rates of illiteracy observed in districts where concertaje
had more presence, reflect both the poor incentives any individual attached to an
hacienda had to go to school, as well as the impediment they faced due to work
obligations. In that sense, the results presented previously give a quantitative relation
between institutions and human capital. In particular they stress the negative effects
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of labor coercion on education.
Table 1.6: IV Results: Functional Illiteracy (1990)
Model
Base
fixed effect
Time
Districts
Southern
Without
fixed effect
Province
to Capital
Distance
Capitals
No
(1800)
Indigenous
Fraction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: 2SLS
Concertaje .3* .44** .45*** .4** .2 .26 .37*
(.16) (.18) (.16) (.19) (.17) (.17) (.19)
Panel C: OLS
Concertaje .06 .09 .06 .19*** .05 .04 .08
(.07) (.07) (.07) (.06) (.07) (.07) (.08)
Geo. Controls Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Time Controls No Yes No No No No No
Province fixed effect No No No Yes No No No
Observations 126 126 110 126 126 119 112
Mean Dep. Var. 36.85 36.85 38.27 36.85 36.85 37.84 35.06
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Geographic controls include elevation, latitude and longitude.
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
I obtain the same negative relationship between concertaje and human capital
if instead I use as a dependent variable years of school, like reported in Table 1.7.
Overall, the results show a negative impact of the institution on the average years
of school in a district. The point-estimate of concertaje is around -0.05 which means
that an increase in 10 percentage points of concertaje around 1800 lead to a reduction
of half a year of education in 1990. These effects are quantitatively important given
that the mean of years of school in a district is around 5.5 years.
Additionally, Figures 1.13 replicates the exercise done in the previous section by
estimating the effects of concertaje on illiteracy rates for different years, starting
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Table 1.7: IV Results: Years of School (1990)
Model
Base
fixed effect
Time
Districts
Southern
Without
fixed effect
Province
to Capital
Distance
Capitals
No
(1800)
Indigenous
Fraction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: 2SLS
Concertaje -.04** -.06*** -.06*** -.05** -.03 -.04* -.06**
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Panel C: OLS
Concertaje -.01 -.01 -.01 -.02*** -.01 0 -.01
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Geo. Controls Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Time Controls No Yes No No No No No
Province fixed effect No No No Yes No No No
Observations 126 126 110 126 126 119 112
Mean Dep. Var. 5.48 5.48 5.3 5.48 5.48 5.3 5.66
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Geographic controls include elevation, latitude and longitude.
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
1960. Results have to be taken with caution, as the reference population for illiteracy
differ depending on the census (see Appendix A). However, the exercise is useful to
understand how the effect of concertaje on illiteracy has evolved over time. The
results show a stronger effect of concertaje in the earliest decades, which decrease
afterwards. For example, the estimates for 2010 are statistically indistinguishable
from zero. Again, these decreasing effects could be explained by the government’s
efforts to abolish illiteracy. Moreover, they also suggest that the effects of concertaje
may no longer be reflected in illiteracy rates, but in years of school, as reported in
Figure 1.14.
The concerns about the low education of workers in haciendas is not new, as
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historically there have been several legal initiatives to improve this condition. For
example, in 1899 the Congress passed a law that demanded that each hacienda had to
send all children between 10 and 14 years old to school. Furthermore, it also required
each hacienda with more than 20 conciertos to build a school (Oberem, 1978, p. 324).
But in practice, the power landlords exerted over local authorities made it difficult
to accomplish all these resolutions. Using census data from secondary enrollment in
1990, I also observe that regions with high rates of concertaje have a reduced school
attendance, as reported in Table 1.8.
Table 1.8: IV Results: Secondary School Enrollment (1990)
Model
Base
fixed effect
Time
Districts
Southern
Without
fixed effect
Province
to Capital
Distance
Capitals
No
(1800)
Indigenous
Fraction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: 2SLS
Concertaje -.29* -.48** -.34** -.4* -.21 -.25 -.35**
(.15) (.19) (.14) (.21) (.15) (.16) (.18)
Panel C: OLS
Concertaje -.02 -.04 -.01 -.07 -.01 .01 0
(.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.06)
Geo. Controls Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Time Controls No Yes No No No No No
Province fixed effect No No No Yes No No No
Observations 126 126 110 126 126 119 112
Mean Dep. Var. 57.58 57.58 57.64 57.58 57.58 56.42 58.51
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Geographic controls include elevation, latitude and longitude.
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
The landlord elite also had strong incentives to limit the education of indigenous
workers as a strategy to preserve labor coercion. Only in 1978 were illiterate citizens
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given the right to vote (Corkill (1985)). Hence, the provision of public goods, as roads
and schools, may have been lower due to the lack of involvement of their citizens
in public affairs. Moreover, illiterate workers could be easily deceived through the
alteration of their debt accounts, which again gave an advantage to landlords to keep
controlling conciertos. So on top of reducing hacienda workers’ to access to education,
the concertaje system also generated strong incentives to the landlord elite to block
their formal education, reinforcing a circle of low education-low income.
Altogether, the results of this section make a case to explain the variations of hu-
man capital within a country, a mechanism also emphasized by Mariscal and Sokoloff
(2000). It is possible to think that extractive institutions such as concertaje either
create barriers to education or distort the incentives to invest in human capital, which
in turn have negative effects on economic development. Additionally, concertaje also
generated incentives for the landlord elite to block education of workers both as a
method to perpetuate the institution, and perhaps also to maintain political control.
1.5.2 Sectoral Composition
Nowadays, the major disparities in productivity across countries are in the agri-
cultural sector (Caselli (2005b), Restuccia et al. (2008)). At the same time, as doc-
umented by Restuccia et al. (2008), poor countries allocate more employment in
agriculture than developed ones. One of the main justifications behind this empirical
finding is the Schultz hypothesis (Schultz (1953)), which argues that poor countries
face a “food problem”, meaning that those countries allocate much of their resources
to produce food for subsistence needs because of their low productivity. Although the
food hypothesis seems plausible, another reason behind the important allocation of
labor in agriculture in developing countries could come from historical labor coercive
institutions. Given the close relation of concertaje with agriculture, a mechanism by
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which the institution may have had persistent negative effects is by creating distor-
tions precisely in that sector. Although those distortions might include a wide range
of inefficiencies, a more direct effect of the institution could have been blocking the
movement of workers to other economic activities.
Since conciertos were a valuable asset to the hacienda, landowners had strong
incentives to retain both attached workers and their families for generations. Pre-
cisely, the mechanisms developed by the haciendas to control workers impede labor
mobilization and might crowd out the development of other economic sectors. If in
addition to this we include the lack of education of coerced workers evidenced in
the previous section, it is not surprising this labor system generated an environment
where workers remained attached to the agricultural sector, with little options to
escape from it. As workers could not move to other occupations, this process might
have negatively affected the economic prospects of a district.
The relationship between low income and share of labor allocated in agriculture
observed in a cross-country setting also holds for the case of Ecuador. Figure 1.15
shows the positive relationship between the share of employment in agriculture and
the poverty rates of the districts studied in this paper. Evidently, the immediate
question is what are the reasons behind this relationship. Considering that concertaje
might have provoked an effect in distorting labor markets, I hypothesize that there is
a causal relationship between both of them, meaning that the institution could have
had a direct effect in the labor composition of a district.
I test this hypothesis in the 2SLS framework by estimating the effects of concertaje
in sectoral composition. As before, I estimate equation (1.2), but use Ad, the fraction
of labor working in agricultural activities as a dependent variable. The results of
these estimates are shown in Table 1.9. It is noticeable how the rate of concertaje is
a strong predictor of the contemporary economic activity. Through all our different
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specifications, the effect of concertaje is statistically significant, implying a very close
relation between both: on average, an increase of 10 percentage points in the rate
of concertaje have an effect of an increase between 6 to 10 percentage points in the
share of workers allocated in agriculture.
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Figure 1.15: Share of Employment in Agriculture (1990) Vs Extreme Poverty (1990)
These results are also consistent with historical analysis showing a slow process of
industrialization in the Ecuadorian highlands (Saint Geours (1994)). In particular,
they reflect the persistent effects of haciendas and concertaje on agriculture depen-
dence. Moreover, the results document how institutions may delay the process of
structural transformation by creating barriers to allocate resources in the economy,
in particular labor. If coercion dominates the labor market, not only the mobility
of workers is limited, but the incentives to start new type of business could be re-
duced. A counterfactual then implies that the lack of labor coercion could facilitate
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Table 1.9: IV Results: Share of Workers in Agriculture (1990)
Model
Base
fixed effect
Time
Districts
Southern
Without
fixed effect
Province
to Capital
Distance
Capitals
No
(1800)
Indigenous
Fraction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: 2SLS
Concertaje .83*** .95*** .8*** .88*** .6** .73** 1.01***
(.29) (.32) (.26) (.32) (.27) (.29) (.33)
Panel C: OLS
Concertaje .18 .23** .16 .46*** .15 .12 .22*
(.11) (.11) (.12) (.1) (.11) (.11) (.12)
Geo. Controls Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Time Controls No Yes No No No No No
Province fixed effect No No No Yes No No No
Observations 126 126 110 126 126 119 112
Mean Dep. Var. 50.16 50.16 49.6 50.16 50.16 52.5 48.86
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Geographic controls include elevation, latitude and longitude.
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
the mobility of workers between sectors. A notable case is the town of Otavalo, where
the minor presence of big haciendas and landlords contributed to the formation of
trade specialists, who nowadays are renown because of their entrepreneurial talent
(Valarezo (2002)). On the other side, the excessive burden landlords imposed over
the indigenous workers in the neighbor town of Cayambe limited the formation of
such traders. These differences in sectoral composition between both towns seemed
to occur as early as the mid XIX century. For instance, Valarezo (2002) reports
that census data of 1862 reveals important differences in the kind of occupations the
population of each town had. While Otavalo reported to have 38% of its population
working in the agricultural sector, Cayambe had 82%.
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The results presented in this section also reflect the fact that historically, labor
coercion has been intimately related with agriculture. Even nowadays, most forced
labor relations occur in low-technology, labor-intensive activities as agriculture (An-
drees and Belser (2009)). In the context of Latin America, for instance, labor coercion
has been historically concentrated in agricultural and mining activities. While most
mines controlled by the Spanish were depleted as early as possible, coercion in the
agricultural sector remained for a longer period of time. Accordingly, the persistence
of the institution seems to have created barriers in the allocation of labor that later
on was reflected on important differences in economic performance.
1.5.3 Inequality
Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) suggested that the colonial strategy imposed in
South America by the Spanish generated a very unequal society, a situation which
later on affected the economic prospects of the region. Due to the distribution of land
claims and privileges to a small group of settlers, a reduced economic and political
elite emerged, who extracted rents from natives via forced labor or other forms of
taxation. Inevitably, over time this strategy could have led to a high concentration
of wealth. Ecuador seems not to be an exemption to this analysis, as the existence
of concertaje is a reflection of the control of the indigenous population by a small,
racially different elite. Consequently, it is expected to find a positive relation between
concertaje and inequality.
Specifically, I focus on the distributional effects of concertaje on land inequality
as the institution was heavily supported on the existence of big rural states. The
data about land distribution in Ecuador at a parish level comes from the agricultural
census of 1974. It is important to mention that this is the only source that reports
land data in such disaggregated level. The census provides data about the number
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of agricultural units and classifies them under 15 categories based on size. Using
that information I build a Gini coefficient of land inequality similar to Nunn (2008).
Additional details about the data and the construction of the Gini coefficients is
provided in Appendix A.
I report the results between land inequality and concertaje in Table 1.10. Notably,
from the OLS to the IV estimates, all specifications reflect a positive and statistically
significant relationship between concertaje and land inequality. For instance, the
IV estimates suggest that an increase in 10 percentage points in concertaje in 1800
increased Land Gini in 1979 in almost 5 percentage points. These estimates are
consistent with the Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) hypothesis that forced labor insti-
tutions like slavery or concertaje induced high levels of inequality, and aligned with
the empirical evidence presented by Nunn (2008) between the positive correlation
between slavery and inequality in the United States. From a historical perspective,
the results reported in Table 1.10 should not be unexpected. First, their correspond
to the year of 1974, a period in which the agricultural reform was just starting to take
effect, and so they reflect much of the colonial heritage conditions of land distribution
until that moment.
Nevertheless, in order to consider inequality as a channel of persistence, it should
be negatively related with economic prosperity. Although the evidence on inequality
and development at country level is mixed16, several papers have also used micro-
data to explore this relationship. Acemoglu et al. (2008) used data from the region of
Cundinamarca in Colombia, and reported a positive correlation between economic in-
equality and contemporaneous economic development. Instead Nunn (2008) reported
16 Banerjee and Duflo (2003) report a U-shaped relationship between inequality and economic
growth, arguing that changes in inequality in any direction are correlated with a decrease in
growth in the future.
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Table 1.10: IV Results: Land Gini (1974)
Model
Base
fixed effect
Time
Districts
Southern
Without
fixed effect
Province
to Capital
Distance
Capitals
No
(1800)
Indigenous
Fraction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: 2SLS
Concertaje .47** .52** .37* .74*** .41** .47** .48**
(.2) (.21) (.19) (.26) (.2) (.21) (.22)
Panel C: OLS
Concertaje .22*** .21*** .22*** .23** .21*** .22*** .23***
(.07) (.08) (.08) (.09) (.07) (.08) (.08)
Geo. Controls Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Time Controls No Yes No No No No No
Province fixed effect No No No Yes No No No
Observations 125 125 109 125 125 118 112
Mean Dep. Var. 72.92 72.92 73.69 72.92 72.92 72.91 73.21
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Geographic controls include elevation, latitude and longitude.
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
a weak correlation between inequality and today’s economic income.
The relation between land inequality and extreme poverty can be seen in Fig-
ure 1.16. There is no apparent correlation between both variables, suggesting that
inequality by itself may not be a persistence mechanism, although the results should
be taken with caution. For instance, inequality could not only appear in the land
distribution across districts, but also at a country level, by creating a very hierarchi-
cal society where a small elite controls de political and economic power of a nation.
For example, Acemoglu et al. (2008) emphasizes the role of political inequality in-
stead of economic inequality in explaining differences in economic performance. This
narrative fits the analysis of many historians who have studied the region, and have
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identified landlords as a ruling elite that blocked the political participation of the rest
of the population (Quintero Lo´pez (1987)).
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Figure 1.16: Land Inequality (1979) vs Extreme Poverty (1990)
These results also seem to suggest that although haciendas created a high con-
centration of land, its negative repercussions might come from the effects of coercion
through human capital. Galor et al. (2009) argues that land inequality could have
adverse effects in economic development by blocking human-capital promoting in-
stitutions, but the results presented in this section emphasize not only the role of
land inequality by itself, but the negative effects of labor coercion, which might or
might not be accompanied with land inequality. For example, the coast of Ecuador,
although not predominantly influenced by mechanisms of labor coercion as concer-
taje, exhibited land concentrations very similar to those of the highlands17. Because
17Barsky (1984) reports a Gini coefficient for the highlands in 1979 of 0.64, while the one of the
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of a small labor force and the risks of tropical diseases, the coast was not heavily
populated, or controlled, by the Spanish. Although the ports were of economic rel-
evance, agricultural activities there were not of special interest until the prices of
cacao and the availability of some labor force generated enough conditions to attract
new colonizers. In that case, land availability and a reduced population created a
landlord class that claimed and appropriate the land because of its availability. For
different historical reasons, the coastal region also showed a very unequal distribution
of land, but not the negative effects of labor coercion. Probably the inconclusive em-
pirical relationship between inequality and economic development is due to the lack
of understanding of the mechanisms that lead to inequality. In some cases, inequality
might be capturing the effect of coerce labor institutions, while in others, it might be
the reflect of other historical processes.
1.5.4 Public Goods Provision
Instead of suggesting a negative relationship between haciendas, concertaje, and
contemporary economic development, Dell (2010) states that under the presence of
the mining mita, haciendas in Peru protected indigenous workers by offering an escape
from the cruel conditions of working in the Potosi silver mines. Hence, she proposes
an alternative hypothesis to Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) theory to explain the
development path in the Americas, where she emphasizes the role landlords had on
providing public goods, like roads, and secure property rights. Accordingly, I test
if places with higher rates of concertaje also show higher presence of public goods,
measured by the density of local roads.
In order to measure the density of local roads, I follow the same strategy as Dell
(2010), and use a GIS road map of Ecuador. Roads are classified by two dimensions,
coast was of 0.62
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either as local, secondary or primary, and according to the type of material they are
made off: paved, not paved, temporal or other. Using that classification, I compute
the total length of roads and divide them by the district surface area.
Table 1.11 shows the results between concertaje and local road density. Although
the coefficients are not precisely estimated, all the specifications show a negative
relation between the institution and the provision of roads. These results are contrary
to those presented by Dell (2010), who hypothesizes that large landowners with secure
property rights had higher incentives to invest on public goods. In contrast, I observe
that public goods, reflected in road density, seem to be negatively related to the
existence of forced labor in haciendas. If landlords in the highlands of Ecuador
produced to sell to local markets, a question then is why they did not invest or lobby
for better or more roads?
One possibility is that the data on roads, which belongs to 2010, might reflect quite
different conditions from those in the past due to the recent important investments in
infrastructure by the government. To see if that is the case, I use data from the 1974
agricultural census where there is information about the number of farms that are
further from certain distance to transitable roads. The classification is a farm being
less than 1km, between 1 and 5km, between 5 and 10 km and further than 10km.
I compute for each district the fraction of farms that are further than 5km from a
transitable road. The results can be observed in Table 1.12. Once again the estimates
suggest that higher rates of concertaje are associated with farms being further from
a transitable road.
Another explanation could be that the narrowness of the Andes in Ecuador, which
is quite differently from the extensions found in countries like Peru or Bolivia (Basile
(1974)), gives little variation in the road density. Then, the discrepancy in conclu-
sions could simply reflect conditions inherently specific to each country. However, an
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Table 1.11: IV Results: Local Road Density
Model
Base
fixed effect
Time
Districts
Southern
Without
fixed effect
Province
to Capital
Distance
Capitals
No
(1800)
Indigenous
Fraction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: 2SLS
Concertaje -24.63* -31.07* -18.24 -24.55* -13.46 -15.61 -31.35*
(14.64) (16.84) (13.64) (14.79) (12.83) (12.63) (16.68)
Panel C: OLS
Concertaje .74 .68 .12 -14.68** 2.18 2.08 -.8
(5.29) (5.52) (5.65) (6.44) (5.02) (4.82) (6.19)
Geo. Controls Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Time Controls No Yes No No No No No
Province fixed effect No No No Yes No No No
Observations 126 126 110 126 126 119 112
Mean Dep. Var. 1111.91 1111.91 1242.96 1111.91 1111.91 1045.82 1198.87
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Geographic controls include elevation, latitude and longitude.
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
economic explanation may lie in the fact that conciertos were an asset, and so, land-
lords minimized their chances to escape, limiting the availability of workers within
a district. For instance, during the construction of a road system near the town of
Otavalo, state officials complained about the hacienda system as the principal ob-
stacle for labor recruitment (Williams, 2007, p. 51). Although it may have been in
their best interest to improve the road system close to their properties, landlords also
seemed to be careful about retaining the workers they had. If hacienda workers had
to go and be part of the pool of road workers, the likelihood of escaping or that some-
body else appropriated them might have been risks landlords did not wanted to take.
Then, under the presence of such uncertainties, it is not clear that a major provision
54
of public goods could exist in districts with higher presence of haciendas. Also, the
availability of plenty of labor allowed landlords to use its workers to transport objects,
without the need to invest on transportation, as exemplified in 1925, when electric
equipment was mobilized for 150 km. by 3000 indigenous workers (Albornoz, 1971,
p. 80).
Table 1.12: IV Results: Percentage of Farms Further than 5 Km. (1974)
Model
Base
fixed effect
Time
Districts
Southern
Without
fixed effect
Province
to Capital
Distance
Capitals
No
(1800)
Indigenous
Fraction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: 2SLS
Concertaje .63** .46 .52** .65* .31 .63** .6**
(.28) (.29) (.21) (.38) (.25) (.3) (.3)
Panel C: OLS
Concertaje -.04 -.08 .02 .08 -.07 -.06 -.06
(.09) (.09) (.09) (.1) (.08) (.1) (.1)
Geo. Controls Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Time Controls No Yes No No No No No
Province fixed effect No No No Yes No No No
Observations 122 122 107 122 122 116 108
Mean Dep. Var. 17.78 17.78 13.57 17.78 17.78 18.41 16.28
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Geographic controls include elevation, latitude and longitude.
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Perhaps also a larger presence of labor coercion affected the state capacity. No-
tably, Table 1.13 show that concertaje is associated with a lower presence of workers
in the public sector. Hence, the provision of public goods may have been more dif-
ficult to accomplish in places where landlords have larger control. This could have
happened if landlords wanted to exert more influence over local affairs by having a re-
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duced number of government workers. At the same time they might have been afraid
that a larger presence of the state may implied certain forms of regulation. Hence,
the concertaje system could have not necessarily given landlords incentives to provide
more public goods. Instead, it seems to be the case that the opposite happened.
Table 1.13: IV Results: Percent of Workers in Public Sector (1990)
Model
Base
fixed effect
Time
Districts
Southern
Without
fixed effect
Province
to Capital
Distance
Capitals
No
(1800)
Indigenous
Fraction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: 2SLS
Concertaje -.2** -.28** -.23*** -.24* -.15* -.19** -.27**
(.09) (.11) (.08) (.12) (.08) (.1) (.11)
Panel C: OLS
Concertaje -.07** -.08** -.05* -.08** -.07** -.05 -.08**
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.04) (.03) (.03) (.04)
Geo. Controls Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Time Controls No Yes No No No No No
Province fixed effect No No No Yes No No No
Observations 126 126 110 126 126 119 112
Mean Dep. Var. 10.05 10.05 9.31 10.05 10.05 9.26 10.42
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Geographic controls include elevation, latitude and longitude.
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
1.6 Conclusion
This paper documents the long-run effects of concertaje in the Ecuadorian high-
lands by exploiting the variation in its intensity across districts. I first provide evi-
dence of the persistence of the institution both during colonial times and afterwards
to emphasize its importance in the economic development of the region. Then I use
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as an instrument for concertaje the ratio of crops with different labor requirements.
I state that this instrument could be considered as a plausibly exogenous variation
of concertaje supported in the hypothesis that geographic conditions influenced the
incentives to coerce, which in turn affected the type and severity of colonial insti-
tutions stablished in different regions. I estimate that in average, an increase of 10
percentage points in the rate of concertaje around 1800 increased the rate of extreme
poverty in 1990 by 6 percentage points and reduced average night light intensity in 2
digital numbers (DN).
Due to the close relationship between concertaje and the labor market, I hypothe-
size that the presence of this labor coercive institution created barriers to the process
of human capital accumulation and generated distortions that affected the sectoral
composition of labor. I estimate that on average, an increase in 10 percentage points
in the rate of concertaje circa 1800 increased the illiteracy rate of a district in 1960
by 3 percentage points and the share of workers in agriculture by 8 percentage points.
These results plausibly document the role historical institutions as a cause of persis-
tent market distortions.
Using data about land distribution around 1970 I also document a strong relation-
ship between the institution and land inequality, favoring the Engerman and Sokoloff
hypothesis about the relationship between endowments, institutions and inequality.
However, I found no relation between inequality and economic development. Instead,
I suggest that labor coercion by itself, which sometimes might be accompanied with
land inequality, was a detrimental factor to economic development. These suggests
the relevance of understanding the underlying reasons behind the historical inequality
in order to asses the question between its relation with economic development.
Also, using data of contemporary roads, I report that there is a negative relation
between concertaje and the provision of public goods. These results are opposite to
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those of Dell (2010), who highlighted a positive role of haciendas in Peru in provid-
ing access to roads. Instead, the results presented in this paper do not favor Dell’s
hypothesis that landlords and haciendas shield individuals against extractive institu-
tions. For the case of Ecuador, where the presence of gold and silver mines during
colonial times was minimal, it is possible to have a more homogenous setting to study
the effects of coercive labor institutions promoted by landlords. Within that setting,
there seem to be more evidence favoring the historical analysis that haciendas consti-
tuted extractive institutions that affected the process of economic growth. Overall,
I emphasize that is labor coercion by itself an important institution that generated
divergences in the economic development across regions.
Under the lens of the evidence presented in this paper, the nature of coercion
is what explains the negative effects of forced labor institutions. Coercion, when
profitable, usually demands that workers are retained both in a certain activity (like
agriculture) and in a certain place, becoming a barrier for labor reallocation across
sectors and regions. To perpetuate this condition, coercers have to make sure that
workers’ outside option is low enough. This is achieved via legal punishment (debtor’s
prison), and by limiting and reducing the incentives the acquire other forms of human
capital than those required by the coerced activity. This last point is achieved by
either blocking politically attempts to invest in the provision of public goods like
schooling, or by plainly denying the access to education. Furthermore, in order to
keep a stable labor force over time, the next generation needs to be coerced from
early ages, which induces a substitution of school for labor. As illiterate workers were
relegated from political participation, like voting, this perpetuates the lower provision
of public goods and reinforces the barriers to escaping from coercion.
A more robust conclusion of the results presented in this paper requires obtaining
data of concertaje for the republican period, as well as the finding of intermediate
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outcomes in the 19th century in order to better understand at which point institu-
tions started to generate divergent development paths across regions. Future topics of
research might consider the findings in this paper as a motivation to develop models
where institutions explicitly play a role in the process of structural transformation by
creating barriers or generate a misallocation of resources. Moreover, further contri-
bution of empirical evidence about the relationship between institutions and human
capital might help us to disentangle the puzzle about the fundamental causes of eco-
nomic growth.
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Chapter 2
ALL IN THE FAMILY: FIRM DYNAMICS AND FAMILY MANAGEMENT
2.1 Introduction
Firm dynamics in developing countries are quite different from those of developed
ones. For instance, Hsieh and Klenow (2014) provide evidence that 40-year-old plants
in India and Mexico are 40% and 100% respectively larger than new plants, whereas
plants in the United States are 600% larger. These life-cycle differences in developing
countries could reflect barriers that firms face to raise their productivity, which in turn
may have important consequences for Total Factor Productivity (TFP). Therefore,
understanding the forces behind these growth differentials appears to be relevant for
explaining income variations across countries1.
One channel that may explain these life-cycle differences is contract enforcement
frictions that hinder the hiring of external managers in developing countries (Bloom
et al. (2013)). Instead, firms’ owners in developing countries are much more likely to
rely on family members to manage their business (La Porta et al. (1999), Claessens
et al. (2000)). This is relevant because managerial practices are associated with firm-
level productivity and they tend to be particularly poor in family-managed firms
(Bloom and Van Reenen (2007)). However, further exploration of this channel has
been limited due to unavailability of firms’ data where one can observe at the same
time both family relations between owners and managers and their corresponding
dynamics.
1See Caselli (2005a) and Jones (2016) for a review of the role of TFP in explaining cross-
country income differences.
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In this paper I overcome this challenge by using longitudinal data from adminis-
trative tax records for the universe of all firms in Ecuador, merged with a complete
national registry of upper managers and shareholders. Thanks to a combination of
information about true family linkages and inference through surnames, I can identify
if a firm is managed by a family member. More concretely, I can tell if the upper
management (e.g. CEO for a Corporation) is related to any of the shareholders of the
firm. Consequently, I can classify each firm as Family-Managed (FM) or Externally-
Managed (EM) and use their corresponding tax records to provide several stylized
facts about each type of firm.
The main finding, depicted in Figure 2.1, is that the revenue life-cycle profile
is twice as steep in Externally-Managed firms as in Family-Managed firms. That
is, by the age of 20, EM firms are 200% larger if compared to firms of the same
type at age 1, while FM firms are 100% larger than their corresponding younger
counterparts. A consequence of these life-cycle differences is that despite representing
80% of total firms, Family-Managed firms only account for almost 40% of total revenue
and 50% of total employment in the economy. Accordingly, in contrast to the overall
distribution of family-managed firms, 80% of large firms (i.e. more than 500 workers)
are externally-managed. I show that these results are robust to various classification
criteria of family management and to different sample selections.
The magnitude of the life-cycle gap between FM and EM firms I present here
is similar to the cross-country differences in the life cycle of plants documented in
Hsieh and Klenow (2014). Since family management is thought to be a widespread
phenomena in developing countries, this channel appears to be quantitatively relevant
to explain cross-country differences in firm dynamics and its implications for economic
development2. In that sense, although precise statistics of the overall presence of FM
2Economic growth could also be affected by both differences in firm dynamics (Akcigit (2017))
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Figure 2.1: Life-cycle Profile of Family-Managed and Externally-Managed Firms
Notes: The sample includes the universe of all formal firms in Ecuador, except the financial sector,
for the period 2009-2016. Age equal one is the base category. Revenue is deflated using the CPI.
Data sources: Servicio de Rentas Internas (SRI) and Superintendencia de Companias, Valores y
Seguros (SCVS) of Ecuador.
firms are rare for other countries, comparable samples to survey data from Bloom
and Van Reenen (2007) suggest that the share of FM firms in Ecuador is around 2
times that of the United States and other developed countries.
I also report through a case-event study that there is an expansion in revenue
and employment when a family-managed firm switches to external management. Al-
though this transition is infrequent, when it happens, firms show in average gains
in revenue and employment of 20% and 10% respectively two years after the switch,
that persist over time. On the contrary, when firms change management but remain
and a large concentration of inherited firms (Morck et al. (2000)).
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as a family-managed firm, they exhibit smaller gains that vanish faster years after
the replacement.
Even though I cannot tell the identity of the successor within the family, alto-
gether these findings are consistent with causal evidence that a firm’s performance
drops after a primogeniture succession (Bennedsen et al. (2007)), and that manage-
rial practices are worse in family managed firms, especially when administered by the
first-born (Bloom and Van Reenen (2007)). Therefore, one interpretation of the un-
derperformance of family-managed firms over the life cycle is the selection of critical
managerial positions from a small pool of talent (Perez-Gonzalez (2006))3.
I also discuss two pieces of evidence that indicate the abundance of Family-
Managed firms is likely to be the symptom of a deficient contractual environment
(Laeven and Woodruff (2007), Bloom et al. (2009)). First, I show that the presence
of family management is similar across industries, and varies little over age and time,
revealing an overall barrier to the hiring of external managers. Moreover, contractual
distortions could make difficult the diversification of ownership, making it more likely
that the control of a firm falls in the hands of a family member (Burkart et al. (2003)).
Consistent with that interpretation, I note that most firms in Ecuador have very few
owners. For example, in 85% of the firms there are less than 5 owners.
Based on the stylized facts discussed above, I build a general equilibrium model
of firm dynamics a` la Hopenhayn (1992) and Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) where
entrepreneurs choose to operate either with their endowed family managerial talent
or by hiring external management services on the market. Management is modeled as
a factor of production, and certain levels of productivity induce firms to operate only
3Empirical studies have also provided further understanding of mechanisms that explain dif-
ferences in performance of family managed firms, like a reduced supply of time of family managers
(Bandiera et al. (2017)) or how the family structure shape a business (Bertrand et al. (2008)).
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through family management. Firms that choose to be family managed rely on the
fixed pool of talent given by blood, which implies a decreasing returns to scale produc-
tion function in the remaining factors. Firms that choose external management can
hire more managers and hence have a constant returns to scale production function.
However, contracting frictions make external managers less efficient (as they need to
be incentivized and monitored).
I calibrate the model to the Ecuadorian economy and then use it as a framework
to study counterfactuals and policy analyses. The model is able to replicate the new
stylized facts presented here, including the life cycle differences between firms, the
prevalence of FM firms and their relative share in aggregate employment. In the
main counterfactual experiment, I find that changes in the contractual environment
that lead to a drop in the presence of family-managed firms by half could increase
output on the order of 6%. These gains operate through both extensive and intensive
mechanisms. First, the share of Family Managed firms is reduced by almost half, so
the larger presence of Externally Managed firms increases the average growth of firms
by 50%. Second, already-EM firms become more efficient in the use of managerial
services, so they demand more inputs and become larger.
Finally, I use the detailed administrative data at hand to provide some suggestive
evidence on one managerial practice in which FM firms seem to differ: workforce se-
lection. I join the tax records of every classified firm with those of their corresponding
workers to create a full matched employer-employee dataset. I show first that work-
ers in FM firms are on average paid 10% less after controlling for individual fixed
effects. I then decompose worker’s earnings using the AKM model (Abowd et al.
(1999)) and document that worker quality and firm productivity (the respective fixed
effects of the estimation) are more strongly correlated for externally-managed than
family-managed firms. This seems to suggest that potentially productive firms, by
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restricting their management to their family talent, fail to hire and retain otherwise
good-match workers that could enhance firms’ productivity.
This paper builds on recent models of management and firm dynamics that try to
explain life cycle differences across countries. In particular, it closely follows on the
work of Akcigit et al. (2016) in which firms can optimally decide when to hire external
management in order to avoid the diminishing returns of size as in Lucas (1978).
However, a key difference in this paper is that I explicitly categorize firms according
to their family management status. Similarly, the work of Cole et al. (2016) focus
on firms’ life-cycle differences across countries through the eyes of financial frictions
and its implications for technological adoption, but without emphasizing the role of
management. Caselli and Gennaioli (2013) also stress the importance of financial
frictions as an important mechanism to explain the abundance of family firms in
developing countries, although abstracting from the firm dynamics4. Guner et al.
(2018) instead study how the earnings life cycle of managers differs across countries,
emphasizing the role of human capital accumulation, similar to Roys and Seshadri
(2014) and Bhattacharya et al. (2013), while Alder (2016) discusses the aggregate
implications of mismatch between managers and firms.
On the other side, understanding the sources of cross-sectional differences in the
allocation of factors across countries has been the focus of recent papers (Guner et al.
(2008); Midrigan and Xu (2014)) due to the aggregate consequences for Total Factor
Productivity (Restuccia and Rogerson (2008), Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Bartelsman
et al. (2013))5. With those works mainly centered on cross-sectional differences in size
4The role of financial frictions for economic development is also studied by Buera et al. (2011)
and Moll (2014).
5See Restuccia et al. (2013), Restuccia and Rogerson (2013) and Hopenhayn (2014) for a re-
view of the recent literature.
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and less scope for the life-cycle dynamics of firms6. Yet, the cross-sectional implication
of family management studied in this paper is that larger firms are typically those
that have delegated outside management. Since family management is suspected
to be abundant in developing countries, this is consistent with large cross-country
differences in the size of establishments (Bento and Restuccia (2017)).
Finally, studies stressing the importance of management for firm’s growth can be
traced back to Penrose (1959), and more recently to Bertrand and Schoar (2003) and
the research agenda of measuring managerial practices across countries (Bloom and
Van Reenen (2010), Bloom et al. (2014)). There is also a large literature in corporate
finances studying the particularities of family firms, with special focus on family
successions (Villalonga and Amit (2006)), and performance (Morck et al. (1988);
Yermack (1996))7. From a theoretical perspective, the effect of family management
on firm’s performance is ambiguous (Donnelley (1964)), as family managers could face
higher incentives due to non-pecuniary benefits (Kandel and Lazear (1992)), while
a negative aspect is the selection from a small pool of talent. In that sense, the
empirical evidence presented in this paper puts more weight to the latter.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data and the
methodology used to classify firms. Section 2.3 provides several stylized facts of
Family-Managed and Externally-Managed firms. Section 2.4 describes the model,
while Section 2.5 discusses the calibration strategy and Section 2.6 performs several
counterfactual analysis of changes in the contractual environment. Section 2.7 returns
to provide more empirical evidence about some managerial practices in which both
types of firms differ. Section 2.8 concludes.
6See Bartelsman et al. (2009) for several facts about cross-country differences in firm dynam-
ics.
7See Bertrand and Schoar (2006) for a review of the literature
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2.2 Data
The main empirical exercise of the paper is to classify firms according to their
family management status and then analyze if there are differences in performance
associated with it. To do so, I rely on administrative records from two sources: (i) tax
records and (ii) a national registry of shareholders and upper managers. The latter
allows me to identify if a firm is managed by a family member, while the first one lets
me observe their performance over the life-cycle and across several other dimensions.
Tax records, of restricted access, were provided by the Ecuadorian Internal Rev-
enue Service (Servicio de Rentas Internas (SRI)), while a complete registry of share-
holders and upper managers was provided by the Bureau of Companies (Superinten-
dencia de Companias, Valores y Seguros (SCVS)). In both sources I have the unique
firm’s ID, which allows me to join datasets. Furthermore, both datasets combine the
universe of nearly all formal firms (around 150,000 by year), and includes both Sole
Proprietors and Limited Liability Companies, the two main forms to organize a busi-
ness in the country. The only sector excluded from my analysis is the financial one,
since it is regulated by a different entity and is not required to provide information
about either managers or owners.
In addition I have both the unique citizen’s ID of both shareholders and managers,
so I can use their corresponding tax records in a similar fashion as firms. Finally,
I can also link workers (beyond managers) to firms to create a complete matched
employer-employee dataset because workers’ tax records are mainly reported by their
employers. This is particularly relevant to explore one channel in which FM firms
differ: workforce selection, a point discussed in detail in Section 2.7.
It is noteworthy to emphasize that the registry of shareholders covers every formal
firm regardless of size or condition, and it includes the records of every shareholder,
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even for public-listed firms. What is more, I have the complete history of managers
and shareholders from the moment a firm started operating, although I only have
access to their corresponding tax records starting for 2009. Hence, I limit the analysis
of the data for the period 2009-2016. Finally, all relevant variables were deflated using
the CPI deflator provided by the National Institute of Statistics (INEC).
2.2.1 Tax Records
Firms
Tax records of firms include detailed financial information mainly composed by the
firm’s balance sheet and its income statement, accompanied by data of several firms’
characteristics such as the year they where legally founded, 6-digit industry code and
their geographic location. From the Balance Sheets I mainly use the firm’s book value
measure of capital stock, while from the Income Statement I obtain information about
firm’s revenues and costs.
Data about total employment do not appear directly in the tax records of firms,
however, given that I also have access to the tax records of workers, which report
the employer ID, I compute the total number of workers from that source and then
merge it to the firms’ database. Moreover, information about total employment for
Limited Liability Companies was also provided by the Bureau of Companies, as firms
were asked to self-report it while updating the information about ownership and
management.
Individuals
Individuals report taxes in Ecuador mainly through their employers. Hence, it is
possible to connect the IDs of both parts to create a matched employer-employee
longitudinal dataset. For those who declare income from other sources different from
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employed labor (rents, dividends, business income, self-employment income and cap-
ital income), a second report of taxes is used. The principal variable recovered from
these records is labor earnings. Further details about the specificities of this informa-
tion can be found in the Appendix B.
2.2.2 Ownership and Management
Data for ownership and management for Limited Liability Companies are available
because by law, every Limited Liability Company constituted in Ecuador, regardless
of its size, must report to the Bureau of Companies during the first four moths of
the year a full list of its legal representatives, upper managers (discussed below), and
shareholders. Any change during the year should be updated within three months
after the event (Art. 20, Ley de Compan˜´ıas (1999)). For any firm, the legal represen-
tative is the manager on whom falls the legal burden of the firm, so it is a category
aside from any management position8.
For Sole Proprietors, ownership and management are not reported to the Bureau
of Companies. However, in this case ownership is trivial, as there is only one residual
claimant. Since at the same time the law defines the residual claimant to be the legal
representative of the firm, I consider that person to be the main manager of the firm.
Instead, for Limited Liability Companies, the identity of managers and owners was
divided in two parts. I describe below the treatment of each dataset.
Managers appointments
Starting from the moment of the firm’s legal foundation, I was provided with a full
history of upper-managerial appointments. This includes both the starting and end-
ing date and the corresponding position. I use these spells to build a panel of these
8Foreign companies are only required to provide the identity of their legal representative.
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managers for every firm, cut at the last day of the year. This was done to later be con-
sistent with the timing of the information presented in the tax records. Management
positions are self-reported to the Bureau of Companies.
Upper management in a Limited Liability Company overall is defined as the indi-
viduals in charge of leading it and responding to shareholders. Nevertheless, from all
management positions, I mainly focus on the figure of Legal Representative (which
in most of the cases is the CEO) since by law a Limited Liability Company requires a
legal representative in order to operate (Art.6, Ley de Compan˜´ıas (1999)). I also focus
on that position because although firms report other managers (like CFO, President,
members of the board or plant managers if applicable), this information has not been
standardized, so the hierarchy of these positions is not completely clear. Although
it is possible that the legal representation of the firm may be separate from the the
actual managerial duties, anecdotal evidence suggest this is not the case. Neverthe-
less, in some cases I also consider the rest of upper managers, particularly the CEO,
top manager and President. Details about the selection of upper manager’s and its
implications to the classification of firms are discussed in detail in Section 2.2.3.
Table 2.1 displays the frequency of different categories of managers in the dataset.
As it can be observed, the main categories of upper management are CEO (Gerente
General)/Manager and President/Executive President. Moreover, one can see that in
94% of the cases, the Legal Representative of the firm is either the CEO/Top Man-
ager or the President of the firm, the most common case (69%) being the CEO/Top
Manager. Therefore, as discussed above, focusing on the Legal Representative as the
leading manager of the firm is a plausible assumption.
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Table 2.1: Managerial Positions in Limited Liability Companies
(1) (2)
Position
distribution
Unconditional
Legal Representative
on being the
Conditioning
Manager/CEO 54% 69%
President/Executive President 40% 25%
Other 6% 6%
N 665,395 516,230
Notes. Distribution of managerial positions for the years 2007-2016.
Data Source: Superintendencia de Companias, Valores y Seguros.
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Ownership
Similar to the case of manager’s appointments, I was provided with a full history of
the stock’s transactions of every firm from the moment of its foundation, accompa-
nied with the identity of the person involved on it. This includes transactions like the
initial amount of capital, purchases, sells, transfers, reevaluations, and new capital
injections. Knowing all these details allows me to know the distribution of sharehold-
ers at any point of time. For example, when a transaction includes two parties, for
instance, a buyer and seller, I have information about the identity of both. Hence, I
can build at any period the stock of capital of every shareholder.
I compute at the end of each year the distribution of stocks of every shareholder
and update it according to the flows provided by the stock’s transactions. Addi-
tionally, since I have the complete list of owners of every firm, I can track the final
shareholder for those cases when a firm is owned by another firm. This tracking can
only be done for firms stablished in the country, as foreign firms are not required to
reveal the full composition of their shareholders.
Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of the number of shareholders by firm for the
year 2016. As it can be seen, ownership of most firms is highly concentrated. Around
85% of firms have fewer than 5 shareholders, while less than 1% of firms have more
than 100 shareholders9. This lack of dispersion is consistent with the interpretation
of weak rule of law and less effective legal protection of minority shareholders in
developing countries (La Porta et al. (1997), La Porta et al. (1998), La Porta et al.
(1999)).
In that sense, the concentration of ownership is likely to be related to the incidence
9The mode of the distribution is two since this is the minimum number of individuals required
to start a limited liability company
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Figure 2.2: Frequency of Shareholders in Limited Liability Companies
Notes: The sample includes the universe of all non-sole proprietors firms in Ecuador, except the
financial sector, for the period 2016. Data source: Superintendencia de Companias, Valores y Seguros
(SCVS) of Ecuador.
of Family-Managed firms. If minority investor rights are not well protected, it may
be challenging to diversify ownership, reducing the checks among shareholders and
making it more likely that delegation falls on the hands of a family member. Instead,
in environments with better protection rights, widely held corporations where profes-
sional managers exercise a vast control of the firm could arise. Hence, the decision to
delegate is likely to be shaped by the legal environment, so family management could
be seen as second best when there is difficulty to diversify ownership due to a weak
protection of investors’ right (Burkart et al. (2003)).
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2.2.3 Classification of Firms
The ultimate goal of having the information of both managers and owners is to
identify if a firm is managed by someone of the family or instead has an external
manager. The identification of family linkages between the upper management and
the shareholders within each firm was done by using a combination of two approaches:
inference via surnames and observation of true linkages using administrative data. I
explain both methodologies below.
Surnames
My benchmark approach to classify family-managed firms relies on identifying whether
firm owners and firm managers are related through their surnames. Surnames offer
two advantages for making such linkages. First, individuals sharing surnames are very
likely to be related, particularly because the distribution of surnames in Western soci-
eties (including Ecuador) is skewed, meaning that although there are few individuals
with really common surnames, most have infrequent ones, making it more likely that
sharing a surname implies familiarity10. Moreover, as I am not inferring family link-
ages via surnames of two randomly drawn individuals, but instead focusing on shared
surnames in a very specific place, a firm, it is more likely to accurately infer a family
relation using this methodology.
Second, Ecuador is a Spanish-speaking country, so surnames encode information
about both the mother’s and father’s families, making it possible to identify family
relations from both sides until the fourth degree of consanguinity (cousins). One
drawback, however, is that individuals in Spanish-speaking countries as Ecuador do
10For instance, the use of surnames has been used to provide estimates of intergenerational
mobility in the absence of true family linkages (Gu¨ell et al. (2015)).
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not change surnames when they get married, making it unfeasible to identify affinity
relations. I partially overcome this problem by using administrative records of true
linkages for a subset of individuals, as described below.
The surnames of managers and owners of Limited Liability Companies come from
the lists provided by the Bureau of Companies. In order to recover current surname(s)
of an individual, I split the name string of each manager and shareholder and separate
the first name(s) from the surname(s). As mentioned above, Ecuadorians, as most
Spanish-speaking people, usually have two surnames. The first one associated to the
father, and the second one to the mother. Since it is also very common for people to
have two first names, the typical string in the dataset is organized as follows,
[Surname 1][Surname 2][Name 1][Name 2]
and each piece of the name is separated by spaces. Of course, there are cases in which
an individual only has one surname, or only one name. I take into consideration all
the possible cases and develop a procedure to accurately separate each surname and
name.
I first split each part of the string if separated by a space. The baseline case is
two surnames and two first names, as I know then with great certainty that the first
two words are surnames and the last two are first names. For the rest of the cases,
the algorithm classifies the split parts into surnames or first names given its position
in the string and how likely they are to be a surname or a first name, considering
the names and surnames in the baseline case. I also consider Spanish conventions of
surnames to take into account composed surnames that are not a unique word, like
the surname “De la Cruz.”
Once I have recovered the surnames, I first compare if the managers share sur-
names with the owners, and then quantify the magnitude of family involvement in
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the management of the firm, measured by the fraction of ownership. The following
example illustrates the methodology.
Suppose a firm has three individuals: two shareholders and a CEO, with the
corresponding ownership an surnames as described above,
owner 1: 40%︷ ︸︸ ︷
Garcia Sanchez,
owner 2: 60%︷ ︸︸ ︷
Perez Garcia
manager︷ ︸︸ ︷
Perez Acosta
In this case, the CEO is related to one of the shareholders as both share the
surname “Perez”. Additionally, this surname is associated with 60% of the control
of the firm, so potentially it could be considered as a Family-Managed firm, as the
principal manager is related to the major shareholder of the company.
More generally, for every firm j, let Sjo be the set of shareholders’ surnames, S
j
m
be the set of CEO’s surnames and ωji,s the ownership of individual i with surname s.
To classify firms I use the following cut-off rule,
FMj =

1 if
∑
s∈{Sjo⋂Sjm} ωji,s > c¯
0 otherwise
(2.1)
where the baseline sets c¯ = 50%. Under this criteria, the firm of the example
will be effectively a Family-Managed firm. The decision to choose this cut-off was
done for two reasons. First, it represents simply majority control of the firm, and
second, it allows me to compare my estimates with similar findings in the literature
(for instance, the classification of Family Ownership and Management in Bloom and
Van Reenen (2007) is binary). Nevertheless, I provide several robustness checks of
the empirical results linked to this definition by setting different thresholds.
Finally, I do not recover sole-proprietor’s surnames, as this type of firms are con-
sidered FM since they satisfy the criteria defined in (2.1) given that the ownership of
the firm is concentrated in one person, which at the same time is the Legal Represen-
tative of the firm (the manager legally accountable for the firm’s actions.). Moreover,
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this group of firms represent 45% of total firms, and so are an important group to be
analyzed. Additionally, research by Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) have suggested
that similar to Family-Managed firms, Founder-Managed firms (a category in which
Sole Proprietors fall) have poor managerial practices. Nevertheless, I perform sev-
eral robustness checks to see whether the inclusion of this group changes the results
significantly.
True family linkages
To complement the identification of family linkages between managers and sharehold-
ers, I also use information of the true linkages using data provided by the Internal
Revenue Service of Ecuador (SRI in Spanish). Due to control purposes, the SRI has
developed a network of family connections using information provided by the Civil
Registry. The core of the network is built on information about parents and couples,
if applicable. In principle, once those links are known, the program can map every
possible family relationship of any individual.
Unfortunately, this data is incomplete, as the network is on an early phase, so it
only includes information of individuals who have renewed their citizens ID to one
with a new format11. Due to this limitation I use this data more as a complement of
the surnames methodology, in particular to identify linkages related to marriage and
the corresponding family-in-law, for which there are no shared surnames but a family
connection exists.
By using this network data, I complement the classification of FM firms ap-
plying the criteria defined in (2.1), and treating the existence of a relation as if
11In 2009 the Government changed the format of the national identification to increase its se-
curity. However, since it was not mandatory to renew it, many individuals do not appear in these
dataset, and show with missing family linkages.
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the parts shared a surname. Finally, after firms were classified as Family-Managed
or Externally-Managed, I returned the list of firms to the tax office so they could
anonymize their IDs in order to merge it with the corresponding tax records.
2.3 Empirical Analysis
In this section I use the methodology described above to classify each firm in the
tax records database as family-managed or externally-managed. With that classifi-
cation at hand, I document new stylized facts about the presence of family-managed
firms, the life-cycle differences with respect to externally-managed firms, and the
consequent implications for cross-sectional employment and size distribution.
2.3.1 Prevalence of FM firms
Family-Managed firms are the most common type of firms throughout the Ecuado-
rian economy. They represent around 80% of the total number of firms, with little
variation across sectors and over time. Figure 2.3 shows how the distribution of
FM firms is similar across the four biggest sectors (in terms of employment), while
Figure 2.4 evidences the constant presence of FM firms over time.
Moreover, the prevalence of FM firms seem to be constant across age, although
there is a slightly smaller fraction of FM firms in both the youngest and oldest co-
horts, as displayed in Figure 2.5. This considerable number of family-managed firms
evidences that their presence is a widespread phenomena and depict it as a structural
feature of the economy.
To put these numbers in context, I compare the magnitude of the prevalence of
FM firms with evidence provided from survey data in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007).
Using survey data for medium-sized manufacture firms (firms between 50 and 10,000
workers) the authors present a summary of the prevalence of this type of firms for
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Figure 2.3: Frequency of Family-Managed and Externally-Managed Firms Across Indus-
tries
Notes: Firms were classified according to the cut-off rule defined in (2.1) with c¯ = 50%. The
sample includes the universe of all formal firms in Ecuador, both Limited Liability Companies and
Sole Proprietors, except the financial sector, for the period 2009-2016.
a set of countries, including the United States. Although the definition of FM firm
from that study is not exactly the same as the one used in this paper (see notes of
Table 2.2), it is the most comparable sample.
Table 2.2 shows the fraction of FM firms in Ecuador using the sampling criteria
described above accompanied with the cross-country data of Bloom and Van Reenen
(2007). As one can see, the presence of this type of firms is higher in Ecuador as
compared to all of the other countries. It is around 12 percentage points larger than
the UK (the country of the sample with the largest share of FM firms) and more than
2 times larger than the U.S. This is consistent with the idea that the typical form of
business organization in a developing country crucially relies on a family network to
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Figure 2.4: Frequency of Family-Managed and Externally-Managed Firms Across Years
Notes: Firms were classified according to the cut-off rule defined in (2.1) with c¯ = 50%. The
sample includes the universe of all formal firms in Ecuador, both Limited Liability Companies and
Sole Proprietors, except the financial sector, for the period 2009-2016.
operate. (La Porta et al. (1999), Bloom et al. (2013))12.
In order to provide a robustness check and bound the estimates of the participation
of FM firms in the economy, Table 2.3 summarizes the prevalence of FM firms accord-
ing to different criteria. When Sole Proprietors are considered, the classification of
FM firms when using different cut-off rules do not change its frequency substantially.
The difference between the less restrictive case (c¯ = 25%) and the most restrictive one
(c¯ = 75%) is 13 percentage points. However, when only Limited Liability Companies
are considered, the magnitude of this difference goes up to 26 percentage points. The
reason, as mentioned above, is that Sole Proprietors account for 45% of the total
firms. Due to these differences, I provide several robustness checks in Appendix B for
12Developed economies seem to have a larger fraction of family firms (Faccio and Lang (2002))
than traditionally assumed (Berle et al. (1932)), although to lesser extent than developing ones.
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Table 2.2: Cross-country Differences in Family-Managed Firms
(Manufacture Sector)
Country Prevalence of Family-Managed Firms (%)
France 36
Germany 12
United Kingdom 35
United States 19
Ecuador 48
Notes. This Table compares the prevalence of Family-Managed
firms for different countries. The data for countries different
than Ecuador come from Bloom and Van Reenen (2007). For
Germany, France, UK and the US I consider a Family-Managed
firm to be that where one of the following criteria apply: a)
a family is the largest shareholder and the CEO belongs to
the family as well; b) a family is the largest shareholder and
the CEO is chosen by primogeniture; and c) the CEO is the
founder and largest shareholder. The sample includes medium-
sized firms (between 50 and 10,000 workers) in the manufacture
sector. The sample for Ecuador fits the same criteria for com-
parison purposes.
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Figure 2.5: Frequency of Family-Managed and Externally-Managed Firms Across Age
Notes: Firms were classified according to the cut-off rule defined in (2.1) with c¯ = 50%. The
sample includes the universe of all formal firms in Ecuador, both Limited Liability Companies and
Sole Proprietors, except the financial sector, for the period 2009-2016.
the results described below.
2.3.2 The Life-cycle of Family and Externally-Managed Firms
In this section I present one of the main empirical exercises of the paper: the
life-cycle differences between Family-Managed and Externally-Managed firms. First,
in order to compute the life-cycle profiles, I exploit the longitudinal characteristics of
the data and estimate the following regression,
log(yj,t) = α + θj + δt +
∑
a∈A
∑
k∈FMj,t
λa,kD
a,k
j,t + errorj,t (2.2)
where yj,t is the outcome of interest (e.g. revenue) of firm j, at time t; θj represents
a firm fixed effect; δt is a vector of time period dummies, while D
a
j,t is a dummy
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Table 2.3: Frequency of Family-Managed Firms
According to Different Criteria
(1) (2) (3)
Cut-off Rule
(%)
c¯ = 25%
(%)
c¯ = 50%
(%)
c¯ = 75%
Includes Sole Proprietors
Yes 87 79 74
(N=150,558)
No 77 60 51
(N= 81,345)
Notes. This Table compares the prevalence of Family
Managed firms using the methodology defined by (2.1)
according to different thresholds. Column (1) uses a cut-
off of c = 25%, Column (2) report the baseline case, c =
50%, and Column (3) uses a cut-off of c = 75%.
83
variable that takes the value of one if the firm’s age belongs to the category a ∈ A =
{1, 2, . . . , 20, 21+}, and,
FMj,t =
 1 if firm j at t is FM aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa0 otherwise

I omit the category of age 1, so the results should be interpreted relative to that age.
Moreover, this age bin was normalized for each group separately in order to account
for differences in the size of entry of both classes of firms. I also collapsed the age
above 21 as a single bin because the number of firms in this category starts to be
relatively small.
This specification captures age effects in a nonlinear way to account for any pos-
sible decrease in the growth rates of a firm over time (Haltiwanger et al. (2013)). It
also captures any time-invariant unobserved characteristic of the firm, as it uses the
within-variation in the dependent variable yj,t
13. Nevertheless, as it is well-known
in the literature, even with the panel structure of the data, this specification cannot
separately identify age, cohort and time effects14. However, it is parsimonious and has
the strength to follow firms over time while absorbing any unobserved characteristic of
the firm, including cohort effects. For presentation purposes, all results shown below
were transformed from log-points to percentages to facilitate their interpretation.
The age coefficients λa, with a ∈ A˜ = {1, . . . , 20} for each type of firm are plotted
in Figure 2.6. The figure shows the life-cycle profiles of both types of firms using
revenue as a dependent variable15. The results jump-out immediately: at age 20,
13Recently Kueng et al. (2014) uses a similar specification to document the forces that drive
the life-cycle of firms using data from Canada.
14See Deaton (1997) and Schulhofer-Wohl (2018) for a recent discussion about the topic.
15I focus on revenue instead of employment due to concerns of the tax authority that their
information of employment is misreported, particularly for the years before 2012, while this is
not the case for revenue. In Appendix ?? I show the estimates of the life-cycle profile resultant
84
family-managed firms double in revenues, but externally-managed triple. The faster
expansion of EM starts happening early in the life of the firm, as one can see before
the age of 5 the patterns start to diverge. Moreover, after age 10, the life-cycle profile
of family-managed firms remain flat and do not change for the next 10 years, which is
not the case for the externally-managed ones. The latter keep expanding over time,
so at the age of 20, in average they are 200% larger than their counterparts at age
1. Instead, by the age 20, family-managed firms look the same as at age 10, and are
only 100% times larger than their younger counterparts at age 1.
The life-cycle profiles presented in Figure 2.6 include all the firms in the dataset,
which combine entrants and quitters, thus are influenced by a selection effect. For
example, FM firms may be more prone to stay in business for some non-pecuniary
motive, or instead EM firms could identify easier if it is advantageous to stay in
business, so they could shrink faster and exit. One way to address these concerns is
to focus on the firm dynamics of firms that have stayed for all the periods data is
available. Figure 2.7 shows the results when restricting the sample to fit that criteria.
In this case the life-cycle profiles of both type for firms become steeper, however, the
size of the gap between FM and EM firm at age 20 remains of the same magnitude as
before: EM firms are 230% larger than their younger parts at age 1, while FM firms
are 130% larger.
These results suggest that firm dynamics in developing countries are greatly influ-
enced by the disproportionate presence of FM firms, which in average do not expand
as they age. To further see this, Figure 2.8 shows the life-cycle profile of all firms in
Ecuador, without separating them by the type of management. In this case the age
profile closely follows that of FM firms, as at age 20 firms are in average 120% larger
of (2.2) when using employment as a dependent variable, and compare those results with the find-
ings of this section and those reported by Hsieh and Klenow (2014).
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Figure 2.6: Life-cycle Profile of Family-Managed and Externally-Managed Firms
Notes: Estimated by (2.2). Firms were classified according to the cut-off rule defined in (2.1) with
c¯ = 50%. The sample includes the universe of all formal firms in Ecuador, both Limited Liability
Companies and Sole Proprietors, except the financial sector, for the period 2007-2016. Age equal
one is the base category. Revenue is Real Revenue, deflated using the CPI.
than younger firms.
Moreover, the gap in the life-cycle profiles between family-managed and externally-
managed firms documented here mimics that reported by Hsieh and Klenow (2014)
between Mexico and the United States, and hence provides a further explanation of
why firm dynamic differ in developing countries: the abundance of family managed
firms16. Indeed, there are firms in developing countries that expand as they age,
however, those are typically the ones not managed by a family member.
16Although the mentioned paper uses cross-sectional data, in Appendix B I provide further
comparison to their results using a similar methodology, arriving to the same conclusion.
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Figure 2.7: Life-cycle Profile of Family-Managed and Externally-Managed Firms (Stayers)
Notes: Estimated by (2.2). Firms were classified according to the cut-off rule defined in (2.1) with
c¯ = 50%. The sample includes the universe of all formal firms in Ecuador, both Limited Liability
Companies and Sole Proprietors, except the financial sector, for the period 2007-2016. Age equal
one is the base category. Revenue is Real Revenue, deflated using the CPI.
2.3.3 Cross-sectional Differences
The cross sectional implication of these life-cycle differences is that EM firms are
typically larger. Figure 2.9 shows the distribution of firms according to their size. As
one can see, larger firms are composed in a great part by externally-managed firms,
while small firms are typically concentrated as family-managed firms. Although there
are large firms that continue to be family-managed, that case seems to be more the
exception than the rule. For instance, the largest categories of employment, which
refers to firms with more than 500 workers, are composed in around 80% of EM firms.
Furthermore, these differences in expansion have also non-negligible aggregate
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Figure 2.8: Life-cycle Profile of All Firms
Notes: Estimated by (B.1). The sample includes the universe of all formal firms in Ecuador,
both Limited Liability Companies and Sole Proprietors, except the financial sector, for the period
2009-2016. Age equal one is the base category. Revenue is Real Revenue, deflated using the CPI.
implications due to the importance of each type of firms for the economy. In that
sense, even though FM firms are disproportionately represented, they account for
a smaller fraction of total revenue and employment. Table 2.4 shows that family-
managed firms, despite being 80% of firms, only represent 49% of total employment
and 41% of total revenue, consistent with the previous finding that EM firms are
typically larger. Hence, forces that difficult the delegation of management to an
outsider have critical aggregate implications, as they push towards a larger fraction
of firms to keep the administration within the family, which in turn contribute to the
existence of smaller firms that also do not expand as their age.
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2.3.4 Switchers
Why do Family-Managed firms grow less? This is a point that will be continuously
discussed throughout the paper, but several pieces suggest a mix of bad managerial
practices (Bloom and Van Reenen (2007)) likely to be related to the supply of lower
managerial talent from family members. However, it could simply reflect some further
unobserved heterogeneity beyond management.
If instead firms can face rapid growth when delegating to outsiders, there should
be gains in revenue or employment when firms switch. Precisely, I address this issue
by studying what happens to firms when they switch and become EM. To do so I
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Table 2.4: Total Participation in the Economy of
Family and Non-Family Managed Firms
(1) (2)
Employment (%) Revenue (%)
Family-Managed 49 41
Externally-Managed 51 59
Notes. This Table reports the share of Employment
and Revenue of both Family-Managed and Externally-
Managed firms for the overall economy.
restrict the sample of switchers to those firms that have switch to be an EM firm in
such a way that they remain like that for the rest of the studied period. This sample
restriction enables to clearly distinguish switchers, instead of simply reflecting spuri-
ous changes due to movements around the FM baseline threshold. This transition,
although infrequent in the studied period, sheds light about the gains of expansion
due to outside management.
The specification I estimate for this case-event study is the following,
log(yj,t) = α + θj + δt +
τ¯∑
τ=1
βτD
τ
j + errorj,t (2.3)
where yj,t is the outcome of firm j, at time t; θj represents its fixed effect; δt is a vector
of time period dummies, while Dτj,t is a dummy variable that takes the value of one
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if the firm’s age belong to the category a ∈ τ¯ = {−5,−4, . . . , 0 . . . 5}. The coefficient
normalized is that of the last year a firm was FM, so the results should be interpreted
relative to that period. The results of this exercise are reflected in Figure 2.10a
and Figure 2.10c, for the outcomes of revenue and employment, respectively. The
figures report the estimates of βτ for the bins described above. In average, firms show
an increase in 17% in revenue and 10% in employment one year after the switch,
which continues to increase for the subsequent years, although decay a little 5 years
afterwards for the case of revenue. Interestingly, there seem to be not much of a trend
in a firm’s revenue or employment before the switching decision.
To see the opposite case, I consider firms that have changed management, but
continued to operate as FM firm during the studied period. In order to see what
occurs in the FM-FM transition, I estimate (2.3) restricting the sample to firms that
have changed the top manager only once, but keep management within the family.
The results are plotted in Figure 2.10b and Figure 2.10d for revenue and employment,
respectively.
There are three observations to be noticed in this case. First, there are also
positive gains after changing a manager, but the size of these gains are smaller than
those reported when the transition is to an external manager. For instance, the gains
in revenue are around 10% and in employment 5% relative to the last year a different
family-manager operated. Second, those gains vanish faster compared to the FM-
EM transition, as 5 years later the gains fade away for the case of revenue. Lastly,
there seems to be a trend before switching, which may suggest a premeditated family
transition. This could be the case if the CEO plans its retirement, so reorganizes the
business in such a way to leave it “ready” for the successor.
Although I cannot tell the motives to switch from EM to FM or to keep the
business in the family, the results are consistent with Bennedsen et al. (2007), who
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(d) FM-FM transition: employment
Figure 2.10: Case Event Study: Switchers
Notes: Figures 2.10a and 2.10c report the case-event estimates of (2.3) for firms that switch from
FM to EM, while Figures 2.10b and 2.10d show the estimates for firms that changed management,
but remain as a FM firm, using revenue and employment respectively as outcomes of interest. Firms
were classified according to the cut-off rule defined in (2.1) with c¯ = 50%. The FM-EM switchers
are defined as those firms that (i), change from being FM to EM and (ii), stay as EM for the rest of
the periods. Instead, the FM-FM are defined as those firms that (i), change management and (ii),
continue as FM for the rest of the periods. The sample includes switchers in every sector, except the
financial one, for the period 2007-2016. All results were normalized relative to the last year before
a firm switch. Revenue is Real Revenue, deflated using the CPI and Employment is the number of
workers formally registered computed from tax returns.
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provided casual estimates that family successions have a negative effect on a firm’s
performance, and stress the value of professional outside managers to operate a family-
owed firm. However, the positive improvement in terms of revenue and employment
for firms that change management but continue to operate as a FM firm suggest
that perhaps an indistinct rotation in management could lead to an increase a firm’s
performance, at least in the short-run.
Another interpretation is that not all family successions necessarily lead to a lower
performance of the firm. For instance, the literature has stressed the negative effects
of primogeniture succession (Bennedsen et al. (2007)) and management (Bloom and
Van Reenen (2007)). However, the latter also provides evidence that companies that
select CEO from family members other than the first-born child are no worse managed
than other firms. Since I cannot differentiate the type of family bondage between top
managers, I confound all type of family successions, so it leaves open the possibility
that some transitions within the family may actually lead to positive effects for the
firm. Moreover, the results presented here could also be thought as a lower bound
of family-management transitions that could be larger for specific family successions,
like the primogeniture one.
Overall, the evidence presented in this section supports previous findings that
Family-Managed firms perform worse than their counterparts, but document a new
fact: they also do not expand as their age. Given that these firms seem to represent
the majority of firms in a typical developing country, understanding the forces that
limit firms to keep management inside the family and the implications for economic
development. The next section advances in that direction by studying and quantifying
how distortions in the delegation environment could induces a larger mass of firms to
keep operating only with their own managerial endowment.
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2.4 Model
I build a general equilibrium model of firm dynamics a` la Hopenhayn (1992)
to analyze how different forces interact in the decision of a firm to hire external
management, and in particular how distortions in the contractual environment affect
that decision. The key modification of the model is to allow firms to optimally choose
to be either managed by the family member or instead hire external management.
The parameters of the model are identified using the data and several of the new
stylized facts reported in the previous section. I then use the calibrated model to
quantify the aggregate implications of changes in the contractual environment. The
details of the model are described below.
2.4.1 Firms
There is a continuum of ex ante identical entrepreneurs who may start a firm and
produce a homogenous final product. Production requires managerial input (h) and
labor (n), and is subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks (z) every period. The
shocks are independent across firms but come from the same stochastic process. Every
entrepreneur is endowed with h¯ managerial efficiency units that cannot be traded in
the market, which is interpreted as their family endowment of managerial talent.
Managerial input, however, could also be hired in the market at a compensation rate
wh. If the entrepreneur decides to run a firm using only their managerial endowment,
h¯, the firm is labeled as a Family-Managed (FM) firm, in which case output is given
by
yFM =
(
zγh¯1−γ
)1−α
nα
Instead, if the entrepreneur rents managerial services in the market, that firm is
considered as an Externally-Managed (EM) one. These external managerial services
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are added to the initial endowment, and so expand the scope of production. In that
case output is given by,
yEM =
(
zγ(h¯+ φh)1−γ
)1−α
nα
where 0 < α < 1 represents the returns to labor, while 1 − γ (0 < γ < 1), adjusted
by (1−α), governs the contribution of management to production. The parameter γ
plays a critical role in the dynamics of the firm, since an expansion in productivity z
will need to be paired eventually with an increase in managerial services. I discuss its
implications for the life-cycle of the firm below. Note also that the difference between
both types of firms is modeled as a technological one, in line with Bloom et al. (2016).
Finally, the parameter φ represents the managerial efficiency of external management,
which reflects in a reduced-form way the contractual environment, and is explained
in detailed below.
Since firms face idiosyncratic shocks z every period t, there is a dynamic environ-
ment with the following timing. Every incumbent firm enters at period t with state
zt−1 and first is hit by an exogenous shock with probability λ that forces it to exit,
in which case it will receive zero profits in all future periods. If the firm stays in the
market it receives a new shock zt. Then the entrepreneur decides to run the firm as
either a FM or an EM, and finally it hires labor and managerial services accordingly.
Entrants on the other side, pay an entry cost, ce, and draw a productivity shock from
a distribution that is also i.i.d, and start operating immediately with the drawn z, so
from that moment their timing is the same as incumbents.
The more natural way to think about this model is to start backwards, thinking
first the problem at the last stage, which is the decision of choosing the optimal factor
demands given the type of firm, to then discuss the optimal choice of either being
a FM or EM firm, to finally study the exit/entry dynamics. The discussion below
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follows that order.
Static problem
At the last stage, an entrepreneur that has chosen to run a FM firm, in the sense that
it only uses its managerial endowment, h¯, selects labor to maximize profits taking the
price of labor wn as given
piFM(z;wn) = max
n
{(
zγh¯1−γ
)1−α
(n)α − wnn
}
Note in this case the firm does not have to pay for the management it uses, since
it operates with the given endowment. On the other side, an entrepreneur that has
decided to delegate and run the firm as EM chooses to hire both labor and managerial
services, h, compensated at rate wh to maximize profits taking prices as given
piEM(z;wnwh) = max
n,h>0
{(
zγ(h¯+ φh)1−γ
)1−α
(n)α − wnn− whh
}
However, due to contractual frictions, hiring management services implies to devote
part of the managerial endowment to monitor them. These contractual frictions
reduce the managerial efficiency and are captured by the parameter φ. This is a
reduced-form way to account for a variety of distortions that mitigate external dele-
gation in developing countries.
Akcigit et al. (2016) uses a similar specification interpreting it as a parameter that
is country-specific, related to the contractual environment, the level of technology
available or the level of financial development. It is also consistent with the evidence
presented in Section 2.2.2 about the concentration of ownership and its interpretation
as symptom of a weak rule of law, and with the fact discussed in Section 2.3 that
the presence of FM firms is similar across sectors, suggesting an overall deficient
contractual environment.
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The corresponding demand of labor of a FM firm is given by
n = zγh¯1−γ
(
α
wn
) 1
1−α
(2.4)
While the demand for labor of an EM firm is
n = z (1− α) 1−γγ
(
φ(1− γ)
wh
) 1−γ
γ
(
α
wn
) γ+α(1−γ)
γ(1−α)
(2.5)
And the demand of managerial services of an EM is
h =
z
φ
(1− α) 1γ
(
φ(1− γ)
wh
) 1
γ
(
α
wn
) α
γ(1−α)
− h¯
φ
(2.6)
Given the optimal demand for inputs, it can be shown that substituting (2.4) into
the profit function of a FM firm leads to,
pi∗FM(z, wn) = z
γ (1− α)
(
α
wn
) α
1−α
h¯1−γ (2.7)
Equivalently substituting the optimal demand of labor (2.5) and managerial ser-
vices (2.6) in the profit function of a EM firm gives the following expression,
pi∗EM(z, wn, wh) = zγ
[
(1− α)
(
α
wn
) α
(1−α)
(
φ(1− γ)
wh
)1−γ] 1γ
+
whh¯
φ
(2.8)
As can be observed in equations (2.7) and (2.8), piFM(z;wn) is concave in z, while
piEM(z;wn, wh) is linear for EM firms. This comes from the fact that outside delega-
tion allow firms to scale up production, overcoming the diminishing returns of oper-
ating uniquely with their fixed endowment. This property generates an endogenous
unique cutoff which defines the extensive margin of the firm’s managerial decision.
Below certain productivity level it is optimal for entrepreneurs to only uses their fam-
ily managerial endowment to run the firm, while above this threshold it is optimal to
switch and hire external management.
Formally, using (2.7) and (2.8) one can show that the productivity level at which
it becomes optimal to hire external management is,
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z∗(wn, wh) =
[(
1
1− α
)(wn
α
) α
1−α
(
wh
φ(1− γ)
)] 1
γ
h¯ (2.9)
Note that the expression above is an equilibrium object which additionally to the
parameters of the model, depends on both the equilibrium price of labor wn and the
equilibrium compensation rate of managerial services, wh. A graphical representation
of the cut-off rule is shown in Figure 2.11. Before certain threshold, firms will opti-
mally demand no outside managerial services and operate just as a FM firm. Above
the threshold, however, it is no longer optimal for them to continue to be FM, as
higher levels of productivity require higher inputs of managerial services that are not
fulfilled by the initial endowment, due to the complementarity between both.
Productivity (z)
Pr
of
its
 (pi
)
 
 
Family Managed Non−Family Managed
Figure 2.11: Profit’s Function for Family-Managed and Externally-Managed Firms
Notes: Profit’s function according to equations (2.7) and (2.8) respectively. The vertical dashed
line represents the productivity level z∗ that induces firms to switch from FM to EM.
Now, observe that this switching threshold critically depend also on the param-
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eters of the model, including the magnitude of the managerial efficiency, φ and the
endowment of managerial talent, h¯. In particular, note that everything else fixed,
it is decreasing in φ. That is, a reduction in the managerial efficiency, caused for
example by a worsen in the contractual environment, increases the productivity level
that induces a firm to switch, making the presence of FM firms more abundant. Only
firms with really high productivity draws do the transition and hire external manage-
rial services. Instead, when there are improvement in the managerial efficiency firms
are more likely to delegate outside management as the benefits of doing so increase.
Note also that the equilibrium cutoff is increasing in h¯ and wh, reflecting the intuition
that both higher family managerial endowment and higher manager’s compensation
reduce the incentives of firms to hire external management.
Furthermore, notice from (2.9) that even when the managerial efficiency is very
high, there will still exist a positive fraction of firms being FM. This speaks to the
fact that even in countries with good contractual environment, like the United States,
we observe a non-negligible fraction of firms being family-managed. It follows from
the fact that h¯ managerial efficiency units comes for free. As low-productive firms do
not need to rely on outside management, it is optimal for them to simply use their
family managerial talent to run the firm. Contractual distortions affecting the man-
agerial efficiency more critically affects the marginal firm which is close to switching.
Potentially highly productive firms, in an otherwise better contractual environment,
can’t expand and grow at higher rates since they have to keep relying on their family
endowment to run the firm instead of hiring better suited managerial talent in the
market.
Consequently, the parameter governing the managerial efficiency, φ, together with
the endowment h¯, will be critical in the calibration, as captures several forces that
shape delegation, like the contractual environment, and is also policy relevant in the
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sense that improvements in the rule of law or on the enforcement of contracts have
direct implications for the expansion of firms via increasing the incentives to delegate
and scale up production. In that sense, having information about the share of firms
that delegate is critical.
Finally, given the endogenous cut-off, z∗, one can characterize the optimal demand
of managerial services, and hence, the decision to be either a FM or EM firm, as
h(z;wn, wh) =

0, if z < z∗
a
z
φ
(1− α) 1γ
(
φ(1−γ)
wh
) 1
γ
(
α
wn
) α
γ(1−α) − h¯
φ
, if z ≥ z∗
(2.10)
Analogously, the optimal labor demand of a firm will be given by,
n(z;wn, wh) =

zγh¯1−γ
(
α
wn
) 1
1−α
, if z < z∗
a
z (1− α) 1−γγ
(
φ(1−γ)
wh
) 1−γ
γ
(
α
wn
) γ+α(1−γ)
γ(1−α)
, if z ≥ z∗
(2.11)
Entry/Exit dynamics
The remaining stage to be considered is that which deals with the entry and exit
dynamics. Recall firms face an idiosyncratic productivity shock every period, which I
assume follows a first-order Markov process characterized by the conditional distribu-
tion F (zt+1 | zt), and is i.i.d across firms. Accordingly, given a shock z, the Bellman
equation of an incumbent is,
V(z, wn, wh) = max
{
max
{
pi∗f , pi
∗
n
}
+ β(1− λ)
∫
z′
V(z′, wn, wh)dF(dz′ | z)
}
where λ denotes the probability of exit and both pi∗f and pi
∗
n are the optimal profits
function of FM and EM firms defined by (2.7) and (2.8) respectively. This Bellman
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equation captures today’s benefit to operate, accompanied by the expected value of
tomorrow’s return given the state z, discounted by β, and the probability to survive
to the next period, 1− λ.
Entrants, on the other side, pay an entry cost before knowing their initial produc-
tivity, which is drawn from the distribution ν(z) that is also i.i.d across firms. Since
conditional on paying the entry cost, ce, the problem of an entrant looks the same as
that of an incumbent, the present discounted value of a potential entrant is
V e =
∫
V (z, wn, wh)ν(z)dz − ce (2.12)
so in an equilibrium with firm entry, V e will be zero.
Finally, the evolution of the distribution of firms is characterized by
µ′(Z0) = (1− λ)
∫
z′∈Z0
µ(Z0)dF (z
′ | z) +Mν(dz)
where the distribution of firms tomorrow will be composed by the fraction of firms
that survive, 1 − λ, plus the distribution of entrants ν(z), accommodated by the
corresponding mass, M .
2.4.2 Households
There is a unit measure of households that supply both labor and managerial
services and collect profits, if any, from firms. Similar to Akcigit et al. (2016), I
simplify the labor supply problem by assuming individuals are endowed with one
efficiency unit of production labor, and h units of managerial talent which is drawn
from a Pareto Distribution,
P (h > h0) =
(
θ − 1
θ
µh
)θ
h−θ0 (2.13)
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where the parameter µh represents the average level of managerial talent relative to
workers, and can be thought as the overall human capital of external managers. The
parameter θ instead controls the dispersion in managerial talent. Accordingly, given
labor rate wn, managerial rate wh and endowments, an individual chooses to be a
manager by simply following a comparative advantage rule,
whh︸︷︷︸
Manager’s compensation
≥ wn︸︷︷︸
Worker’s compensation
Therefore, the fraction of managers in the economy is,
P (whh > wn) = P (h >
wn
wh
)
=
(
θ − 1
θ
µh
)θ (
wh
wn
)θ (2.14)
And the total supply of managerial efficiency units is,
Hs =
(
θ − 1
θ
µh
)θ (
wh
wn
)θ−1
θ
θ − 1 (2.15)
Note the supply of managerial services is increasing in the relative compensation,
with elasticity θ − 1, which is positive as long as θ > 1.
Finally, the supply of labor is given by,
N s = 1−
(
θ − 1
θ
µh
)θ (
wh
wn
)θ
(2.16)
2.4.3 Equilibrium
I focus on the stationary competitive equilibrium. A stationary competitive equi-
librium in this economy is a list {µ∗,M∗;w∗n, w∗h} s.t,
• Labor market clears,
N s(µ∗,M∗;w∗n, w
∗
h) =
∫
n(z;wn, wh)dµ(z)
102
• Manager’s market clears,
Hs(µ∗,M∗;w∗n, w
∗
h) =
∫
h(z;wn, wh)dµ(z)
• There is an invariant distribution of firms,
µ∗ = T (µ∗,M∗, w∗n, w
∗
h)
• The free entry condition holds,
ce ≥
∫
V (z, w∗n, w
∗
h)ν(z)dz
Further details of the equilibrium are described in Appendix B.
2.4.4 Life-cycle of Firms
The static decision of the firm to delegate has an implication to the the life-cycle
of the firm. To see this, denote the subindex a as the age of the firm and suppose z
evolves deterministically over time, and consequently, over age as well. Then, a FM
firm with age a produces
yFM,a = z
γ
a
(
α
wn
) α
1−α (
h¯
)1−γ
while output of an EM with age a is,
yEM,a = za
(
α
wn
) α
1−α
(
h¯
z∗
)1−γ
where the last expression uses the optimal cut-off (2.9). Let gz be the growth rate
of z conditional on survival. Therefore, the growth rate of an incumbent FM firm at
age a is,
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gFM,a ≈ log(ya)− log(ya−1)
= γ (log(za)− log(za−1))
≈ γgz
(2.17)
equivalently, the growth rate of a EM is,
gEM,a ≈ gz (2.18)
Hence, as discussed above, γ has an implication for the life cycle of firms. The
growth rate of both FM and EM firms will depend on the growth rate of z. However,
for any growth rate, gz, the growth rate of a FM firm will be constrained by γ, while
an EM firm will grow at the same rate of productivity. Therefore, distortions that
reduce the efficiency of external management puts more weight on firms that cannot
fully exploit the complementarities with productivity, and so grow at a slower rate.
2.4.5 Aggregate Productivity
The presence of Family-Managed firms in has an implication to the overall pro-
ductivity of the economy. To see this, observe that one can write aggregate output
as,
Y =
(
α
wn
) α
1−α
h¯1−γ
[∫ z∗
z−
zγdµ(z) +
∫ z+
z∗
z∗
γ−1
zdµ(z)
]
where the expression in brackets reflects a weighted sum of firm’s productivities,
which can be thought as the aggregate productivity of the economy. Since externally-
managed firms can scale up production, the sum of the productivities of this group
enters in a linear way. This is not the case for family-managed firms, whose sum of
productivities is affected by the parameter γ. Hence, the composition of firms in the
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economy determines endogenously the aggregate productivity, as the cut-off level z∗
changes the weights towards the left or right side of the distribution of productivities.
2.5 Calibration Strategy
To simplify the analysis and emphasis the role of family management on firm
dynamics, I assume a firm’s productivity, z, evolves deterministically at a growth
rate gz, and discretize accordingly the grid points. Note that this process could also
be written as a Markov one with Pr(Zt+1 = zt+1 | Zt = zt) = 1, so it reduces
the uncertainty of tomorrow’s outcome to only the probability of survive, 1 − λ.
Furthermore, this specification also induces to a stationary distribution given the
assumption of exogenous exit.
I also assume that the distribution of initial draws of productivities, ν(z), is Pareto,
with scale parameter zm that is normalized to 1, shape parameter a. This parametric
assumption is made since the entrants size in the data is well approximated by a Pareto
distribution. With that in mind, the model described so far has 11 parameters:
{
β, λ, α, gz, γ, h¯, φ, a, µh, θ, ce
}
Some of the parameters are standard, while others are to some extent new and
related to management. In terms of identification, the first five parameters are cal-
ibrated separately, and the remaining six, h¯, φ, a, θ, µh, ce, are jointly calibrated by
targeting several moments from the data, including the new stylized facts documented
in this paper. I consider a period to be one year to use the same frequency as the
data.
Regarding the calibration of the standard parameters, I first calibrate the discount
rate β to match a real interest rate of 5% typically used in the literature. The
probability of exit, λ, is chosen to match the mean firm exit rate for the years 2009-
105
2016. The parameter α is the labor’s share of income, and is assumed to be 2/3,
following standard estimates.
As discussed in Section 2.4.4, the parameters gz and γ govern the life-cycle of the
firm, and so are chosen to match the growth rate of EM and FM firms. I chose gz
to match the relative size of an EM firm at age 20 respect to an entrant of the same
type, while γ is chosen to match the gap between FM and EM firms at the same age,
as documented in Section 2.3.2.
Finally, each of the last parameters are jointly calibrated by targeting some specific
moments under the procedure I describe below. First, recall that there is a unit
measure of households, so the average size of firms is given by
Average size =
(1− FH)
M/λ
(2.19)
where FH is the fraction of external managers in the economy. So using data about the
fraction of external managers, average size and exit rate λ, I pick the mass of entrants
that is consistent with the expression above. Then, for a given entrants distribution,
ν(z) and mass of entrants, M , I compute the stationary distribution of firms, µ(z)∗,
and pick the productivity threshold, z∗, that gives the share of Family-Managed firms
that is consistent with that observed in the data.
I then use the equilibrium condition in the labor market to compute h¯. To see this,
note that one can rewrite the equilibrium condition in the labor market as follows
1− FH =
(
α
wn
) 1
1−α
h¯1−γ
[∫ z∗
z−
zγdµ(z) +
∫ z+
z∗
z∗
γ−1
zdµ(z)
]
(2.20)
so I normalize wn = 1 and obtain the value of h¯. I then use the equilibrium condition
in the managerial market to get the parameter that governs the efficiency of external
managers, φ. Since the equilibrium condition in the managerial market can be written
as
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(FH)
θ−1 µh =
h¯
φ
∫ z+
z∗
(
1
z∗
− 1
z
)
zdµ(z) (2.21)
one can get φ using for a given µh, so I normalize this parameter
17. This normalization
does not affect the counterfactuals in the following section, since for different values
of µh, φ simply escalates. I then recover the equilibrium managerial rate, wh, that is
consistent with (2.9) and adjust a to ensure market clears. I also adjust θ in such a
way that targets the share of output of family-managed firms in the economy. The
cost of entry, ce is finally obtained from the free entry condition (2.12).
2.5.1 Results
The results of the calibration exercise are presented in Table 2.5. Column (3)
describe the interpretation of each parameter, as discussed above, while column (2)
show their values. Although some of the parameters were jointly calibrated, column
(5) shows the key moments targeted by each of them as explained in the previous
section. I discuss briefly the magnitude and implications of some of these parameters.
First, the growth rate, gz, is of 0.06, as it was chosen to match the life-cycle of
EM firms, so in average, a firm of this type that has survived 20 periods will be
close to 3.2 times (1.0620) larger than an EM entrant. The value of γ is 0.50, as it
targets the fact documented in this paper that family-managed firms grow as half as
quickly as those managed by a non-family member. So for the growth rate of z of
0.06, a FM that have survived 20 periods as such will be in average close to 1.8 times
(1.0320) as large than the typical FM entrant. Interestingly, note that (1− γ)(1− α)
also represents the importance of managerial input in the production function, which
17This parameter is also calibrated for India by Akcigit et al. (2016), but comparing the differ-
ences in human capital between immigrants before and after coming to the United States using a
similar methodology as Hendricks and Schoellman (2018).
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given the parameters above, is 0.17. This means that 17% of the returns to scale comes
from management. This is a similar value as that reported Bloom et al. (2016), which
comes from their experimental work on the importance of management (Bloom et al.
(2013)).
On the other side, columns (5) and (6) in Table 2.5 display the moments generated
by the model and compare them to their empirical counterparts in the data. As one
can observe, the model match relatively well the targeted moments. Moreover, Fig-
ure 2.12a show the life-cycle of both type of firms from the simulated model. Although
the shape of the life-cycle is not captured, the relative gap between both types is,
showing at age 20 that EM are in average 220% larger than their counterparts, while
FM are in average 180% larger than the typical FM entrant. Figure 2.12b instead
display the simulated life-cycle of all the firms. So similar to what we observe on the
data and is reported in Section 2.3.2, the model shows that the abundance of FM
firms implies that when seen altogether, the overall life-cycle profile of firms appears
to be flat.
2.6 Changes in the Managerial Efficiency
Using the calibrated version of the model, I quantify the aggregate implications of
changing the size of the managerial efficiency, φ, and its consequences for the overall
life-cycle of firms. As discussed above, from a policy perspective this could be thought
as an improvement in the contractual environment or reforms looking to strength the
rule of law. The first set of experiments is to increase φ in such a way that the
fraction of FM firms reduce to 0.75, 0.60 and 0.40 respect to the baseline estimate.
The results are shown in Table 2.6.
The first column of the Table reports the baseline aggregates given the parametriza-
tion described above. Output in this case was normalized to 100 to facilitate the
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Table 2.5: Parameter Values
Parameter Value Interpretation Target Data Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
gz 0.06 Growth rate of productivity
(Age 1 vs 20)
Life-cycle EM
2.13 2.20
γ 0.50
management and productivity
Complementarity btw
(Age 20)
Life-cycle differences
2.26 1.77
h¯ 72.73 Managerial endowment
(workers)
Average size 13 13
φ 48.55 Managerial efficiency % of FM 80% 81%
µh 0.2 Average managerial skill Normalization
a 1.48
(entrants)
Pareto shape
% of External Managers 4.3% 4.3%
θ 1.61
(managerial talent)
Pareto shape
Revenue FM
Share Total 40% 41%
λ 0.10 Exit rate Exit rate 10% 10%
α 0.65 Labor share Labor compensation — —
ce 28.21 Entry cost —–
β 0.96 Discount factor Real interest rate — —
Notes. This Table report the estimates of the parameters used to calibrate the model. See Sec-
tion 2.5 for details about the calibration procedure.
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Figure 2.12: (a) Life-cycle profile of Family-Managed and Externally-Managed firms, ac-
cording to the parameters reported in Table 2.5. Age equal one is the base category. The
number of periods simulated is 50. (b) As for (a) but for the overall economy.
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Table 2.6: Counterfactual Analysis: Increase in Managerial Efficiency
Baseline Economy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Level of Managerial Efficiency (φ) (φ1) (φ2) (φ3) (φ4)
Output 100 101 103 106
Fraction of FM firms 0.81 0.75 0.60 0.40
Share of output (FM) 0.40 0.32 0.21 0.11
Notes. This Table reports the effects of improving the managerial effi-
ciency from the baseline estimate. Column (1) depicts the baseline econ-
omy, where output has been normalized to 100 for comparison purposes.
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interpretation of the experiments. Column (2) report the results when φ improves
the managerial environment in such a way that the fraction of FM firms drop from
0.80 to 0.75. In this case output increases 1%, and the participation of FM firms in
total output decreases in 6 percentage points, as EM firms become more efficient and
capture a larger share of the market.
Column (3) and (4) in Table 2.6 show the results when the managerial efficiency
improves to reduce the fraction of FM firm to 0.60 and 0.40. In these cases the gains
on output correspond to an increase of 3% and 6% when compared to the benchmark
economy in column (1). At the same time, the participation of FM firms in the
economy drops in 19 and 29 percentage points, respectively. These exercises suggest
that as the managerial efficiency increases, for instance, due to an improvement in
the contractual environment, output expands as a result of both a greater selection
of firms that move away from family management, and an overall increase in the
efficiency of those that were already externally managed, which reduces the share of
the participation in output of FM firms.
More generally, Figure 2.13 show how improvements in the managerial efficiency
generate output gains (left axis), and how at the same time these changes reduce the
fraction of FM firms in the economy (right axis). As it can be seen, increasing the
managerial efficiency monotonically augments output, although the relation is not
linear. For instance, when managerial efficiency leads to a drop of family-managed
firms to 10%, output increases 12% relative to the benchmark economy. Now recall
from Table 2.2 that the fraction of FM firms in developed countries is lower than in
Ecuador, and in average the share of FM firms from that group is twice as large. So
using them as a benchmark, it suggests that changes in the contractual environment
that lead to a drop in the presence of family-managed firms by half could increase
output on the order of 6%.
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Figure 2.13: Changes in Output and Composition of Firms for Different Levels of φ
Notes: Changes in output (left) and composition of firms (right) for different levels of φ. Output
was normalized to the benchmark economy. The dashed line represent the baseline estimate of φ.
The rest of the parameters are the same as reported in Table 2.5 for each counterfactual.
Note that given the parameters gz and γ, the differences in life-cycle between
both FM and EM will not be affected. However, due to changes in composition, the
overall firm dynamics will be altered. To illustrate this point, Figure 2.14 show the
life-cycle profiles for the baseline economy accompanied with the corresponding ones
generated for three different economies with different managerial efficiency levels. As
the value of φ increases, when seen altogether, the life cycle of firms improves due to
a composition effect. For instance, the baseline case closely follows that of FM firms
displayed in Figure 2.12b, similar to the empirical evidence shown in Figure 2.8.
Instead, when φ increases in such a way that the fraction of FM firms drop by half,
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the life-cycle of firms improve in such a way that at age 20, firms are in average 150%
larger that the typical entrant at age 1.
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Figure 2.14: Simulated Life-cycle Profile of Family Managed and Non-Family Managed
Firms
Notes: Estimated by (2.2), according to the parameters reported in Table 2.5, except for φ, which
is altered to the values portrayed in Table 2.6. Age equal one is the base category. The number of
periods simulated is 50.
In summary, the experiments performed in this section suggest that improvements
in the managerial efficiency, for instance, linked by a reduction of distortions in the
contractual environment, create incentives to firms to more frequently hire external
management. These improvements in turn leads to important gains in output. These
gains operate in two ways. First, induces a larger fraction of medium-sized firms,
which an otherwise contractual environment will stay as FM firms, to switch and
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start expanding at earlier ages. Consequently, in the cross section, there is not only
a larger group of EM firms, but also firms that were already EM become bigger in
terms of output and employment, as they scale up production thanks to a greater
ease to delegate. Finally, as EM firms become more efficient, they also capture a
larger share of the market.
In terms of the life-cycle, the relative gap between both type of firms is not altered,
however, when seen altogether, firms seem to expand in average at higher rates. For
instance, when the level of φ is such that the managerial efficiency drops the fraction
of FM firms by half, in average firms are 150% larger than the typical entrant. This
model, in consequence, stresses the importance of the composition of firms in terms
of the type of management to account for differences in the life-cycle across countries.
To the extent that developing countries seem to have a larger fraction of family-
managed firms, as documented in this paper, it suggests that their firm dynamics are
greatly influenced by the overrepresentation of FM firms. Through the lens of the
model, the relatively flat life-cycle profile of FM firms occur because firms can’t scale
up production by hiring the required management to expand, critically influenced by
the low levels of managerial efficiency, so they end up operating only with their fixed
endowment, facing eventually a span of control problem.
2.7 Managerial Differences
The previous section explores the potential aggregate gains of increasing the man-
agerial efficiency. Through the lens of the model, this improvement leads to gains
in output as they decrease the participation of FM firms in the economy by giving
more incentives to delegate and scale up production. At the same time the model
gives a quantitative assessment of how the composition of firms is reflected in the
overall life-cycle of firms. However, the model abstract from particularities in the set
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of managerial skills that may account for the differences in performance between both
type of firms documented in this paper. In this section I provide further empirical
evidence along those lines of future extensions of the model that may amplify the
effects of improving the delegation environment.
One of the four categories of managerial practices measured by Bloom and Van Reenen
(2007) is labeled as incentives, and refers to a firm’s ability to attract and retain hu-
man capital, as well as fixing and rewarding employees according to their performance.
Given I also have access to employees records, I explore management differences be-
tween FM an EM through this channel, by studying differences in compensation and
workforce selection. This exercise is similar to Bender et al. (2018) who link survey
data of managerial practices with administrative data of Germany, although I have
the advantage to explore a larger dataset of firms and focus specifically on the role of
family management.
To perform this analysis I match workers to their correspondent employers at
an annually basis using the reported employer ID in worker’s tax records (Form
107). I restrict the sample to be for full time workers (earn more than the minimum
salary) and exclude from these set of workers individuals reported as managers in the
administrative registries.
I start documenting that the earning’s distribution of workers in Family-Managed
firms is skewed to the left, while the opposite is true for the corresponding distri-
bution in Externally-Managed firms. The results are displayed in Figure 2.15. The
Figure simply shows the raw distribution of earnings. At first glance, it suggests
that workers in EM firms tend to have higher earnings, although the distribution of
workers’ earnings in EM firms do not fully dominate that of FM firms. Perhaps more
interesting, top earners mainly work in firms with external managers.
To further quantify if there is an earning’s premium in Externally-Managed firms,
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Figure 2.15: Annual Earnings Distribution for Workers Employed in FM and EM Firms
Notes: Firms were classified according to the cut-off rule defined in (2.1) with c¯ = 50%. The
sample includes the universe of matched workers on formal firms in Ecuador, both Limited Liability
Companies and Sole Proprietors, except the financial sector, for the period 2009-2016. Earnings is
Real Earnings, deflated using the CPI.
I estimate the following regression,
log(yi,t) = µ+ αi + δt + FMi,t + errori,t (2.22)
where yi,t is the annual earning of a worker i, at year t; the coefficients αi correspond
to a time invariant fixed effects, δt denotes a year fixed effect and FMi,t is a variable
that correspond to 1 if the individual was working for a FM firm in period t, and 0 if
that was not the case; while errori,t is the residual. Unfortunately, it is not possible to
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Table 2.7: Earning’s Differences Between Workers in FM and EM Firms
(1) (2)
(Employed in a Family-Managed firm)
FM
-0.10 -0.097
(.001) (.001)
Controls
Individual fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Include Sole Proprietors Yes No
Number of Observations 11,783,008 10,030,409
Notes. This Table report the estimates of (2.22). FM, is a cate-
gorical variable that takes the value of 1 if a worker is employed in a
Family-Managed firm, as classified by (2.1) with c¯ = 50%. Column
(1) includes workers from all firms. Column (2) only uses workers in
Limited Liability Companies. Standard errors in parenthesis.
control for demographic characteristics of workers, as this information is not available
in the tax records. Hence, these estimates abstract for important time-varying forces
that could explain differences in compensation, as experience, although other time-
invariant characteristics, like education, may be in part captured in the fixed effects.
The results are displayed in Table 2.7.
Column (1) show that in average, FM firms pay 10% less than EM ones. These
results are statistically significant and suggest a positive premium for working in a
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EM firm. Also the magnitude is economically relevant, as it suggest a non-negligible
difference in earnings. Now, recall that in the group of FM firms are also included
Sole Proprietors. Therefore, in order to see if the inclusion of these firms is driving
the results, Column (2) redo the exercise, but exclude employees that work for Sole
Proprietors. As one can observe, the results change little, since most matched-workers
appear to be employed in Limited Liability Companies. This finding is consistent with
the fact that EM firms are generally larger, so in part may reflect the premium for
working for a large business (e.g. Troske (1999)).
One further explanation of this difference in the distribution of worker’s earnings
could also be attributed to the selection of more skilled or talented workers in EM
firms. For instance, Sraer and Thesmar (2007) report that public-listed firms in France
controlled by a family pay in average lower wages, in part because they employ less-
skilled employees. To see if that is the case, I decompose worker’s earnings in both
firm’s and worker’s components via the AKM model (Abowd et al. (1999)), recover
the workers effect and use it as a proxy measure of the quality of the workforce of
each type of firm. More specifically, I follow the literature and assume that log-annual
earnings (yi,t) can be written in the following way,
log(yi,t) = αi + ψj(i,t) + δt + Xi,t + errori,t (2.23)
where i = 1 . . . N denotes workers and j = 1 . . . J firms. The coefficients αi and ψj(i,t)
correspond to time invariant unobserved heterogeneity at the worker and firm level
(fixed effects), and typically interpreted by the literature as worker’s “ability” and
firm’s “productivity”. Finally, δt denotes year fixed effects and Xi,t are time-varying
observable on workers; errori,t is the residual.
However, as mentioned above, unfortunately tax records do not contain demo-
graphic information about workers, like age or gender, making this piece of informa-
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tion missing in the estimation. Hence, I regress a modified version of (2.23), where
worker’s characteristics, Xi,t, are omitted. I also do not include the classification of
worker’s firm (FM vs EM) as a control variable. Instead, after I recover the fixed
effects estimates, I associate them with their correspondent firm status in that year,
fmJ(i,t) =
 1 if individual i at t was working in a FM-firm0 if individual i at t was working in a EM-firm

Finally, I estimate (2.23) using the methodology developed by Correia (2016)18.
As way to measure differences in workforce selection, I simply compute the cor-
relation between workers and fixed effects for both type of firms. The results of this
exercise are depicted in Figure 2.16, where I collapsed the information into 20 equal-
sized bins to facilitate the visualization of the graph19. As one can observe, there is a
flat correlation between worker’s and firm’s fixed effects for FM firms. This is not the
case for EM firms. For the latter, more productive firms tend to hire more productive
workers, as proxied by their individual fixed effects.
Although these results do not necessarily imply differences in assortative matching
(Eeckhout and Kircher (2011)), they are suggestive about the hiring patterns of both
type of firms. If workers in FM firms expect that upper positions will be held by
family members of the owners, instead of being rewarded in a more meritocratic way,
it is likely that many of them will abandon the firm in look for other opportunities.
This could particularly be more hurtful for the firm if the workers that leave are those
more talented.
Another interpretation of this finding is that managers in FM firm may fail to
reward and properly recognize outside talent. Since one of the tasks of managers is
18This estimator has been implemented in STATA in the “reghdfe” package.
19To estimate the fixed effects a normalization relative to one was, so the scale in both axis has
been normalized relative to some arbitrary level.
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to recruit the adequate workforce for the firm, lacking the ability to do so could have
important implications for the productivity of the firm. In fact, as mentioned above,
properly giving incentives to workers is one of the managerial practices that Bloom
and Van Reenen (2007) report are associated with better firm’s performance. In that
sense, allowing the model to capture this additional channel will likely to amplify the
effects of changes in the managerial efficiency.
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Figure 2.16: Correlation Between Workers and Individuals Fixed Effects for Family and
Externally Managed Firms
Notes: Estimated by (2.23). Firms were classified according to the cut-off rule defined in (2.1)
with c¯ = 50%. The sample includes the universe of matched workers on formal firms in Ecuador,
both Limited Liability Companies and Sole Proprietors, except the financial sector, for the period
2009-2016.
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2.8 Conclusion
This paper uses novel administrative data of family-relations between owners and
managers within a firm and their tax records to provide several stylized facts about
differences in performance between Family-Managed and Externally-Managed firms.
One of the main new findings is that firms managed by a family member grow as
half as those that do not. Given the large number of firms that is suspected to
operate under this condition in developing countries, these channel appear to be a
quantitatively relevant to explain cross-country differences in the life-cycle of firms,
like those documented by Hsieh and Klenow (2014). For instance, I report that these
family-managed firms represent around 80% of the total number of firms in Ecuador
and comparable samples suggest that this share is around 2 times that of a developed
economy.
A consequence of this life-cycle differences is that despite being 80% of firms, these
family-managed firms only account for almost 40% of total revenue and 50% of total
employment in the economy. Moreover, the vast majority of these firms are associated
with lower levels of employment. I also provide some evidence via a case-event study
that there are gains of 20% in revenue and 10% in employment when firms switch
from being a FM firm to a EM one. However, this transition is really infrequent. The
apparent benefits of operating with external management leads to the question of
why there is there is a large concentration of Family-Managed firms? In that sense, I
provide some pieces of evidence that suggest that a deficient contractual environment
may be behind the low levels of outside delegation. I show for example that ownership
is quite concentrated, reflecting the difficulty to cope with outsiders. I also report
that family-management is a widespread phenomena across sectors, suggesting it is a
structural feature of the economy.
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I then write a model of firm dynamics to study the stylized facts documented
in this paper. In the model entrepreneurs endogenously decide if they operate as a
family-managed firm, or delegate and hire external managerial services. A family-
managed firm in the model is characterized as one that only uses the endowment of
managerial talent of the entrepreneur, while a externally-managed firm is the one that
hires external management in the market. The contractual environment affect the
managerial efficiency and shapes the decision of a firm to remain as family-managed.
I calibrate the model to the Ecuadorian economy by using several of the new empirical
findings documented here. The model is able to replicate most of the new stylized
documented in this paper. I then perform several counterfactuals associated with
an increase in the managerial efficiency. Through the lens of the model changes in
the contractual environment that lead to a drop in the presence of family-managed
firms by half could increase output on the order of 6%. These gains operate through
two channels. First, they induce more firms to hire external management and scale
up production, and second, they improve the productivity of firms that were already
externally-managed, leading them to capture a larger share of the market.
I also provide empirical evidence related to workforce selection and compensation
between FM and EM firms that can be associated with differences in managerial
practices. I report that EM in average pay more, consistent with the fact that they
are typically larger. I then decompose workers’ earnings via the AKM model (Abowd
et al. (1999)) and show that the correlation between firm’s fixed effects and worker’s
fixed effects is more pronounced for externally-managed firms, and close to flat for
family-managed firms. This suggests first that the average quality of workers is higher
in EM firms, but also that relatively higher productive family-managed firms tend
to have lower quality workers. Two potential explanations to this finding is the self-
selection of workers to firms where they can professionally grow and achieve upper
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positions that are not necessarily reserved to family members. Another is that family-
managers display poor managerial practices like failing to recognize and incentivize
outside talent.
In that sense, an important future extension of the model is to include worker
heterogeneity, as it could amplify the effects of distortions in the contractual envi-
ronment. Another relevant extension will be to add heterogeneity to the talent of
managers in FM firms. This will account for the fact that there are successful family-
managed firms. But more important, this extension will add a further scope of policies
to be studied. As improvements in the delegation environment may take longer time
to execute, another relevant policies to analyze is what type of incentives or training
could be given to family-managed firms in order to increase their productivity.
It will also be interesting to understand further hybrid mechanism of control inside
a firm. In this paper I focus specifically on the top management positions, however,
firms operate with different layers of management (Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg
(2015)). Understanding if family members or outside workers are part of these layers
will help to disentangle the sources of managerial productivity and model richer micro-
foundations of delegation. In that sense, learning about the mechanism of control for
outside managers in these different layers on environments with contractual frictions
will expand our knowledge of the forces behind the selection of family managers. To
do so, it will be required to collect further information about managerial practices of
firms and join them with their administrative records.
More generally, future studies of management in both developed and developing
countries should focus on the role of these family-managed firms for firm dynamics
due to their suspected large presence. That will allow us confirm and contrast the
findings in this paper and to generate more comparable data across countries. For
example, one important fact to be confirmed in coming studies is if the life-cycle gap
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between FM and EM documented in this paper is smaller or larger in environments
with better contractual enforcement. Yet is to be verified in the future once data of
the same nature used in this paper is available for other countries.
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 1
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Concertaje
The data of concertaje and haciendas come from two sources. The main one is
the colonial tax records located in the National Archive of History of Ecuador. The
second one is from Oberem (1981). I describe the treatment of the data below.
National Archive of History
As mentioned in the paper, the information of concertaje was obtained via colonial
tax records. Those records are at the level of colonial districts (parishes) and kept in
books organized by colonial tax administration. I collected as many books as possible,
trying to obtain at least one record by administration. The only administration for
which I did not find any record was that of Guaranda. I took photographies of those
records and digitize them. The exact location of each record in the Archive is reported
below.
Since the collection of taxes was in charge to the authority of each colonial tax ad-
ministration, and later kept separately, the books differ in their quality, completeness,
and raise questions about their comparability. These are the three main concerns re-
garding these books that I try to minimize by employing the following criteria. First,
although most of the time the quality of the books is good, in the sense that it is
relatively easy to read them, in some cases the ink has vanished and is hard to recover
the information written there. If other sources for the data are available, I disregard
the data coming from books difficult to read in an effort to minimize transcription
errors.
Second, even when in most of the cases the books include complete information
for all districts, some of them do not have information of certain districts due to
partial destruction or time deterioration. For those reasons, I use as a reference
the population census circa 1784 reported by Salmoral (1994) in order to identify
potential missing districts. Consistently, each table below mentions if the concertaje
information of that district is complete, and reports if the district appears in the
population census.
Finally, most of the books, in particular the earliest ones, seems to be more com-
parable between them, as they explicitly mention the payments of indigenous workers,
free and living in haciendas for the periods of San Juan and Navidad. The books
after 1822, when the region gained its independence, tend to omit the tax collection
period or reflect partial payments for a different period. Moreover, I am particularly
cautious with the information after 1822 since the independence wars could have tem-
porarily affected the distribution of workers and the new political control of landlords
could have allowed them to skip the taxation of their workers. Hence, to validate
the truthfulness of some observations after 1822, especially when no other source is
available, I refer to the information of Oberem (1981). I discuss in detail all of these
caveats for each book below.
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Alausi
Book 1 (1826)
Location:
Archivo Nacional de Historia. Seccion: Empadronamientos. Caja: 12. Documento:
11.
Colonial District Description Census
1 Tixan Complete No
2 Alausi Complete Yes
3 Guasuntos Complete No
4 Chunchi Complete No
5 Sibambe Complete No
Missing districts from census: None.
Notes:
1. This book does not specify if the payments belong to the periods of San Juan
and Navidad. This book is also difficult to read and does not specify the location
of any of the haciendas mentioned. Hence, I used other sources to identify their
location. This procedure recover rates of concertaje similar to those presented
by Oberem (1981). However, due to concerns related to its quality, I disregard
the data from sample. Instead I use the data presented in Oberem (1981).
2. The census data provides aggregate information for Alausi, so none of the other
4 districts appear on it.
Ambato
Book 1 (1823)
Location:
Archivo Nacional de Historia. Seccion: Tributarios. Caja: 35.
Colonial District Description Census
1 Pillaro Complete Yes
2 Patate Complete Yes
3 Pelileo Complete Yes
4 Quero Complete Yes
5 Tisaleo Complete Yes
6 Santa Rosa Complete Yes
7 Quisapincha Complete Yes
8 Izamba Complete Yes
9 Ambato Complete Yes
Missing districts from census: (1) Banos.
Notes:
1. This book does not specify if the payments belong to the periods of San Juan
and Navidad. The number of indigenous workers in this book is inferior to
those reported by Oberem (1981), but the concertaje rates are relatively similar
(see-Figure A.1). Hence, I use all the information of the book.
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Book 2 (1825)
Location:
Archivo Nacional de Historia. Seccion: Empadronamientos. Caja: 29. Documento:
21.
Colonial District Description Census
1 Banos Complete Yes
Missing districts from census: Read notes below.
Notes:
1. This book does not specify if the payments belong to the periods of San Juan
and Navidad. This book also contains data about other districts of the region,
but it is very difficult to read since the ink has vanished. Consequently, I did not
recover information from it. I only extracted the information of Banos in order
to have all the districts mentioned in the population census of 1780, although I
omit this observation due to concerns about the quality of data.
Cuenca
Book 1 (1792)
Location:
Archivo Nacional de Historia. Seccion: Presidencia de Quito. Caja: 132. Libro: 305.
Documento: 8612.
Colonial District Description Census
1 Banos Complete Yes
2 Cumbe Complete No
3 Giron Complete Yes
4 Canaribamba Complete Yes
5 Ona Complete Yes
6 Nabon Complete No
7 San Bartolome Complete Yes
8 Paccha Complete Yes
9 Jadan Complete No
10 Sigsig Complete No
11 Gualaceo Complete Yes
12 Guachapala Complete No
13 Paute Complete Yes
14 Azogues Complete Yes
15 Canar Complete Yes
16 Deleg Complete Yes
17 Sidcay Complete No
Missing districts from census: (1) Cuenca, (2) Sayausi.
Notes: This is the only source of concertaje for the colonial province Cuenca.
Guaranda
Notes:
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1. No tax records have been found for this province. Hence, the sample for this
province come from Oberem (1981). The town of Simiatug is not included
because of missing information (see below).
Ibarra
Book 1 (1784)
Location:
Archivo Nacional de Historia. Seccion: Presidencia de Quito. Caja: 83. Libro: 207.
Documento: 8607.
Colonial District Description Census
1 Tulcan Complete Yes
2 Guaca Complete Yes
3 Tusa Complete Yes
4 Puntal Complete Yes
5 Mira Complete Yes
6 Salinas Complete Yes
7 Cahuasqui Complete Yes
8 Intag Complete Yes
9 San Antonio de Caranqui Complete Yes
10 Asuncion de Caranqui Complete Yes
11 Pimampiro Complete Yes
12 Ibarra Complete Yes
13 Otavalo Complete Yes
Missing districts from census: None.
Notes:
1. The district of Otavalo is included in the records, although it didn’t belong to
the colonial administration of Ibarra. Seems that the records of Otavalo reflect
unpaid taxes for several districts of its jurisdiction. I did not use those records,
as they seem to aggregate information from various places.
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Book 2 (1817)
Location:
Archivo Nacional de Historia. Seccion: Tributarios. Caja: 29. Documento: 27.
Colonial District Description Census
1 Tulcan Complete Yes
2 Guaca Complete Yes
3 Tusa Complete Yes
4 Puntal Complete Yes
5 El Angel Complete No
6 Mira Complete Yes
7 Salinas Complete Yes
8 Cahuasqui Complete Yes
9 Intag Complete Yes
10 San Antonio de Caranqui Complete Yes
11 Asuncion de Caranqui Complete Yes
12 Pimampiro Complete Yes
13 Ibarra Complete Yes
Missing districts from census: None.
Notes:
1. Apparently Puntal split into Puntal and El Angel after 1784 since some of the
names of the haciendas reported in 1784 appear in the location of El Angel in
1817.
Book 3 (1818)
Location:
Archivo Nacional de Historia. Seccion: Tributarios. Caja: 35. Documento: 12.
Colonial District Description Census
1 Tulcan Complete Yes
2 Guaca Complete Yes
3 Tusa Complete Yes
4 Puntal Complete Yes
5 El Angel Complete No
6 Mira Complete Yes
7 Salinas Complete Yes
8 Cahuasqui Complete Yes
9 Intag Complete Yes
10 San Antonio de Caranqui Complete Yes
11 Asuncion de Caranqui Complete Yes
12 Pimampiro Complete Yes
13 Ibarra Complete Yes
Missing districts from census: None.
Notes:
1. Apparently Puntal split into Puntal and El Angel after 1784 since some of the
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names of the haciendas reported in 1784 appear in the location of El Angel in
1817.
Latacunga
Book 1 (1828)
Location:
Archivo Nacional de Historia. Seccion: Presidencia de Quito. Caja: 259. Libro: 645.
Documento: 13228.
Colonial District Description Census
1 Alaquez Complete Yes
2 Mulalo Complete Yes
3 Tanicuchi Complete Yes
4 Toacazo Complete Yes
5 Saquisili Complete Yes
6 Poalo Complete No
7 Pujili Complete Yes
8 Cusubamba Complete Yes
9 San Miguel Complete Yes
10 San Felipe Complete Yes
11 Sigchos Complete Yes
12 Chugchilan Complete No
13 Isinlivi Complete Yes
14 Angamarca Complete Yes
15 San Sebastian* Incomplete Yes
16 Latacunga* Incomplete Yes
Missing districts from census: None.
Notes:
1. This book seems to be a partial list of the tax collected for the second semester
of the year. Opposite to the headlines of most of the other books, this one
refers to the “contribucion personal” (personal contribution), instead of the
collection of the taxes of San Juan and Navidad. One can also note that this
is an incomplete and partial list since the concertaje rates are systematically
lower than those reported by Oberem (1981) (see Figure A.4).
2. San Sebastian, although incomplete, is preserved. The only information missing
for that district are two pages from the hacienda section. It is assumed that
each page reported 20 workers, which is the average per page.
3. The data of Latacunga is missing. However, at the beginning of the book the
index indicates that the data of that district only comprises two pages. Its
absence does not appear to be a major loss.
4. Apparently Sigchos split into Sigchos and Chugchilan after 1805, while Saquisili
split into Saquisili and Poalo. Due to the closeness of those district I merged
them back to both compare with the information from Oberem (1981) and have
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a more accurate report of the concertaje rates given the partial report of the
book. Similarly, the information of Angamarca is omitted since the concertaje
rates are way below what is reported by Oberem (1981).
Loja
Book 1 (1786)
Location:
Archivo Nacional de Historia. Seccion: Presidencia de Quito. Caja: 96. Libro: 233.
Documento: 8610.
Colonial District Description Census
1 San Sebastian de Loja Complete Yes
2 San Juan del Valle Complete Yes
3 Saraguro Complete Yes
4 Catacocha Complete Yes
5 Santiago Complete Yes
6 Malacatos Complete Yes
7 Chuquiribamba Complete Yes
8 Gonzanama Complete Yes
9 Cariamanga Complete Yes
10 Sozoranga Complete Yes
11 Guachanama Complete Yes
12 Celica Complete Yes
13 Zamora Complete Yes
14 Valladolid Complete Yes
15 Chito Complete Yes
16 Zaruma Complete Yes
17 Yulug Complete Yes
Missing districts from census: (1) Loja. Read below.
Notes:
1. Loja, the capital, does not appear in the tax records by itself.
Book 2 (1792)
Location:
Archivo Nacional de Historia. Seccion: Presidencia de Quito. Caja: 132. Libro: 305.
Documento: 8611.
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Colonial District Description Census
1 San Sebastian de Loja Complete Yes
2 San Juan del Valle Complete Yes
3 Saraguro Complete Yes
4 Catacocha Complete Yes
5 Santiago Complete Yes
6 Malacatos Complete Yes
7 Chuquiribamba Complete Yes
8 Gonzanama Complete Yes
9 Cariamanga Complete Yes
10 Sozoranga Complete Yes
11 Guachanama Complete Yes
12 Celica Complete Yes
13 Zamora Complete Yes
14 Valladolid Complete Yes
15 Chito Complete Yes
16 Zaruma Complete Yes
17 Yulug Complete Yes
Missing districts from census: (1) Loja. Read below.
Notes:
1. Loja, the capital, does not appear in the tax records by itself.
Otavalo
Book 1 (1785)
Location:
Archivo Nacional de Historia. Seccion: Presidencia de Quito. Caja: 83. Libro: 207.
Documento: 8608.
Colonial District Description Census
1 Tocachi Incomplete Yes
2 Tabacundo Incomplete Yes
3 Cayambe Incomplete Yes
4 San Pablo Incomplete Yes
5 Cotacachi* Incomplete Yes
6 Urcuqui Complete Yes
7 Atuntaqui Complete Yes
8 Ibarra Complete Yes
9 Otavalo Complete Yes
Missing districts from census: (1) Tumbabiro.
Notes:
1. As with the case of Otavalo in Ibarra, the district of Ibarra is included in the
records, although it didn’t belong to the tax administration of Otavalo. For the
same reasons mentioned before, I don’t use the data of this district.
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2. Cotacachi is incomplete since the book starts with the hacienda section. How-
ever I use it, since one can recover the number of free workers given that at the
end the book it’s reported the total number of workers.
Book 2 (1820)
Location:
Archivo Nacional de Historia. Seccion: Tributarios. Caja: 35.
Colonial District Description Census
1 Tocachi Complete Yes
2 Tabacundo Complete Yes
3 Cangagua Complete No
4 Cayambe Complete Yes
5 San Pablo Complete Yes
6 Atuntaqui Complete Yes
7 Urcuqui Complete Yes
8 Cotacachi Complete Yes
9 Otavalo Complete Yes
Missing districts from census: (1) Tumbabiro.
Notes:
1. Apparently Cayambe split into Cayambe and Cangagua after 1784.
Book 3 (1830)
Location:
Archivo Nacional de Historia. Seccion: Indigenas. Caja: 174. Documento: 7.
Colonial District Description Census
1 Tocachi Complete Yes
2 Tabacundo Complete Yes
3 Cangagua Complete No
4 Cayambe Complete Yes
5 San Pablo Complete Yes
6 Atuntaqui Complete Yes
7 Cotacachi Complete Yes
8 Otavalo Complete Yes
Missing districts from census: (1) Tumbabiro, (2) Urcuqui.
Notes:
1. Apparently Cayambe split into Cayambe and Cangagua after 1784.
2. This source is just a summary of haciendas, conciertos attached to them, and
free workers.
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Quito
Book 1 (1785)
Location:
Archivo Nacional de Historia. Seccion: Presidencia de Quito. Caja: 96. Libro: 235.
Documento: 8610.
Colonial District Description Census
1 Chimbacalle Complete Yes
2 Maria Magdalena Complete Yes
3 Chillogallo Complete Yes
4 Aloag Complete Yes
5 Aloasi Complete Yes
6 Machachi Complete Yes
7 Uyumbicho Complete Yes
8 Amaguana Complete Yes
9 Sangolqui Complete Yes
10 Pintag Complete Yes
11 Alangasi Complete Yes
12 Conocoto Complete Yes
13 Guapulo Complete Yes
14 Cumbaya Complete Yes
15 Tumbaco Complete Yes
16 Puembo Complete Yes
17 Yaruqui Complete Yes
18 Quinche Complete Yes
19 Guayllabamba Complete Yes
20 Perucho Complete Yes
21 San Antonio Complete Yes
22 Calacali Complete Yes
23 Pomasqui Complete Yes
24 Zambiza Complete Yes
25 Cotocollao Complete Yes
26 Santa Clara Complete Yes
27 San Blas* Complete No
28 Santa Barbara* Complete No
29 San Roque* Complete No
30 San Sebastian* Complete No
31 San Marcos* Complete No
32 Catedral* Incomplete No
Missing districts from census: (1) Quito, (2) Guali, (3) Canzacoto, (4) Nanigal,
(5) Mindo. Read below.
Notes:
1. Quito, the capital, does not appear in the tax records by itself. It is assumed
that San Blas, Santa Barbara, San Roque, San Sebastian and San Marcos were
the parishes that comprised Quito. Catedral is also assumed to be part of Quito,
although its records are incomplete.
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2. Guali, Canzacoto, Nanigal and Mindo belong to the subtropical region of Quito.
Riobamba
Book 1 (1778)
Location:
Archivo Nacional de Historia. Seccion: Presidencia de Quito. Caja: 83. Libro: 207.
Documento: 8606.
Colonial District Description Census
1 Riobamba Incomplete Yes
2 Cajabamba Complete Yes
3 Licto Complete Yes
4 Guamote Complete Yes
5 Punin Complete Yes
6 Chambo Complete Yes
7 Quimiag Complete Yes
8 Yaruquies Complete Yes
9 San Luis Complete Yes
10 Penipe Complete Yes
11 Guanando Complete Yes
12 Ilapo Complete Yes
13 Cubijies Complete Yes
14 Guano Complete Yes
15 San Andres Complete Yes
16 Lican Complete Yes
17 Calpi Complete Yes
18 Pungala Complete Yes
Notes:
1. The data of several districts seem incomplete. It refers to the collection of taxes
of indigenous workers belonging to certain encomiendas, instead of mention
the payments of the taxes of San Juan and Navidad. Hence, I dismiss this
information.
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Book 2 (1812)
Location:
Archivo Nacional de Historia. Seccion: Tributarios. Caja: 34.
Colonial District Description Census
1 Riobamba Complete Yes
2 Lican Complete Yes
3 Yaruquies Complete Yes
4 San Luis Complete Yes
5 Licto Complete Yes
6 Pungala Complete Yes
7 Punin Complete Yes
8 Guamote Complete Yes
9 Cebadas Complete Yes
10 Columbe Complete Yes
11 Cicalpa Complete Yes
12 Cajabamba Complete Yes
13 Calpi Complete Yes
14 San Andres Complete Yes
15 Guano Complete Yes
16 Ilapo Complete Yes
17 Cubijies Complete Yes
18 Penipe Complete Yes
19 Guanando Complete Yes
20 Quimiag Complete Yes
21 Chambo Complete Yes
Notes:
1. The district of Guamote does not appear in the population census of 1780.
Oberem (1981)
In his essay, he published three partial lists relative to concertaje and haciendas
circa 1805. The first one includes, for every tax administration, districts with their
respective concertaje rates. However, the rates of concertaje are only reported for
districts with the three highest and three lowest rates, relative to their respective
administration. The second one reports a partial list of districts with a different mea-
sure of the incidence of the institution, namely conciertos per hacienda, accompanied
by the number of haciendas. As with the first one, this measure is only reported
for a small group of districts, those with the three highest and three lowest rates of
conciertos per hacienda relative to the administration they belonged. The third one
is a general list for the whole region where he only reported the districts that had rates
of concertaje above 75% or below 25%, but did not report any specific number. The
three lists do not fully overlap. Additionally, he reported the aggregate number of
conciertos, haciendas and tributaries at a colonial tax administration level. Oberem
mentions that this information was obtained from a private archive which, despite my
best efforts, has not been possible to locate. Nevertheless, when I compare the data
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with that from the National Archive of History, the numbers are very close, which
gives me confidence about its truthfulness.
For both measures of concertaje, i.e, either conciertos/tributaries or concier-
tos/haciendas, I have districts where I observe i) both the numerator and denom-
inator, ii) only the numerator or iii) none. Given these limitations, I address the
problem of incomplete information by doing the following procedure. First I classify
districts with missing observations under three categories: a) those where I can infer
the number of conciertos, but not the total number of tributaries, b) those that I
cannot infer either the number of conciertos or the number of tributaries but are
mentioned in some list and c) those that I cannot infer either the number of concier-
tos or the number of tributaries and are not mentioned in any part of the essay, but
are assumed to be in the original source based on the list of districts reported in the
population census of 1784. For all cases, what I can impute is the rate of concertaje
under certain boundaries, which allows me to have an educated guess of the number of
conciertos and tributaries, given all the extra information provided. This procedure
is only used as a robustness check. Now, I describe it with an example.
Consider Table 2 below. It shows the districts of the tax administration of
Guaranda. The text mentions that this administration had 9 districts. From those
9, we know the concertaje rates of 6 of them (3 lowest, 3 highest). The lowest of
the highest concertaje rates was 0.39 and the highest of the lowest was 0.22. Then,
we have missing information for the following districts: Chapacoto, Asancoto and
Simiatug, that belong to type a), b) and c), respectively. First, it is mentioned that
Chapacoto had 2 conciertos per hacienda and 6 haciendas, that is, the district had 12
conciertos, as reported in brackets. Given those 12 conciertos, the rate of concertaje
for the district was in the interval [0.22, 0.39]. Furthermore, it is mentioned that
Chapacoto had a concertaje rate below 0.25. Hence, we could narrow the interval
to [0.22, 0.25]. Given those 12 conciertos, it should have been the case that the dis-
trict had between 48 and 55 tributaries. Now we only have missing data for the two
other districts. Let’s move to Asancoto, a district for which we only know that had
a concertaje rate below 0.25. Again, the rate of concertaje for the district was in
the interval [0.22, 0.25]. In that case we can’t actually tell the number of conciertos
and tributaries. Nevertheless, given that we know the total number of workers in the
administration, we can tell the number of conciertos to be distributed among the two
districts with missing information. In this case, it was reported to be 586 conciertos
in the whole administration, and so far the other districts sum a total of 506 workers.
Hence, both districts should add up 80 conciertos. I split those 80 evenly between
both, and then recover the respective interval of tributaries. For the case of Simiatug,
that is not reported in any list, I assume it to be one of the districts that belonged
to the administration because it appears in the population census of 1784. In that
case, the only thing we know is that its concertaje rate, if reported, must have been
between 0.25 and 0.39. Since I already assigned 40 conciertos to it, I can compute
the interval of tributaries ([102, 160]). Off course, the number of conciertos for Asan-
coto and Simiatug could be very different, but their rates are consistent with all the
information available.
Lastly, I follow the exact procedure to impute the number of haciendas when they
are not reported. That is, given that for every colonial tax administration I know
the districts with the three highest and three lowest conciertos per hacienda, I can
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deduce the number of haciendas a district in that administration had. Tables A.1-
A.8 reports the data of this exercise for each tax administration. The information
imputed is in brackets. Additionally, Figures A.1 and A.4 summarizes the data by
tax administration and compare the concertaje rates of 1805 with the information
obtained from the National Archive of History.
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Figure A.1: Ambato and Guaranda: Comparison of Concertaje Rates for Different Years
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Figure A.2: Ibarra and Otavalo: Comparison of Concertaje Rates for Different Years
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Figure A.3: Riobamba and Loja: Comparison of Concertaje Rates for Different Years
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Figure A.4: Latacunga and Quito: Comparison of Concertaje Rates for Different Years
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Measurement Error
Since the data come from several sources, I tried to minimize the measurement
error by employing the following procedure. When two or more sources exist for
one province, I kept those with the highest quality, defined by its completeness and
readability. So I dismiss the books of Alausi (1826), Ambato (1825), and Riobamba
(1778). On top of that, I selected only books before 1830, that is, before Ecuador’s
independence. This is because during the first years of the republican period the
nation had a reduced administrative capacity (Saint Geours (1994)), so its records
are less trustworthy.
Summary
To sum up, I collected concertaje data for all of the 10 colonial tax administrations
of the Ecuadorian highlands. Excluding the central tax districts, from the 127 districts
reported in the population census of 1784, I have data of concertaje for 121 of them.
I don’t have information of Mindo, Guali, Nanigal and Cansacoto for the province
of Quito; Sayausi for the province of Cuenca; and Tumbabiro for the province of
Otavalo. Additionally, I have information for 6 out of 10 central tax districts. I don’t
have information of Latacunga, Loja, Cuenca and Quito, although I have information
of 5 parishes of Quito.
Additionally, I have information of concertaje for the 13 following districts that
do not appear in the census: El Angel, in the administration of Ibarra; Cangagua in
the administration of Otavalo; Guamote, in the administration of Riobamba; Cumbe,
Nabon, Jadan, Sigsing, Guachapala and Sidcay in the administration of Cuenca; and
Tixan, Guasuntos, Chunchi and Sibambe in the administration of Alausi. That gives
a total of 145 districts. In the next section I describe the matching of colonial districts
with contemporary ones.
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Matching
From the 145 districts for which I have concertaje data, I disregard the informa-
tion of Chimbacalle, Maria Magdalena, Guapulo, Cotocollao, Santa Clara, San Blas,
Santa Barbara, San Roque, San Sebastian de Quito and San Marcos that would have
matched with the contemporary parish of Quito for the following reasons. First, its
tax records are incomplete both in the records of 1794 and in the list of Oberem.
More important, Oberem (1981) mentions that the numbers reported for the district
of Quito are of low quality, due that many indigenous workers camouflaged as mesti-
zos (mixed between Spanish and Indigenous workers ). Finally, given that Quito has
been historically the main administrative center of the region, concertaje was min-
imal, so including it in the sample could overestimate the effects of the institution.
That leave us to match 135 districts.
I am able to match those 135 districts with 129 contemporary parishes by proceed-
ing as follows. First, I used the official political division of Ecuador to merge districts
that have joined over time to form a modern parish. That is the case of 4 places:
Guanujo and Guaranda, which belong to the modern parish of Guaranda; Caranqui
and Ibarra, which formed the parish of Ibarra; and Sicalpa and Cajabamba, which are
now the parish of Villa del la Union, and Riobamba and Yaruquies, which are now the
parish of Riobamba. Then, even when I do not have information of concertaje for the
districts of Latacunga and Loja, I assume that San Sebastian de Latacunga and San
Felipe, and San Sebastian de Loja and San Juan del Valle, represent their respective
concertaje data since they are parishes of those places. Finally, 120 districts (93%
of the sample) are matched simply by name. The remaining 5 districts are matched
via other sources. From those 129 districts, three of them are dropped: Banos (T),
Angamarca and Simiatug for the reasons explained above. I then give a code to each
colonial district using today’s administrative codes. The table below summarizes the
matching process.
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District
Colonial
District
Modern
Admin.
Tax
Province
Modern
Criteria
Matching
1 Alausi 1 Alausi Alausi Chimborazo Name
2 Guasuntos 2 Guasuntos Alausi Chimborazo Name
3 Sibambe 3 Sibambe Alausi Chimborazo Name
4 Tixan 4 Tixan Alausi Chimborazo Name
5 Chunchi 5 Chunchi Alausi Chimborazo Name
6 Ambato 6 Ambato Ambato Tungurahua Name
7 Banos 7 Banos Ambato Tungurahua Name
8 Izamba 8 Izamba Ambato Tungurahua Name
9 Patate 9 Patate Ambato Tungurahua Name
10 Pelileo 10 Pelileo Ambato Tungurahua Name
11 Pillaro 11 Pillaro Ambato Tungurahua Name
12 Quero 12 Quero Ambato Tungurahua Name
13 Quisapincha 13 Quisapincha Ambato Tungurahua Name
14 Santa Rosa 14 Santa Rosa Ambato Tungurahua Name
15 Tisaleo 15 Tisaleo Ambato Tungurahua Name
16 Azogues 16 Azogues Cuenca Canar Name
17 Banos 17 Banos Cuenca Azuay Name
18 Canar 18 Canar Cuenca Canar Name
19 Canaribamba 19 Santa Isabel Cuenca Azuay Other
20 Cumbe 20 Cumbe Cuenca Azuay Name
21 Deleg 21 Deleg Cuenca Canar Name
22 Giron 22 Giron Cuenca Azuay Name
23 Guachapala 23 Guachapala Cuenca Azuay Name
24 Gualaceo 24 Gualaceo Cuenca Azuay Name
25 Jadan 25 Jadan Cuenca Azuay Name
26 Nabon 26 Nabon Cuenca Azuay Name
27 Ona 27 Ona Cuenca Azuay Name
28 Paccha 28 Paccha Cuenca Azuay Name
29 Paute 29 Paute Cuenca Azuay Name
30 San Bartolome 30 San Bartolome Cuenca Azuay Name
31 Sidcay 31 Sidcay Cuenca Azuay Name
32 Sigsig 32 Sigsig Cuenca Azuay Name
33 Asancoto 33 Asuncion Guaranda Bolivar Name
34 Chapacoto 34 Magdalena Guaranda Bolivar Name
35 Chimbo 35 Chimbo Guaranda Bolivar Name
36 Guanujo Guaranda
36 Guaranda Bolivar Merged
37 Guaranda Guaranda
38 Pallatanga 37 Pallatanga Guaranda Bolivar Name
39 San Miguel 38 San Miguel Guaranda Bolivar Name
40 Santiago 39 Santiago Guaranda Bolivar Name
41 Simiatug 40 Simiatug Guaranda Bolivar Name
42 Cahuasqui 41 Cahuasqui Ibarra Imbabura Name
43 El Angel 42 El Angel Ibarra Carchi Name
Continued. . .
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44 Huaca 43 Huaca Ibarra Carchi Name
45 Caranqui Ibarra
44 Ibarra Imbabura Merged
46 Ibarra Ibarra
47 Intag 45 Imantag Ibarra Imbabura Other
48 Mira 46 Mira Ibarra Carchi Name
49 Pimampiro 47 Pimampiro Ibarra Imbabura Name
50 Puntal 48 Bolivar Ibarra Carchi Other
51 Salinas 49 Salinas Ibarra Imbabura Name
52 San Antonio 50 San Antonio Ibarra Imbabura Name
53 Tulcan 51 Tulcan Ibarra Carchi Name
54 Tusa 52 San Gabriel Ibarra Carchi Other
55 Alaques 53 Alaques Latacunga Cotopaxi Name
56 Angamarca 54 Angamarca Latacunga Cotopaxi Name
57 Cusubamba 55 Cusubamba Latacunga Cotopaxi Name
58 Isinlivi 56 Isinlivi Latacunga Cotopaxi Name
59 San Felipe Latacunga
57 Latacunga Cotopaxi Merged
60 San Sebastian Latacunga
61 Mulalo 58 Mulalo Latacunga Cotopaxi Name
62 Pujili 59 Pujili Latacunga Cotopaxi Name
63 San Miguel 60 San Miguel Latacunga Cotopaxi Name
64 Saquisili 61 Saquisili Latacunga Cotopaxi Name
65 Sigchos 62 Sigchos Latacunga Cotopaxi Name
66 Tanicuchi 63 Tanicuchi Latacunga Cotopaxi Name
67 Toacaso 64 Toacaso Latacunga Cotopaxi Name
68 Cariamanga 65 Cariamanga Loja Loja Name
69 Catacocha 66 Catacocha Loja Loja Name
70 Celica 67 Celica Loja Loja Name
71 Chito 68 Chito Loja Zamora Ch. Name
72 Chuquiribamba 69 Chuquiribamba Loja Loja Name
73 Gonzanama 70 Gonzanama Loja Loja Name
74 Guachanama 71 Guachanama Loja Loja Name
75 San Sebastian Loja
72 Loja Loja Merged
76 San Juan Loja
77 Malacatos 73 Malacatos Loja Loja Name
78 Santiago 74 Santiago Loja Loja Name
79 Saraguro 75 Saraguro Loja Loja Name
80 Sozoranga 76 Sozoranga Loja Loja Name
81 Valladolid 77 Valladolid Loja Zamora Ch. Name
82 Yulug 78 Yulug Loja Loja Name
83 Zamora 79 Zamora Loja Zamora Ch. Name
84 Zaruma 80 Zaruma Loja El Oro Name
85 Atuntaqui 81 Atuntaqui Otavalo Imbabura Name
Continued. . .
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86 Cangagua 82 Cangagua Otavalo Pichincha Name
87 Cayambe 83 Cayambe Otavalo Pichincha Name
88 Cotacachi 84 Cotacachi Otavalo Imbabura Name
89 Otavalo 85 Otavalo Otavalo Imbabura Name
90 San Pablo 86 San Pablo Otavalo Imbabura Name
91 Tabacundo 87 Tabacundo Otavalo Pichincha Name
92 Tocache 88 Tocache Otavalo Pichincha Name
93 Urcuqui 89 Urcuqui Otavalo Imbabura Name
94 Alangasi 90 Alangasi Quito Pichincha Name
95 Aloag 91 Aloag Quito Pichincha Name
96 Aloasi 92 Aloasi Quito Pichincha Name
97 Amaguana 93 Amaguana Quito Pichincha Name
98 Calacali 94 Calacali Quito Pichincha Name
99 Chillogallo 95 Lloa Quito Pichincha Other
100 Conocoto 96 Conocoto Quito Pichincha Name
101 Cumbaya 97 Cumbaya Quito Pichincha Name
102Guayllabamba 98 Guayllabamba Quito Pichincha Name
103 Machachi 99 Machachi Quito Pichincha Name
104 Perucho 100 Perucho Quito Pichincha Name
105 Pintag 101 Pintag Quito Pichincha Name
106 Pomasqui 102 Pomasqui Quito Pichincha Name
107 Puembo 103 Puembo Quito Pichincha Name
108 Quinche 104 Quinche Quito Pichincha Name
109 Sangolqui 105 Sangolqui
110 San Antonio 106 San Antonio Quito Pichincha Name
111 Tumbaco 107 Tumbaco Quito Pichincha Name
112 Uyumbicho 108 Uyumbicho Quito Pichincha Name
113 Yaruqui 109 Yaruqui Quito Pichincha Name
114 Zambiza 110 Zambiza Quito Pichincha Name
115 Cajabamba Riobamba
111Villa de la Union Chimborazo Merged
116 Sicalpa Riobamba
117 Calpi 112 Calpi Riobamba Chimborazo Name
118 Cebadas 113 Cebadas Riobamba Chimborazo Name
119 Chambo 114 Chambo Riobamba Chimborazo Name
120 Columbe 115 Columbe Riobamba Chimborazo Name
121 Cubijies 116 Cubijies Riobamba Chimborazo Name
122 Guamote 117 Guamote Riobamba Chimborazo Name
123 Guanando 118 Guanando Riobamba Chimborazo Name
124 Guano 119 Guano Riobamba Chimborazo Name
125 Ilapo 120 Ilapo Riobamba Chimborazo Name
126 Lican 121 Lican Riobamba Chimborazo Name
127 Licto 122 Licto Riobamba Chimborazo Name
128 Penipe 123 Penipe Riobamba Chimborazo Name
129 Pungala 124 Pungala Riobamba Chimborazo Name
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130 Punin 125 Punin Riobamba Chimborazo Name
131 Quimiag 126 Quimiag Riobamba Chimborazo Name
132 Riobamba Riobamba
127 Riobamba Chimborazo Name
133 Yaruquies Riobamba
134 San Andres 128 San Andres Riobamba Chimborazo Name
135 San Luis 129 San Luis Riobamba Chimborazo Name
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The 2010 census reports 452 parishes in the Ecuadorian Highlands, while I’ve
been able to match 125 of them (the parishes of Zamora, Chito and Valladolid belong
to the Amazon province of Zamora Chinchipe, while Zaruma belongs to the coastal
province of El Oro). That represents 27% of the total number of highland parishes.
Figures A.5 to A.11 provides the location of the towns matched and the tax route
during colonial times according to the order they appear in the tax records.
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Figure A.5: Ibarra: Towns and Tax Route
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Figure A.6: Otavalo: Towns and Tax Route
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Figure A.7: Quito: Towns and Tax Route
167
Quero
Ambato
Izamba
Patate
Tisaleo
Pelileo
Pillaro
Banos (T)
Santa Rosa
Quisapincha
Ambato
Colonial Districts
Concertaje (%)
17 - 25
26 - 50
51 - 75
76 - 85
Tax route
Figure A.8: Ambato: Towns and Tax Route
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Figure A.9: Riobamba: Towns and Tax Route
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Figure A.10: Cuenca: Towns and Tax Route
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Figure A.11: Loja: Towns and Tax Route
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Colonial Data
Population (1590-1600)
Population data for the first years of the colonial period comes from several
sources. Tyrer (1988) report the data from 1590 and 1591 using as sources “La
relacion de Zaruma” and “El censo de Morales Figueroa”, so I use the numbers from
there. Data for 1598 comes from Albuja Mateus (1998). I combine all those sources
and compute the average population circa 1600. The matching with other records
was done by comparing names of towns, similar to the procedure explained above,
although keep in mind that some of those towns may incorporate the information of
several others.
Population (1784)
Data for colonial population around the time of the concertaje data comes from
Salmoral (1994). In her article she collected population data around 1784, summarize
it, and reported the most trustable records. I use precisely the latter to obtain the
population of each district.
Geographic Controls
I obtain a map of the point location of the district’s center from the Military
Institute of Ecuador. From there, I used geospatial software to recover their coordi-
nates. A GIS map with district administrative boundaries (2012) was obtained from
the INEC. To compute distance to the capital, I calculate the Euclidean distance of
each district’s center to the modern province capital they belong.
Elevation data are from the Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM). Details
about it can be read in Dell (2010). I use the SRTM data to obtain the point-
elevation of the the district’s center. I also used the data to compute the average
elevation and slope within each district using today’s administrative boundaries. In
order to accurately compute elevation and slope, water bodies were removed. A GIS
file of the waterbodies of Ecuador was obtained from DIVA-GIS (2016).
Crops
Data for potential yield was obtained from the GAEZ-FAO project. A very de-
tailed explanation of how to obtain the raw files could be found in the readme docu-
ment attached to the crop’s data. In short, in the GAEZ application I selected, for
the crops highland maize, potatoes and wheat, their respective Agro-climatically at-
tainable yield under rain-fed water supply and low input, and download several raster
files. Then, using geospatial software I project those rasters to the system of coor-
dinates UTM 17S. While projecting, I resample the rasters in order to make them
suitable to the size of districts1. Finally, using today’s boundaries, I compute the
average potential yield in each district. Figure A.12 shows the relative productivity
differences in maizes versus potatoes for the Ecuadorian highlands.
1In ArcGIS, I employed the option “BILINEAR” in the Project Raster function given that the
variable is continuous.
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Relative Productivity Ratio
Maize/Potato
Value
High : 1.29883
Low : 0.17632
Figure A.12: Relative Productivity Differences in Maize and Potatoes
Notes: Ratio of productivity in highland maize (in tonnes/ha) relative to productivity in potatoes
(in tonnes/ha). Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the FAO GAEZ project.
Intermediate Outcomes
Land Value
Land value for 1909 is reported in the Guia Comercial Agricola e Industrial de la
Republica del Ecuador (1909) Compan˜´ıa Gu´ıa del Ecuador (1909). The book contains
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detailed information about the country at the beginning of the century. It includes
information, by district, of the total value of land as reported in the official cadastral
records. This data has been scanned by the jesuit library Aurelio Espinosa Polit, and
distributed in CD’s. I transcribed the data into an spreadsheet.
Land Distribution
The information relative to land comes from the 1974 Agricultural Census. This
data is only available in books, so I digitized them. The unit of observation used by the
census is the Agricultural Unit of Production (Unidad de Produccion Agropecuaria
(UPA) in Spanish), which is defined as any unit of land devoted partially or totally to
agricultural production, regardless of size, location, type of ownership or legal status.
This is the only Agricultural Census that reports information at a parish level.
Land Gini.
The Gini coefficient of land inequality is computed using data about the number
and size of holdings. The size of each holding is classified as follows: (1) less than 0
hectares, (2) 0.01 to 0.5 hectares, (3) 0.5-1 hectares, (4) 1-2 hectares, (5) 2-3 hectares,
(6) 3-4 hectares, (7) 4-5 hectares, (8) 5-10 hectares, (9) 10-20 hectares, (10) 10-20
hectares, (11) 20-50 hectares, (12) 50-100 hectares, (13) 100-500 hectares, (14) 500-
1000 hectares, (15) 1000-2500 hectares, (16) more than 2500 hectares. I follow the
same procedure as Nunn (2008), and calculate the Gini coefficient using the program
ineqdec0 (Jenkins et al. (2015)).
Distance to farm.
In the 1974 Agricultural Census there is information if the production unit (UPA) is
close to a certain distance to a road that is accessible during the whole year (“Distan-
cia a la via transitable todo el ao”). The categories are less than 1 km, between 1 and
5 km, between 5 and 10 km and above 10 km. I compute the fraction of production
units on these different categories.
Illiteracy
Illiteracy data before 1990 comes from the population census of several years.
Once again, I digitized the books since they are only available physically. I discuss
in details of each census below.
Illiteracy (1962)
Illiteracy is reported relative to the population of 6 years and above that can’t read
or write (Table 2). Data for Quisapincha and the Oriental districts of Zamora, Chito,
Valladolid is not reported.
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Illiteracy (1974)
Illiteracy is reported relative to the population of 10 years and above that can’t read
or write (Table 21).
Illiteracy (1982)
Illiteracy is reported relative to the population of 10 years and above that can’t read
or write (Table 27). Data for Alausi and Sibambe is not reported.
Contemporary Outcomes
Data for contemporary outcomes come from the population census of 1990, 2001
and 2010, obtained from the Sistema Integrado de Indicadores Sociales del Ecuador
(SIISE (2011)) and Sistema Nacional de Informacion (SNI (2011)).
Extreme Poverty
The definition of Extreme Poverty is described in the text (SIISE; Section: De-
sigualdad y Pobreza; Subsection: Pobreza; Variable: Extrema pobreza por necesi-
dades basicas insatisfechas (NBI); Source: Censo de Poblacion y Vivienda; Years:
1990, 2001, 2010; Disaggregation: Parroquia.). Data for Lican in 2001 is not re-
ported.
Illiteracy
Illiteracy is reported relative to the population of 15 years and above that can’t
read or write (SIISE; Section: Educacion; Subsection: Educacion de la poblacion;
Variable: Analfabetismo; Source: Censo de Poblacion y Vivienda; Years: 1990, 2001,
2010; Disaggregation: Parroquia.). Data for Lican in 2001 is not reported.
Functional Illiteracy
Functional illiteracy is defined as the fraction of population 15 years and above
with less that 3 years of primary education (SIISE; Section: Educacion; Subsection:
Educacion de la poblacion; Variable: Analfabetismo funcional; Source: Censo de
Poblacion y Vivienda; Year: 1990; Disaggregation: Parroquia.). Data for Lican in
2001 is not reported.
Years of School
Is the average years of school (approved) for the population above 24 years (SI-
ISE; Section: Educacion; Subsection: Cobertura y acceso a la Educacion; Variable:
Escolaridad; Source: Censo de Poblacion y Vivienda; Years: 1990, 2001, 2010; Dis-
aggregation: Parroquia.). Data for Lican in 2001 is not reported.
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Secondary Enrollment.
Secondary enrollment is defined as the fraction of population between 12 and 17
years that assist to school (SIISE; Section: Educacion; Subsection: Cobertura y acceso
a la Educacion; Variable: Tasa bruta de asistencia; Source: Censo de Poblacion y
Vivienda; Reference Population: Tasa de asistencia secundaria; Years: 1990, 2001,
2010; Disaggregation: Parroquia.). Data for Lican in 2001 is not reported.
Share of Workers in Different Occupations
Population in the Agricultural Sector
The working population in the agricultural sector is defined as the number of individ-
uals that declared to be working in that sector. (SNI; Section: Economia; Subsection:
Ver Economia; Variable: Poblacion ocupada en agricultura, silvicultura, caza y pesca;
Source: Censo de Poblacion y Vivienda; Year: 1990; Disaggregation: Parroquia.)
Population in the Public Sector
The working population in the public sector is defined as the number of individuals
that declared to be working in that sector. (SNI; Section: Economia; Subsection:
Ver Economia; Variable: Poblacion ocupada en Administracion publica y defensa;
Source: Censo de Poblacion y Vivienda; Year: 1990; Disaggregation: Parroquia.)
Working Population
The working population in is defined as the number of individuals above 10 years
that during the census week declared a) worked at least one hour or b) had a job but
didn’t work (SNI; Section: Economia; Subsection: Ver Economia; Variable: Pobla-
cion ocupada; Source: Censo de Poblacion y Vivienda; Year: 1990; Disaggregation:
Parroquia.).
Satellite Lights
Night Light Intensity, as described in the text, is obtained from the National
Centers for Environmental Information. I use geospatial software to compute the
average night light intensity in a district by proceeding as follows. I first project the
raster data to the coordinate system UTM 17S and then overlay a political map of
Ecuador to calculate the average radiation in each district.
Road Density
Road density is defined as the total length of roads (considering changes in ele-
vation) divided by the surface area of a district. Total length is computed using a
GIS road network map of Ecuador available from the Military Geographic Institute
of Ecuador. Roads are classified by type as National (3), Local (4), Primary (14), or
Secondary (15), and by material: paved (1), not paved (2), temporary (3) or other
(4). Data of surface come from the administrative boundaries provided by INEC and
described in the geographic controls section.
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Data
Tax Forms
In this section I describe some details about the tax forms in Ecuador.
Firms
The two ways to operate a business in Ecuador is by either creating a Limited Liability
Company or by registering as as Sole Proprietor. Limited Liability Companies have
to fill the Form 101, while Sole Proprietors the Form 102. More properly, the 102
form is filled by individuals who report gross incomes above USD $300,000 other than
labor earnings, which could include that coming from business activities. Hence, I
make sure to only include in my sample individuals who report business income, as
they are considered a firm for tax purposes. More specifically, I consider as Sole
Proprietors the individuals who have filled the Form 102, and report non-missing
business revenue in the field labeled as “Total Ingresos”, which correspond to the
lines 699 for the years 2009-2013 and 6999 to the years 2014-2016.
There is also a sub category within Sole Proprietors that is not consider in the
analysis, referred as Regimen Impositivo Simplificado, which has been designed to
incentivize informal firms to pay taxes. They are not considered in this study as tax
records for this group has very limited information, given that the payments are a
lump-sum.
Individuals
Individual income taxes in Ecuador are reported through two different forms. The first
one, called Form 107, corresponds to people who only have incomes from dependent
employment, and so their taxes are deducted directly from their monthly salaries.
The Form 102 instead is filled individually by every person who has income from
other sources different from employed labor (aside from business income, it includes
self-employment, rents, dividends and capital income).
The Form 102 has a shorter version, namely the Form 102A, for individuals who
report gross income less than USD $300,000. An individual that has both income
from dependent employment and other sources must consolidate all the information
in the 102 form.
Matching of Records
Regarding to the matching between the information of owners and managers and
their corresponding tax records, Firms’ ID in the tax records are anonymized due to
privacy concerns. Hence, I first do the classification of firms as FM and EM using
the records of the Bureau of Companies and then give the tax authority the classified
list, so they can anonymize the firm’s ID to properly join with their tax records.
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Classification of Firms
Surnames
A significant part of the identification of family management inside a firm relies
on the comparison of surnames between upper-managers and owners. Therefore,
it is important to assure that this inference can be done with minimal error. The
assumption used in this paper is that managers and owners that share a surname
are family-related. This will be the case if surnames unequivocally reflect a family
relation. Although one share surnames with a family member, surnames are not
unique to each family. However, as long as they are distributed in such a way that
there is a sufficient number of rare surnames (to avoid mislabeling a family relation),
the identification through this method is a good approximation.
Consequently, this inference will be affected by the shape of the distribution of
surnames in the society. Figure B.1 provide evidence that the distribution of surnames
in Ecuador (for all individuals) is effectively skewed in the sense that although there
are a few individuals with really common surnames, most have unusual ones. Recently
Gu¨ell et al. (2015) have stressed how this property of the distribution of surnames in
Western societies facilitate the identification of family connections, when true family
linkages are unknown, and use it to recover estimates of intergenerational mobility
from cross-sectional data.
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Figure B.1: Distribution of First Surnames
Notes: Surnames were obtained from individual tax records publicly reported by the tax office in
their webpage for the period 2007-2016. Each number in the horizontal axis represent a surname,
so in total there are displayed 31677 different surnames.
Since the focus of this paper is to identify relations between managers and owners
within a very specific place, a firm, assuming the existence of a family linkage when
a surname is shared is more plausible in this context, than say, making the same
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inference for two randomly selected individuals. In addition, due to the access of
administrative records of family linkages, one can effectively verify to which extent
the surname methodology can identify family relations. The next section discuss the
results of this exercise.
True Family Linkages
Because of privacy concerns, I do not have direct access to the network data.
Instead, the SRI processed the information for me and return a list of family linkages
between manager’s and owners using the records of the Bureau of Companies. The
information was anonymized accordingly, and in addition was codified in such a way
that I cannot tell explicitly the relationship between two individuals. Instead, the
relationships where labeled into three categories. The first one refers to immediate
family, which includes parents, offsprings and spouses. The second refers to relations
built from the first category, which includes siblings, grandparents and mothers and
fathers in law. The third one includes cousins and uncles and more distant relatives
as great-grand parents.
In the text I comment that the network data has missing linkages due that it has
only included the individuals that have renewed their ID. However, another limitation
of using this network for the future is that even if today everybody will renew their
ID, individuals who passed away while having the previous ID will never show up
in the network built by the SRI. For example, if the parents of an individual never
renewed their ID and already passed away, that individual will appear in the network
as an orphan, making it impossible to connect with her siblings or further relatives.
Prevalence of Family-Managed Firms
Life-cycle Differences
Raw Data
In order to provide a more transparent depiction of the data, I first show averages
of firms’ size across ages for Family and Non-Family managed firms, in terms of
revenue and employment, by simply pooling firms for all the years data is available.
Figure B.2 show the average size of both class of firms as measured by employment. As
one can see, bin by bin, EM firms are not only in average larger, but their expansion
across bins is also of a higher magnitude when compared to FM firms. At age 20,
the gap between both type of firms is of an order of 5. Figure B.3 redo the exercise
but considering revenue as a measure of size. In this case the results reflect the same
pattern of employment, although the size of the age-differences is larger.
Further, Figure B.4 show the average size of Family and Non-Family managed
firms but without considering Sole-Proprietors. This exercise shows that Sole-Proprietors
push the average size of Family-Managed firms across age downwards, although the
gap with Non-Family Managed firms still remain, which is now in the order of 2.5
at age 20. This occur despite I only consider relatively large Sole Proprietors (Form
102), which according to the tax authority are those that have reported annual rev-
enue or costs higher than 300,000 USD, or have declared capital higher than 200,000
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Figure B.2: Average Size of Firms Across Age in Terms of Employment by Type of Man-
agement
Notes: Firms were classified as FM and EM according to the cut-off rule defined in (2.1) with
c¯ = 50%. The sample includes Limited Liability Companies and Sole Proprietors in every sector,
except the financial one, for the period 2009-2016. The averages were computed by simply pooling
data in each age category. Employment data was computed by adding up the total number of
workers from individual tax records (Form 107) by employer id.
USD1.
As mentioned in the text, there are discrepancies in the information of employment
when computed from the tax records of workers and that provided by the Bureau of
Companies. These discrepancies can be noted by comparing Figure B.4, in which
employment data is taken from tax records, with Figure B.4, which uses self-reported
data from the Bureau of Companies. Note that this comparison is done only for
Limited Liability Companies, as the Bureau does not have information of Sole Pro-
prietors. Although there are still difference in size across ages, EM firms appear to
be somehow smaller when using employment data from the Bureau of Companies.
In summary, simple exploration of the data through computation of averages by
age in the cross-section already suggests that EM firms are larger, and face a rapid
expansion as they age. The purpose of a more detailed estimation of the life-cycle
patterns of both type of firms, as done in Section 2.3, is to control for several other
forces that could be driving these gaps.
1A Sole Proprietor that exports, despite its size, is also considered in this group.
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Figure B.3: Average Size of Firms Across Age in Terms of Revenue by Type of Manage-
ment
Notes: Firms were classified as FM and EM according to the cut-off rule defined in (2.1) with
c¯ = 50%. The sample includes Limited Liability Companies and Sole Proprietors in every sector,
except the financial one, for the period 2009-2016. The averages were computed by simply pooling
data in each age category. Revenue is Real Revenue, deflated using the CPI.
Comparison with Hsieh and Klenow (2014)
For comparison purposes, I follow a similar methodology as Hsieh and Klenow
(2014) and compute the life-cycle profile of firms treating the data as repeated cross
sections, but controlling for 6-industry codes, and so exploiting the variation within
industry. To do so, I estimate the following specification for each type of firm,
log(ej,t) = α + θc + δt +
∑
b∈B
λbD
b
j,t + errorj,t (B.1)
where ej,t is the number of worker of firm j, at time t; θc represent a vector of
6-digit industry fixed effects; δt is a vector of time period dummies, while B
a
j,t is a
dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm’s age belong to the category
b ∈ B = {< 5, 5− 9, 10− 14, 15− 19, 20− 24, 25− 29, 30− 34, 35− 39, 40+}, which
are the same categories age categories used by Hsieh and Klenow (2014). The results
of this exercise are plotted in Figure B.6.
Interestingly, this exercise produce results very similar to those reported in Hsieh
and Klenow (2014). That is, the gap in life cycle gap profiles between EM and FM
firms are on the same order of magnitude as the gap between USA and Mexico both
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Figure B.4: Average Size of Firms Across Age in Terms of Employment by Type of Man-
agement (Only LLC)
Notes: Firms were classified as FM and EM according to the cut-off rule defined in (2.1) with
c¯ = 50%. The sample includes only Limited Liability Companies in every sector, except the financial
one, for the period 2009-2016. The averages were computed by simply pooling data in each age
category. Employment data was computed by adding up the total number of workers from individual
tax records (Form 107) by employer id.
at age 20-24 and above 40. Note also that in this case the shape of the age-differences
display a convex form, instead of the concave one that appear when exploiting the
panel structure of the data.
Robustness of the Results to Sample Selection
As discussed above, the universe of firms considered in this study includes Sole
Proprietors, which by definition are classified as Family-Managed firms, since owner-
ship falls in one individual which at the same time is its Legal Representative, or the
principal manager of the firm. Given that these firms represent 46% of the total num-
ber of observations, they may disproportionately affect the estimation of the life-cycle
profile of FM firms. In order to see if that is the case, I estimate (2.2) but without
considering this group. Figure B.7 show the results. Although the gap between both
class of firms is still present, now its size reduces to 1.5 at age 20. Hence, even when
Sole Proprietors push the gap upward (as anticipated by Figure B.4), the life-cycle
differences continue to show.
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Figure B.5: Average Size of Firms Across Age in Terms of Employment by Type of Man-
agement (Only LLC)
Notes: Firms were classified as FM and EM according to the cut-off rule defined in (2.1) with c¯ =
50%. The sample includes only Limited Liability Companies in every sector, except the financial one,
for the period 2009-2016. The averages were computed by simply pooling data in each age category.
Employment data come from self-reported information provided by the Bureau of Companies.
Robustness of the Results to Firm’s Classification
In this section I reestimate the life-cycle profiles employing the specification (2.2),
but changing the criteria used to classify FM firms as defined in (2.1) by employing a
different cut-off. Figure B.8 show the results when the cut-off is changed to c¯ = 25%.
That is, now a firm is labeled as Family Managed if the principal manager is related
with a family that controls more than 25% of the ownership of the firm. This is a
more relaxed threshold and so will now include a larger group of FM firms, as shown
in Table 2.3. When using that classification criteria, the gap at age 20 between both
type of firms shrinks relative to the baseline estimates, and is of the order of 1.5. This
is likely to reflect the inclusion of firms where ownership is not fully diversified, and
so a manager still has some non-mayority control of the firm. However, the change is
not substantial due to the overall little dispersion of ownership seen in the data.
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Figure B.6: Life-cycle Profile of Family Managed and Non-Family Managed Firms (Manu-
facture)
Notes: Estimated by (B.1). Firms were classified according to the cut-off rule defined in (2.1) with
c¯ = 50%. The sample includes the universe of all formal firms in Ecuador, both Limited Liability
Companies and Sole Proprietors, except the financial sector, for the period 2007-2016. Age equal
one is the base category. Employment is the number of workers formally registered with the firm,
that is, those that reported being employed by the firm in the Form 107.
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Figure B.7: Life-cycle Profile of Family Managed and Non-Family Managed Firms (Only
LLC)
Notes: Estimated by (2.2). Firms were classified according to the cut-off rule defined in (2.1) with
c¯ = 50%. The sample includes the universe of all Limited Liability Companies, except the financial
sector, for the period 2007-2016. Age equal one is the base category. Revenue is Real Revenue,
deflated using the CPI.
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Figure B.8: Life-cycle Profile of Family Managed and Non-Family Managed Firms (25%
Cut-off)
Notes: Estimated by (2.2). Firms were classified according to the cut-off rule defined in (2.1) with
c¯ = 25%. The sample includes the universe of all formal firms in Ecuador, both Limited Liability
Companies and Sole Proprietors, except the financial sector, for the period 2009-2016. Age equal
one is the base category. Revenue is Real Revenue, deflated using the CPI.
187
Equilibrium
This section describes in detail the equilibrium of the model. First, introduce the
notation of z+ and z− as the upper and lower levels of the productivity distribution.
Now, using equations (2.10) and (2.15), the equilibrium in the managerial market is
defined by,
(
θ − 1
θ
µh
)θ (
wh
wn
)θ−1
θ
θ − 1 =
∫ z+
z∗
(
z
φ
(1− α) 1γ
(
φ(1− γ)
wh
) 1
γ
(
α
wn
) α
γ(1−α)
− h¯
φ
)
dµ(z)
=
h¯
φ
∫ z+
z∗
(
1
z∗
− 1
z
)
zdµ(z)
(B.2)
where the last line uses the optimal cut-off (2.9). Equivalently, by using the equi-
librium cut-off (2.9), from equations (2.11) and (2.16), the equilibrium in the labor
market is given by
1−
(
θ − 1
θ
µh
)θ (
wh
wn
)θ
=
(
α
wn
) 1
1−α
h¯1−γ
[∫ z∗
z−
zγdµ(z) +
∫ z+
z∗
z∗
γ−1
zdµ(z)
]
(B.3)
Observe that in an equilibrium with entrants, the free entry condition is,
ce =
∫
V (z, wn, wh)ν(z)dz (B.4)
Now, let Γ be the transition matrix for the productivity z, of size nz × nz, with
nz being the number of productivity levels. The elements of this matrix are: Pi,j =
Pr(Zt+1 = zj | Zt = zi). Since z grows deterministically, Pi,j=i+1 = 1 for j < nz and
Pnz ,nz = 1. In the stationary equilibrium, the distribution of firms is given by,
µ(z) = (1− λ)Γ′µ(z) +Mν(z)
= µ(z)Γ˜ +Mν(z)
(B.5)
where Γ˜ = (1 − λ)Γ′. Therefore, the stationary distribution of firms can be written
as,
µ(z) = M
(
I − Γ˜
)−1
ν(z) (B.6)
Then, by using (B.6) as the distribution, equations (B.2), (B.3) and (B.4) are a
system of equations that solve the equilibrium mass of entrants, M , the managerial
compensation rate, wh, and the wage rate, wn.
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Computation of Equilibrium
The algorithm used to compute the equilibrium is quite standard. I first start
with a guess of the values of wn, wh and M , and then solve the static problems of
both type of firms, the optimal decision of what type of management they chose, as
well as the dynamic program by iterating in the value function. I then verify that
both labor and managerial markets clear, and that the free entry condition holds,
and continue updating prices until that is the case.
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